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SAMUEL BESWICK

Retroactive Adjudication
abstrac t. This Article defends the retroactive nature of judicial lawmaking. Recent Supreme
Court judgments have reignited debate on the retroactivity of novel precedent. When a court announces a new rule, does it apply only to future cases or also to disputes arising in the past? This
Article shows that the doctrine of non-retroactive adjudication oﬀers no adequate answer. In attempting to articulate a law of non-retroactivity, the Supreme Court has cycled through ﬁve ﬂawed
frameworks. It has variously characterized adjudicative non-retroactivity as (1) a problem of legal
philosophy; (2) a discretionary exercise for balancing competing right and reliance interests; (3) a
matter of choice of law; (4) a remedial issue; and (5) a contingency of last resort. This Article
rejects these paradigms and instead oﬀers an alternative framework grounded in conventional
common-law reasoning: that judicial precedent is inherently retroactive. The “equitable considerations” animating this body of law can best be fulﬁlled by judicial abandonment of non-retroactivity doctrine. Instead, courts should respond to “new” law by turning to a long-held value in our
legal system: that equity aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights.
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retroactive adjudication

introduction
The temporal scope of judicial decisions has long been “among the most difﬁcult of those [issues] which have engaged the attention of courts.” 1 When a
court announces a new rule, does the new rule apply only to future cases or also
to disputes arising in the past?
Over the past half century, the Supreme Court has addressed this temporal
puzzle primarily through the lens of non-retroactivity doctrine. This doctrine,
also known as “prospective overruling” of the law, deﬁes the conventional conception of common-law adjudication whereby judicial decisions both bear upon
past events and lay down the law for future cases. Non-retroactive adjudication
constrains the eﬀects of judicial changes in the law from applying to the past.
Only events postdating a new precedent are treated as governed by it. Litigants’
rights to legal recourse under this doctrine are thus determined according to the
timing and outcome of any relevant leading case.
Federal non-retroactivity doctrine peaked during the Warren Court era. It
now seems destined for demise before the Roberts Court. While scholars continue to argue that non-retroactivity is a useful paradigm, this Article contends
that it is not. To the contrary, non-retroactive adjudication is a defective and superﬂuous doctrine. It lacks a coherent and generally accepted rationale. There is
no agreement within the judiciary or academe as to how the doctrine should be
conceived. Non-retroactivity cannot even perform its basic job: to rationalize
and contain the temporal scope of novel precedent.
This Article advances an alternative framework for understanding novel
precedent, one that returns to conventional common-law reasoning. This framework orients judges’ focus toward the claims that come immediately before their
courts—those over which they have direct jurisdiction. It embraces the retroactivity of judicial precedent. Disputes over rights, adjudicated by courts, can only
be resolved from the perspective of hindsight, and they cannot feasibly be insulated from developments in precedent. Precedent today necessarily informs our
understanding of past rights. That does not mean, however, that new rights of
action are unlimited in temporal scope. Rather, interests of justice and fairness
are embodied in long-recognized temporal limits on plaintiﬀs’ rights to obtain
relief from a court.
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the temporal scope of novel precedent has
eﬀectively been dormant since the mid-1990s.2 But recent judgments have reignited the retroactivity debate. A�er the Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges
declared that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees same-sex couples a right
1.
2.

Chicot Cty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940).
See infra Section I.D.
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to marry, 3 attention turned to the judgment’s remedial implications. Many
scholars encourage “backdating” same-sex marriage to vindicate the rights of
those previously denied the constitutional protection. 4 They argue, for example,
that where a same-sex spouse passed away before Obergefell was handed down,
courts should uphold the partner’s claims to surviving-spouse pension beneﬁts
or to the primary share of the deceased’s estate by treating the couple as retroactively married in law. 5 Others counsel restraining the judgment’s retroactive effects to protect prior reliance interests and the ﬁnality of past transactions. 6
These scholars are concerned that, among other things, retroactive expansion of
spousal property rights and liabilities under Obergefell would likely not have been
anticipated and accounted for by same-sex couples—nor, indeed, by their creditors (who may gain access to newly deemed community property) or by those
with whom they entered (now potentially voidable) transactions. Both of the
competing “right” and “reliance” arguments are compelling.
A similar dynamic has followed the Court’s decision in Janus v. AFSCME,
which held that the deduction of union agency fees from nonconsenting publicsector employees violated the First Amendment. 7 Immediately following the
judgment, plaintiﬀs sought to vindicate their newly announced rights through
lawsuits ﬁled across the country demanding recovery of fees paid before Janus
was decided. Some scholars believe such plaintiﬀs have good constitutional and
private-law grounds, given that Janus held that these fees were unconstitutional. 8 Others do not, on the grounds that agency fees “were indisputably

3.
4.

5.

576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015).
See, e.g., Peter Nicolas, Backdating Marriage, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 395, 395-96, 425-41 (2017);
Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Loving Retroactivity, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 383 passim (2018);
Kate Shoemaker, Post-Deportation Remedy and Windsor’s Promise, 63 UCLA L. REV. 168 passim
(2016); Lee-ford Tritt, Moving Forward by Looking Back: The Retroactive Application of Obergefell, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 873 passim; see also Michael J. Higdon, While They Waited: Pre-Obergefell Lives and the Law of Nonmarriage, 129 YALE L.J.F. 1, 1 (2019) (discussing how the courts
must “wrestle with the question whether any portion of a pre-Obergefell relationship should
count toward the length of the ensuing marriage”).
See, e.g., Nicolas, supra note 4, at 398, 402; Tritt, supra note 4, at 922.

6.

See, e.g., Andrea B. Carroll & Christopher K. Odinet, Gay Marriage and the Problem of Property,
93 WASH. U. L. REV. 847, 851-54 (2016); see also Huiyi Chen, Balancing Implied Fundamental
Rights and Reliance Interests: A Framework for Limiting the Retroactive Eﬀects of Obergefell in
Property Cases, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1417, 1420, 1435-49 (2016) (describing the potential for “signiﬁcant disruption of settled property interests due to the retroactive application” of Obergefell).

7.

Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018), overruling Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).

8.

E.g., William Baude & Eugene Volokh, Compelled Subsidies and the First Amendment, 132 HARV.
L. REV. 171, 172, 203 (2018).
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lawful” at the time of collection. 9 Since fee refunds could bankrupt unions, these
scholars would limit the retroactive eﬀect of Janus to protect union coﬀers based
on the unions’ reasonable reliance on the state of the law at the time agency fees
were collected. 10
This tension between newly declared rights and reliance on prior established
rights arises whenever a court “changes” the law as previously understood.
Claims for restitution of unlawful taxes are another prominent example. When
a court strikes down a taxing statute or overrules prior precedent, its new precedent presents plaintiﬀs with a compelling claim to a remedy for their unlawfully
impinged rights. 11 Prima facie, plaintiﬀs are entitled to restitution of taxes improperly paid. 12 There should, a�er all, be no taxation without (valid) legislation. But defendant states and municipalities have a compelling counterargument: that their treasuries should not be vulnerable to extensive money claims
based on interpretations of law that were not known at the time of collection.13
The stakes are high. In the leading Supreme Court case on recovery of unconstitutional taxes, $1.8 billion of tax revenue hinged on the retroactivity of the Supreme Court’s new precedent. 14 In the United Kingdom, £55 billion of tax revenue was thought to be at stake a�er tax provisions were retrospectively found to
be incompatible with European Union law. 15
Similar concerns arise when the public- and private-party interests are inverted. Where private entities have beneﬁted from a precedent that is later overruled, states may be able to seek backward-looking remedies under the new precedent. For example, for half a century, federal doctrine exempted businesses that

9.

Aaron Tang & Fred O. Smith Jr., Can Unions Be Sued for Following the Law?, 132 HARV. L. REV.
F. 24, 24 (2018); see also Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine L. Fisk, Exaggerating the Eﬀects of
Janus: A Reply to Professors Baude and Volokh, 132 HARV. L. REV. F. 42, 43-54 (2018) (arguing
that unions are not retroactively liable under Janus).
10. See Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 9, at 53-54; Tang & Smith, supra note 9, at 30-37.
11.

See, e.g., McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 31-33 (1990).
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 19(1) (AM. LAW INST.
2011).
13. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 183 (1990) (plurality opinion) (“[W]e think
it unjust to impose this burden [of retroactive tax refunds] when the State relied on valid,
existing precedent in enacting and implementing its tax.”).
14.

See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 130 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The
States estimate that their total liability will exceed $1.8 billion.”).

15.

Charles Mitchell, End of the Road for the Overpaid Tax Litigation?, 9 U.K. SUP. CT. Y.B. 1, 1
(2018).
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had no “physical presence” in a state from state sales tax. 16 When the Supreme
Court was invited in South Dakota v. Wayfair to overrule the physical-presence
rule, 17 the respondent businesses implored judicial restraint, warning that overruling the long-standing precedent would “expose all remote sellers that have
relied on the rule to retroactive liability in dozens, if not hundreds, or even thousands of jurisdictions.” 18 The temporal repercussions of adjudication are pervasive, and managing them may seem irresoluble.
The solution to this puzzle does not lie in denying the retroactive eﬀects of
novel precedent. A familiar ﬂaw in theories of non-retroactivity is failure to appreciate adjudication as a dynamic experience. 19 Part I of this Article shows that
novel judgments do not simply replace “old” law with “new” law. Rules and principles are constantly subject to elaboration, challenge, and revision. Judgments
do not apparate. They proceed from a background of complaint and litigation.
The stakes are set long before issues reach a courtroom. In this context, novel
judgments may be considered surprising, but they are never wholly a surprise.
The protest that novel precedent unpredictably “changes” past law on which parties may have “relied” is thus overwrought. Since interpretation of law is not
divisible into static points in time, adjudicating courts can only coherently understand past rights in light of prevailing law. Judicial precedent is by nature
retroactive: there is no prospectivity puzzle at all.
This Article advances two core contributions to non-retroactivity scholarship. First, Part II challenges the prevailing rationales for non-retroactivity

16.

See South Dakota v. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2091-92 (2018) (describing the physical-presence rule and tracing it to Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967));
see also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 301-02 (1992) (declining to overrule Bellas
Hess).
17. 138 S. Ct. at 2087-88.
18.

Respondents’ Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 35, Wayfair, 138 S. Ct.
2080 (No. 17-494); see Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2104 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer, Sotomayor
& Kagan, JJ., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for overruling the Court’s established precedent when instead Congress could legislate and “provide a nuanced answer to the troubling
question whether any change will have retroactive eﬀect”); Michael T. Fatale, Wayfair, What’s
Fair, and Undue Burden, 22 CHAP. L. REV. 19, 34-35, 42-43 (2019) (discussing the possible retroactive eﬀects of Wayfair); cf. Richard D. Pomp, Wayfair: Its Implications and Missed Opportunities, 58 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 14 (2019) (noting that “the states seem not to be applying
Wayfair retroactively”).
19. Cf. HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM & RETHINKING PRIVATE
LAW THEORY 63-65 (2013) [hereina�er DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING] (discussing “the intrinsic
dynamism of law”); Hanoch Dagan, The Real Legacy of American Legal Realism, 38 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 123, 144 (2018) [hereina�er Dagan, American Legal Realism] (discussing how
“law is a dynamic institution”). But see Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055 passim (1997) (considering how the dynamic nature
of lawmaking implicates conceptions of retroactivity).
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doctrine in federal law. It identiﬁes in the case law and commentary several distinct frameworks. Each framework misconceives the essence of the temporal
problem and relies on distinctions that are arbitrary and manipulable. Non-retroactive adjudication simply has no principled foundation.
Second, Part III oﬀers an alternative framework grounded in conventional
common-law reasoning: that judicial precedent is inherently retroactive. Since
adjudication is dynamic, the essential question is not when it is that law is
changed, but rather when it is that plaintiﬀs can “timely challenge” the validity
of legal rules aﬀecting them. 20 This inquiry—the time at which “novel” rights of
action become justiciable—asks when a plaintiﬀ incurred the complained-of
harm. As a general matter, when a court ﬁnds with hindsight that there has been
a violation of a plaintiﬀ ’s right, the violation should be remedied according to
prevailing law at the time of judgment. In most cases, that will be the end of the
matter. In exceptional cases, where the extent of such relief would be unduly
prejudicial to defendants, courts can invoke the equitable doctrine of laches,
among other possible tools, to constrain the scope of litigation. A�er Janus, for
example, a court might well be justiﬁed in limiting those who sued in Janus’s
wake to a recovery period much shorter than that provided by the statute of limitations. Judges need not deny claims entirely by resorting to the sledgehammer
of non-retroactivity doctrine. The response to “new” law advanced in this Article
reﬂects a long-held value in our legal system: that equity aids the vigilant, not
those who sleep on their rights. 21
i. the puzzle of novel precedent
Whenever a court delivers a novel precedent 22—a judgment that determines
a new rule of law or overrules a prior rule—the decision carries implications for

20.

Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018); see Elizabeth Earle Beske, Backdoor Balancing and
the Consequences of Legal Change, 94 WASH. L. REV. 645, 645 (2019) (describing Lucia as heralding the Court’s “next big retroactivity challenge”).
21. JAMES W. EATON, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 52 (1901) (“Vigilantibus non dormientibus æquitas subvenit.”).
22. This Article addresses only adjudicative (non-)retroactivity, not legislative (non-)retroactivity,
which involves quite diﬀerent considerations. See BEN JURATOWITCH, RETROACTIVITY AND
THE COMMON LAW 67-118 (2008); CHARLES SAMPFORD, RETROSPECTIVITY AND THE RULE OF
LAW 103-64 (2006); Neil Duxbury, Ex Post Facto Law, 58 AM. J. JURIS. 135, 158-61 (2013); J.
Lyn Entrikin, The Death of Common Law, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 351, 424 (2019). But cf.
Jonathan S. Masur & Adam K. Mortara, Patents, Property, and Prospectivity, 71 STAN. L. REV.
963, 997 (2019) (“There is no reason to deprive patent policymakers of the tool of prospective
lawmaking just because those policymakers happen to be judges, rather than legislators or
executive oﬃcials.”).
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similarly situated parties. 23 Some will seem to gain and others to lose substantive
rights in light of the newly determined rule. Without some mechanism to limit
the repercussions of adjudicative change, people, institutions, and courts may
face considerable challenges reconciling parties’ conﬂicting claims to rights.
This Part introduces the problems with novel precedent that have caused
courts to entertain the idea of limiting their retroactive reach. It begins by outlining the puzzle of adjudication’s temporal implications. It then addresses the
retroactive nature of adjudication and sets the scope of this Article, before turning to summarize the development and decline of non-retroactivity doctrine over
the past century. 24
A. The Temporal Puzzle
The doctrine of stare decisis guides lower courts to follow precedent when
issues reappear before them. 25 This reinforces the rule-of-law principle that like
cases should be treated alike. 26 It is conceptually easy for a judge to apply precedent to resolve a dispute that arose a�er that precedent was delivered because no
temporal conﬂict arises. It is harder when parties have ordered their aﬀairs and
conducted transactions on the basis of the law as it stood (or was understood)
prior to a new precedent being delivered. In these cases, to apply a new rule of
law that the parties did not appreciate at the time of their transaction would seem
to undercut the parties’ reliance interests. It is not clear that justice is served by
applying new law to such antecedent claims. 27
Kermit Roosevelt poses the problem this way: consider two parties who
transact at Time 1. A dispute arises that, under the settled law at the time of
transacting, would be resolved in favor of Party A, so Party A ﬁles suit. At Time
2, the Supreme Court delivers a novel precedent in another case that changes the
relevant legal rule. It might do so by striking down a statute or overruling a
23.

LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 216 (3d ed. 2000).
This Article does not draw a sharp distinction between the quite problematic terms “retroactive” and “retrospective,” although some scholars do. See SAMPFORD, supra note 22, at 21-23
(noting that “this distinction is made by many” who write on the temporal implications of
novel precedent, but claiming that “it is not as important as ordinarily assumed”).
25. See William Baude, Precedent and Discretion, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 313, 314-29 (2020) (contending that the Roberts Court has introduced elements of arbitrary discretion into modern stare
decisis doctrine).
24.

26.

GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 86 (1985); BENJAMIN N.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 33-34 (1921); cf. Andrei Marmor, Should Like
Cases Be Treated Alike?, 11 LEGAL THEORY 27, 27 (2005) (arguing that the principle “like cases
should be treated alike” is o�en confused with two other ideas: “the rationale of analogical
reasoning in adjudication” and “the value of coherence”).
27. See infra Section II.B.
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precedent that had supported the earlier rule. This new precedent favors Party
B’s position. At Time 3, the parties’ dispute reaches a court. Should the court
resolve the dispute by applying the rule prevailing at the time of the parties’
transaction (Time 1) or at the time the court delivers its decision (Time 3)? 28 In
other words, should the new rule inﬂuence the outcome of cases that arose before the rule was explicitly articulated?
For clarity, we can designate the parties to the Supreme Court’s novel decision as the “principal” parties. Our concern is with the precedent’s impact on
other, “successive” parties. Applying the transaction-time law (so that Party A
prevails) would seem to vindicate successive parties’ reliance interests, whereas
applying the decision-time law (so that Party B prevails) would seem to vindicate the parties’ rights as understood in the law’s best light. This scenario illustrates the problem that drives judicial non-retroactivity jurisprudence. The
problem is not simply that applying a novel precedent to antecedent disputes
subordinates the expectations that parties may have had about their rights and
duties at the time of their transaction. The problem is that handing down such
a precedent itself changes parties’ expectations. The novel precedent gives Party
B reason to expect to prevail where they otherwise might not have. And it does
so for everyone in society who acted on the basis of the “old” law—the law as it
was understood before the Supreme Court determined the principal parties’
case. Thus, the problem with novel precedent is its tendency to disrupt people’s
expectations and beliefs about their rights and duties across society. People and
institutions who planned, acted, or transacted at a time when the law was understood to be X come to be alerted that the law is ¬X. This creates potential for
great disruption to future expectations and past transactions.
Huiyi Chen shows that similar problems arise when, varying Roosevelt’s scenario, the “events or facts giving rise to the [successive plaintiﬀ ’s] legal claim
occur” at Time 1, and only a�er the new rule is delivered in the principal case at
Time 2 does the plaintiﬀ ﬁle suit. 29 This too is a hard case because the relevant
legal rule changes between the time of the alleged wrong and the time the wrong
is litigated. There are many reasons why people might not litigate until a�er a
relevant rule changes in their favor, not the least of which is that while precedent
stood against them, such parties would have thought they had a losing case.
Much of the post-Obergefell and post-Janus litigation exempliﬁes this problem:
that novel precedent can have cascading eﬀects by inspiring other materially similar parties to pursue their own rights of action.

28.

Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory Is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075, 1080-81 (1999).

29.

Chen, supra note 6, at 1422-23; see David Lehn, Adjudicative Retroactivity as a Preclusion Problem: Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 563, 565 (2004).
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Roosevelt’s scenario concerns the eﬀects of novel precedent on pending cases
before a court, and Chen’s scenario, the eﬀects on subsequent cases ﬁled in court.
In both scenarios, unfairness seems inescapable regardless of whether the successive court applies the new rule or the old rule to the dispute before it. Since in
both scenarios, the underlying dispute arose at a time when the old rule apparently governed, each side can stand on either right or reliance to argue that their
preferred rule should determine their dispute. 30 Each side can invoke notions of
fairness 31 and eﬃciency 32 to support their argument. How should courts sort
between applying old law and new?
B. Adjudication’s Inherent Retroactivity
This Article’s thesis is that this is the wrong question. That is because the
“old”-law versus “new”-law framing rests on a false dichotomy. As Paul Mishkin
recognized over half a century ago, this paradigm oversimpliﬁes the adjudicatory
role. 33 Adjudication is an inherently backward-looking exercise: cases can only
come to the courts via (past) disputes that judges must (now) resolve. 34 In this
30.
31.

See infra Section II.B.
See Chen, supra note 6, at 1435; Fisch, supra note 19, at 1085-86; Pamela J. Stephens, The New
Retroactivity Doctrine: Equality, Reliance and Stare Decisis, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1515, 1560-61
(1998).

32.

See SAMPFORD, supra note 22, at 221, 236-38; Fisch, supra note 19, at 1088-91; Louis Kaplow,
An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 520-66, 598-602 (1986) (evaluating strategies for managing legal transitions and contending that non-retroactivity of new
rules is ineﬃcient because market actors already absorb risks of legal change); cf. Jonathan S.
Masur & Jonathan Remy Nash, The Institutional Dynamics of Transition Relief, 85 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 391, 394 (2010) (“Recent commentary . . . questions the scope of Kaplow’s claim. Scholars have pointed out that considerations of eﬃciency, incentives for socially desirable investments, governmental legitimacy, and fairness might justify legal transition relief.”); Anthony
Niblett, Delaying Declarations of Constitutional Invalidity, in THE TIMING OF LAWMAKING 299,
319 (Frank Fagan & Saul Levmore eds., 2017) (arguing that prospective constitutional remedies can mitigate some of the costs of legal transitions, which “may be socially valuable in
particular circumstances”). See generally Kyle D. Logue, Legal Transitions, Rational Expectations,
and Legal Progress, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 211 passim (2003) (assessing the consequentialist transition frameworks that can account for adjudicative retroactivity).

33.

See Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and
Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 56-60 (1965).

34.

See id. at 60-72 (1965) (discussing institutional, symbolic, and functional explanations for
adjudicative retroactivity); see also Herman Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process:
A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 720-23 (1966) (partially criticizing Mishkin for failing to embrace a fully retroactive conception of adjudication); Bradley Scott Shannon, The Retroactive and Prospective Application of Judicial Decisions, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
811, 838-62 (2003) (discussing the retroactive nature of the adjudicative function); Harry H.
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context, there can be no clean separation between “old” law and “new.” Interpretation of the law is not a static inquiry. It is informed by legal authorities that—
themselves a product of adjudication—build over time. Judges interpret “old”
law with hindsight from their present-day perspective, and they determine
“new” law by ruling today on past disputes. This process inevitably generates
contests in interpretive perspectives. The same judgment can be seen both as a
(mere) evolution from prior law and as a (radical) change in the law.35 The Supreme Court’s judgments in Obergefell, Janus, and Wayfair exemplify the point.
There is a real sense in which these judgments were “new” law: they overturned
prior authorities and upheld rights previously unrecognized by federal precedent. But there is also a real sense in which these judgments were not new: they
rested on long-developed constitutional authority (interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment, the First Amendment, and the Commerce Clause, respectively)
and aﬃrmed rights internalized by claimants, the judicial recognition of which
had long been publicly pursued. The judgments did not suddenly appear one
day out of a blue sky. Owing to the process of dispute and public litigation by
which these cases rose through the courts, it cannot be said that these novel precedents, on the day they were handed down, would have taken any prudent observer of the law wholly by surprise.
Jill E. Fisch has explored how the dynamic nature of adjudication implicates
conceptions of judicial retroactivity, and her work presents a model for analyzing
the stability of rules of law. 36 Some legal rules can be understood as long-standing, settled, predictable, and o�-relied upon (and so in a “stable equilibrium”),
while other rules are unpredictable and in a state of ﬂux such that it would be

Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 254-58 (1973) (discussing “whether a court, when dealing with a rule
justiﬁed by a principle, may overrule a prior decision prospectively, or whether, as at common
law, a retroactive overruling is required,” and concluding that “the answer is retroactive or not
at all”); Andrew J. Wistrich, The Evolving Temporality of Lawmaking, 44 CONN. L. REV. 737,
763-77 (2012) (acknowledging that “[a]djudication is inherently backward-looking” because
“[i]t addresses past events, and it does so primarily in light of previously existing law,” but
discussing how “common law adjudication always has been less past-oriented than is widely
thought, and it has become even less so in recent decades”).
35. See Fisch, supra note 19, at 1071 (considering the diﬃculty of “determining whether adjudication has created a new legal rule at all”); Mishkin, supra note 33, at 60 (noting that “even when
‘new law’ must be made, it is o�en in fact a matter of the court articulating particular clear
implications of values so generally shared in the society that the process might well be characterized as declaring a preexisting law” (footnote omitted)); infra Section II.A.2.
36.

Fisch, supra note 19 passim; see also Dagan, American Legal Realism, supra note 19, at 134 (describing how “legal discourse tends to develop in a pattern of repeated shi�s . . . between periods of ﬁxity and periods of innovation and change”); Hanoch Dagan, Doctrinal Categories,
Legal Realism, and the Rule of Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1889, 1904 (2015) (same).
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unreasonable to assume they will not change (an “unstable equilibrium”). 37 Retroactive law may be justiﬁed to bring certainty to unstable rules. 38 The opposite
generally holds for stable rules: retroactive change tends to be unjustiﬁably disruptive. 39 This captures an essential distinction between legislation and judgemade law. 40 Legislation typically aﬀects or overrides stable rules, hence the rule
of law’s general prohibition on retroactive legislation. By contrast, “adjudication
will rarely disturb a stable equilibrium.” 41 This is due to the restrained nature of
the adjudicative process:
The lawmaking power of the courts is restrained by their inability to control their lawmaking agenda in a way that the legislative power is not.
Courts can make law only as a by-product of deciding cases and, for the
most part, have little role in determining which issues come before them
for decision. Within the context of deciding a particular case, courts are
further constrained by the requirement that their rules be tied to an explicit text or to common law precedents. In either case, the reasoned elaboration that provides legitimacy to judge-made rules demands that a
court employ accepted interpretive principles rather than making naked
policy judgments. 42
This seems right: judicial lawmaking is a backward-looking and comparatively modest lawmaking process. Fisch postulates, however, that a novel judgment would be “revolutionary” when it disrupts stable legal rules. 43 Fisch gives
as examples “[d]ecisions in which the Supreme Court overrules its own precedent or fashions a new principle of constitutional law.” 44 Such judicial
37.
38.

39.

See Fisch, supra note 19, at 1100-11 (developing these ideas).
Id. at 1109 (“The likelihood of legal change in an unstable equilibrium makes reliance on the
legal status quo unreasonable and thereby mitigates potential fairness problems arising out of
retroactivity.”); id. at 1123 (explaining that in an unstable equilibrium, “retroactive lawmaking
is an appropriate and eﬃcient means of clarifying, correcting, and incrementally adjusting the
regulatory climate”).
Id. at 1105 (arguing that “[t]he existence of a stable equilibrium justiﬁes the protection of
reliance-based interests” via non-retroactive application of new rules).

40.

See id. at 1118 (“[A]s a descriptive matter, revolutionary legal change is most commonly associated with the legislative process and . . . adjudicative lawmaking is typically evolutionary.”);
see also Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 311-12 (1994) (“The principle that statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial decisions operate retrospectively, is familiar to
every law student.” (quoting United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79 (1982))).
41. Fisch, supra note 19, at 1107.
42.

Id.
Id. at 1102 (“[W]e can associate disturbance of a stable equilibrium with revolutionary change.
In an unstable equilibrium, evolutionary change is suﬃcient to produce a new position.”).
44. Id. at 1107-08.
43.
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lawmaking, Fisch argues, more closely resembles legislating and warrants “the
temporal ﬂexibility of nonretroactivity.” 45 Indeed, Fisch suggests that “constitutional change frequently disrupts a stable equilibrium,” generating “substantial
transition costs” that should not be compounded through retroactive application
of novel precedent. 46
On this point, this Article pushes back on Fisch’s theory. Certainly, it is illuminating to consider the temporality of judge-made law in terms of stable and
unstable equilibria. Some rules can be seen as more stable than others, and their
stability may vary over time. But the move from stability to instability of judgemade law is more ﬂuid than Fisch’s theory suggests. 47 It is not obvious that “substantial force” is required for an apparently stable judicial rule to become unstable. 48 A rule progresses to instability when it becomes subject to question, goodfaith disagreement, and ultimately litigation. Litigation itself can expose the façade of a stable equilibrium by publicly calling into question the current authoritative force of a rule. (This is not at all comparable to the legislative process. The
process of proposing and debating a bill does not itself make current law more
unstable, since it is clear that a bill is not law.) As dispute over a rule gains traction, and especially as the dispute works its way through and up the court system, the rule is surely in an unstable equilibrium. 49 Ultimately, an appellate court
will be required to determine the state of the law to resolve the dispute. It will
do so by employing accepted interpretive principles that are informed by legal
authorities and assessing the dispute with retrospect to restore certainty over the
issue and to reestablish stability. 50
45.

Id. at 1108.
46. Id.
47.

Equilibrium theory perhaps better explains legislative (non-)retroactivity than adjudicative
(non-)retroactivity. Typically, when Congress enacts a statute to reform the law on some issue,
it does so not because the superseded law was unclear or unstable, but because it was unpopular as compared to the newly enacted law. Such statutes should apply prospectively so as not
to disturb the stable equilibrium of the prior law. By contrast, when a statute as enacted produces confused or unexpected interpretations, the law may be in an unstable equilibrium. The
only way to restore stability may be for Congress to pass corrective or curative legislation with
retroactive eﬀect. See id. at 1105-18.

48.

See id. at 1105 (“A stable equilibrium can be disrupted, but only through the application of
substantial force.”). Moreover, it may only be with the beneﬁt of hindsight that we can assess
the nature of the equilibrium at issue.
49. In adjudicating a novel claim, how can a court ever “conclude[] that the law is in a stable
equilibrium” while the court’s judgment is eﬀecting “legal change . . . suﬃcient to disturb that
equilibrium?” Id. at 1106. If the court is eﬀecting “disruption” in the law, the law is surely in
an unstable equilibrium.
50. Of course, ambiguity and uncertainty can never be fully expunged from the law, so expectations can never be completely stable. See Frederick Schauer, The Convergence of Rules and
Standards, 2003 N.Z. L. REV. 303, 307-09.
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The claim, in sum, is that due to the nature of adjudication, novel precedent
is always the product of an unstable equilibrium. As such, it must operate under
“a general rule of adjudicative retroactivity.” 51
C. Breadth of Non-Retroactivity Doctrine
There are four basic dimensions to adjudicative non-retroactivity doctrine in
the United States:

51.
52.

•

State/federal: U.S. Supreme Court precedent determines non-retroactivity doctrine for the federal courts only. Each state’s ﬁnal appeals court
is competent to determine the temporal implications of its own jurisdiction’s judgments. 52

•

Criminal/civil: Courts and commentators tend to distinguish between
criminal and civil cases when assessing the retroactivity of a new rule. In
the penal context, there is a further distinction between collateral review
(e.g., habeas petitions) and cases brought on direct appellate review. 53

•

Relief sought: A distinction is drawn between whether a remedy sought
is forward-looking (e.g., injunctive relief) or backward-looking (e.g.,
damages or restitution). Ceteris paribus, courts that express concern
about the retroactivity of their decisions tend to view forward-looking
relief more favorably than backward-looking relief.54

•

Temporal era: The prominence of, and preference for, non-retroactivity
doctrine has waxed and waned over the past century. Judicial enthusiasm for non-retroactive adjudication peaked during the Warren Court

Fisch, supra note 19, at 1110.

Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932).
53. See, e.g., Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1264 (2016); Johnson v. United States, 520
U.S. 461, 467 (1997); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989); Griﬃth v. Kentucky, 479 U.S.
314, 328 (1987); Peter Bozzo, What We Talk About when We Talk About Retroactivity, 46 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 13, 13 (2019) (discussing the doctrine concerning new rules of criminal law or procedure, noting that the Supreme Court’s case law is a “mess,” but peculiarly arguing that “[t]he
theoretical incoherence of [non-]retroactivity doctrine is its greatest strength”).
54. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974) (“[A] federal court’s remedial power [in
a § 1983 action], consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief . . . and may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment
of funds from the state treasury . . . .” (ﬁrst citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); and
then citing Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945))). But cf. Wellington,
supra note 34, at 254-58 (critiquing non-retroactivity doctrine’s distinction between forwardand backward-looking relief).
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era. 55 It has since been in decline and it seems likely to be disfavored by
the current Roberts Court, 56 even while U.S. non-retroactivity doctrine
is increasingly inﬂuencing foreign common-law appellate courts. 57
Judicial non-retroactivity doctrine has particularly struggled to manage federal civil cases in which plaintiﬀs seek backward-looking monetary relief. Courts
have strained to resolve such claims when brought in the light of a change in
relevant law (subsequent cases) or in anticipation of a change (pending cases).
It is these cases with which this Article is concerned.
This Article does not venture to resolve the full breadth of issues that arise
from judicial non-retroactivity doctrine. It does not directly address temporal
issues at the state level, issues in the criminal context, or issues concerning injunctive relief. That said, non-retroactivity doctrine in these contexts has o�en
intersected with the doctrine regarding federal civil monetary claims. In this respect, the insights proﬀered in this Article may aid reassessments of non-retroactivity doctrine in other contexts. While those contexts warrant full consideration on their own merits, for the purposes of this Article, the relevant
intersections can be brieﬂy summarized.
First, state courts have tended to look to U.S. Supreme Court precedent in
formulating and assessing their own comparable doctrines. The persuasive force
of federal precedent in this area seems, however, to be waning. Today, non-retroactivity doctrine is on the whole more strongly maintained at the state level
than it is at the federal level. 58

55.
56.

Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1079, 1093.
The idea that judgments create “new” law controverts Chief Justice Roberts’s (in)famous
“balls and strikes” adjudicative philosophy. See Todd E. Pettys, The Myth of the Written Constitution, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 991, 995, 1047 (2009). Prior to being elevated to the Supreme Court, then-Judge Gorsuch delivered an opinion for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
in which he opined that “the presumption of retroactivity attaching to judicial decisions was
anticipated by the Constitution and inheres in its separation of powers” and noted that the
Supreme Court “barely tolerate[s] the practice [of rendering purely prospective judicial decisions] in the civil arena.” De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165, 1170 (10th Cir. 2015); see also
Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Political Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2366 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing Justice Kavanaugh’s plurality opinion for entertaining non-retroactivity as an adjudicative option when “prospective
decisionmaking has never been easy to square with the judicial power”). Justice Scalia, whose
seat Justice Gorsuch ﬁlled, considered prospective overruling “impermissible simply because
it is not allowed by the Constitution.” James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529,
548 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).

57.

The inﬂuence has, though, been modest and incremental. See infra note 173.
58. See Richard S. Kay, Retroactivity and Prospectivity of Judgments in American Law, 62 AM. J. COMP.
L. SUPPLEMENT 37, 42, 50 (2014); Stephen J. Hammer, Note, Retroactivity and Restraint: An
Anglo-American Comparison, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 409, 430 (2018).
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Second, the Supreme Court developed its criminal non-retroactivity doctrine
broadly in tandem with its civil counterpart. Section I.D outlines the doctrinal
progression. This Article’s thesis is that judge-made law is inherently retroactive,
but judges may resort to tools other than non-retroactivity that limit plaintiﬀs’
ability to reopen old cases under new law. 59 It complements Herman Schwartz’s
thesis that, in an early reply to Mishkin, criticized theories of adjudication that
fail to embrace retroactivity fully. 60 This position is broadly consistent with the
Supreme Court’s modern trend toward aﬀording new rules of criminal law retroactive application while maintaining procedural limits on collateral rehearing
of concluded cases. 61
Third, as to remedies, damages tend to operate retroactively (compensating
for past loss), whereas injunctions tend to bear upon the defendant’s prospective
conduct. 62 Many suits in which non-retroactivity doctrine arises concern claims
both for backward-looking monetary awards and for forward-looking injunctions. The cases concerning unconstitutional taxes, discussed further in Section
II.B, are prime examples. In American Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith,63 for example, the
Supreme Court sanctioned an injunction against the defendant state from

59.

See infra Part III.

60.

Schwartz, supra note 34, at 752 (“[N]ewly declared constitutional criminal procedure rights
are not newly conceived or newly relevant. Rather, they reﬂect fundamental principles of our
legal system—principles implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Regardless, then, of when
it took place, a trial conducted in a manner inconsistent with these principles should not be
permitted to stand.”); cf. id. at 746 (noting, as a constraint, that “cases in which a guilty plea
was entered are generally immune from collateral attack”).

61.

See, e.g., McKinney v. Arizona, 140 S. Ct. 702, 709 (2020) (holding that state courts can reweigh aggravating and mitigating sentencing circumstances in collateral-review proceedings
in light of new law); Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1261-62, 1268 (2016) (applying a
new substantive constitutional rule as to criminal sentencing retroactively on collateral review). The Supreme Court nevertheless continues to recognize “a separate non-retroactivity
doctrine” under habeas corpus review, pursuant to which new constitutional rules are presumed not to apply retroactively unless they are “substantive” rules or “watershed” procedural
rules. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1419 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part)
(discussing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)); see Steven W. Allen, Toward a Uniﬁed Theory
of Retroactivity, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 105, 110-12 (2009); cf. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1437 (Alito,
J., dissenting) (criticizing Justice Kavanaugh for opining on this subject in the case “without
brieﬁng or argument,” and questioning the “new”-rule versus “old”-rule premise upon which
the Teague test rests). The Supreme Court will revisit this exception to retroactivity in Edwards
v. Vannoy, No. 19-5807 (Nov. 30, 2020) (hearing argument on the question “[w]hether this
Court’s decision in Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020), applies retroactively to cases on
federal collateral review”).

62.

Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1974) (denying injunctive relief that would have
had the eﬀect of ordering retroactive payment of beneﬁts from a state, where the state conceded that prospective injunctive relief was valid).
63. 496 U.S. 167 (1990) (plurality opinion).
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continuing to collect an unconstitutional tax but denied claims for monetary relief for previously collected taxes. In the view of the Court’s plurality, equitable
considerations favored forward-looking relief but weighed against retroactive
remedies. 64
Finally, beyond the scope of this Article—yet of great importance—is the inﬂuence of U.S. non-retroactivity doctrine on foreign jurisdictions. In 2014, the
Nineteenth Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law gathered in Vienna to review the subject of judicial prospectivity. In her report following the Congress, General Reporter Eva Steiner summarized how “common
and civil law jurisdictions have had to reﬂect in recent years on the possible introduction in their legal systems of the well-established [U.S.] practice of prospective overruling.” 65 This Article shows that, far from “well-established,” the
doctrine of prospective-only overruling in the United States is in decline. Moreover, it argues that abandonment of the doctrine is justiﬁed. Foreign jurists inclined to look to U.S. practice in this area should adopt a more critical gaze.
D. The Rise and Fall of Federal Non-Retroactivity Doctrine
The development and decline of non-retroactivity doctrine over the past century are well documented. 66 A summary is suﬃcient to provide context.
It has become conventional to explain judicial non-retroactivity as having
progressed through a distinctive arc. As Stephen Hammer summarizes, the practice of prospective-only overruling “found acceptance in the 1930s, escalated in
the 1960s, fell into disfavor in the 1980s, and was strictly curtailed in the
1990s.” 67 This arc emerged from “the old days of the common law,” when jurists

64.

Id. at 198-200.
65. Eva Steiner, Judicial Rulings with Prospective Eﬀects: From Comparison to Systematisation, in GENERAL REPORTS OF THE XIXTH CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF COMPARATIVE
LAW 15, 16 (Martin Schauer & Bea Verschraegen eds., 2017).
66.

See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 54-55 (7th ed. 2015);
Elizabeth Earle Beske, Rethinking the Nonprecedential Opinion, 65 UCLA L. REV. 808, 826-43
(2018); Beske, supra note 20, at 651-73; Bozzo, supra note 53, at 28-59; Richard H. Fallon, Jr.
& Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 1731, 1738-58 (1991); Hammer, supra note 58, at 413-26; Toby J. Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments in Criminal Cases, 115 YALE L.J. 922, 972-79 (2006); Alison L. LaCroix, Temporal Imperialism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1329, 1348-67 (2010); Rhodes, supra note 4, at 390-403;
Daniel B. Rice & John Boeglin, Conﬁning Cases to Their Facts, 105 VA. L. REV. 865, 894-97
(2019); Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1081-1103; Shannon, supra note 34, at 816-833; Stephens,
supra note 31, at 1517-58.
67. Hammer, supra note 58, at 413.
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embraced the declaratory theory of adjudication. 68 Scholars have o�en attributed the declaratory theory to Lord Coke, 69 but it is most commonly associated with Sir William Blackstone, who asserted “that judges are ‘not delegated
to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one,’ and that
when courts are called upon to overturn an existing precedent, they ‘do not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation.’”70
In its strong form, the declaratory theory holds, in the words of Justice Story,
that judicial decisions “are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are, and are
not, of themselves, laws.” 71 From this perspective, judges have no power to constrain the retroactive nature of their judgments because judging is an inherently
backward-looking exercise. The judge’s role is to resolve disputes that arose in
the past, and in so doing, the judge cannot escape making determinations on
what the law was (past-tense) that governed. Retroactivity is inherent in the judicial function. As Justice Holmes opined, “Judicial decisions have had retrospective operation for near a thousand years.” 72
68.

Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1077.
This attribution appears to be predicated on a widespread belief that Lord Coke wrote, “It is
the function of a judge not to make, but to declare the law, according to the golden metewand of the law and not by the crooked cord of discretion.” See, e.g., Anastasoﬀ v. United
States, 223 F.3d 898, 901 (8th Cir.), vacated on reh’g en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000);
Kansas v. Farry, 23 Kan. 731, 733 (1880); LEE J. STRANG, ORIGINALISM’S PROMISE: A NATURAL
LAW ACCOUNT OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 106-07 & n.254 (2019); Allen, supra note 61,
at 107 & n.13. Despite much investigation, however, I have been unable to locate this quotation
within Lord Coke’s corpus. Lord Coke did say, “A good caveat to Parliaments to leave all causes
to be measured by the golden and streight metwand of the law, and not to the incertain and
crooked cord of discretion.” EDWARD COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 41 (London, M. Flesher, for W. Lee, and D. Pakeman 1644). But this is no
clear endorsement of the declaratory theory.
70. Allen, supra note 61, at 107 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69); see Note,
Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 907-08
(1962); see also MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 67 (Charles Runnington ed.,
London, W. Strahan & M. Woodfall, for T. Cadell 4th ed. 1779) (“[English courts cannot]
make a law, properly so called, (for that only the king and parliament can do); yet they have
a great weight and authority in expounding, declaring, and publishing what the law of this
kingdom is, especially when such decisions hold a consonancy and congruity with resolutions
and decisions of former times; and though such decisions are less than a law, yet they are a
greater evidence thereof than the opinion of any private persons, as such, whatsoever.”).
69.

71.

Swi� v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938); see Kay, supra note 58, at 38 (“Joseph Story, a preeminent early American legal
authority, embraced this idea with enthusiasm.”).
72. Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting); cf. Gerald J.
Postema, Philosophy of the Common Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 588, 589 (Jules L. Coleman, Kenneth Einar Himma & Scott J. Shapiro
eds., 2004) (noting that “[l]egal historians widely agree that before the eighteenth century
there was no ﬁrm doctrine of stare decisis in English common law”).
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Belief in the declaratory theory of adjudication was shaken with the rise of
legal realism. Two famous judgments in the 1930s encapsulated a new era of adjudicative reconceptualization. In Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil &
Reﬁning Co., the Supreme Court considered for the ﬁrst time the constitutionality of a state court’s decision to make its ruling non-retroactive. 73 Justice Cardozo
held that a state was competent to determine the temporal reach of its judgments
according to “the juristic philosophy of the judges of her courts, their conceptions of law, its origin and nature,” and “the federal constitution,” he held, “has
no voice upon the subject.” 74 State courts have, accordingly, since developed a
spectrum of doctrines that guide whether state laws should be “Sunburst-ed” so
that their novel precedents apply only prospectively. 75
In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 76 the Supreme Court repudiated the notion
that judgments merely evince “an unchanging common law; instead, it recognized that the common law was nothing more than [judges’] decisions.” 77 In
disclaiming any power of federal courts to determine state-law issues according
to a general federal common law, Erie threw into doubt the soundness of the
federal courts’ many prior judgments resolving issues in diversity jurisdiction
unconstrained by state common law. Erie stood for the proposition that overruling created new law. This meant that “law could change; law could die”—insights that exposed “the false unity of the Blackstonian model.” 78 A new problem
thus became salient: What law was to be applied to events that took place before
the date of a law-changing decision?
The federal courts found their voice on this problem in the 1960s, as judges
grappled with the temporal implications of the Warren Court’s landmark criminal-procedure judgments. A�er the Supreme Court determined in Mapp v. Ohio
that evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights
was inadmissible in state courts, 79 the problem arose as to whether this

73.

287 U.S. 358 (1932); see KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING AP301-05 (1960).

PEALS
74.

287 U.S. at 364-65; cf. Rowan v. Runnels, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 134, 139 (1847), cited in Kay, supra
note 58, at 46.

75.

See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 604-08 (1994); Hammer, supra note 58, at 430; Kay, supra
note 58, at 42, 50.
76. 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see HART & SACKS, supra note 75, at 608-09.
77.

Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1078; see Richard S. Kay, Construction, Originalist Interpretation and
the Complete Constitution, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE 1, 10 n.47 (2017) (referring to Erie as
“the now prevalent positivist view”).
78. Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1088; see Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 527,
570-79 (2019) (discussing Erie).
79. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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exclusionary rule could aid persons already convicted. The Supreme Court in
Linkletter v. Walker held by a majority that “in appropriate cases the Court may
in the interest of justice make [a new] rule prospective.” 80 Balancing factors of
purpose, reliance, and eﬀect of the new rule, 81 the Court determined that collateral-review proceedings were appropriately met by treating new rules as non-retroactive. In Stovall v. Denno, 82 the Court anointed the method of “selective” prospectivity by holding that new rules must apply to the cases in which they are
announced, but that cases brought by direct appellate review in the wake of a new
rule would be resolved according to Linkletter’s balancing inquiry. The Burger
Court extended this non-retroactivity precedent to civil cases. In Chevron Oil Co.
v. Huson, the Court articulated a three-factor test to guide courts in determining
whether a new legal rule should apply retroactively.83 This test—which has since
been borrowed by many state courts—considers:
(1) whether the decision to be applied non-retroactively establishes a new
principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent or by deciding
an issue of ﬁrst impression;
(2) if, in light of the new rule’s purpose and eﬀect, retrospective operation
would further or retard its operation; and
(3) the extent of the inequity imposed by retroactive application, namely the
injustice or hardship that would be caused by retroactive application. 84
Non-retroactivity doctrine has always divided courts 85 and commentators,86
and it ultimately fell out of favor with the Rehnquist Court. The Court ﬁrst returned to applying its precedent retroactively in criminal cases on direct review.
In such cases, it had become too diﬃcult for the Court to justify giving remedial
relief to a successful criminal appellant through a selective prospective overruling

80.

381 U.S. 618, 628 (1965).

81.

Id. at 636; see Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1090.
388 U.S. 293, 300-01 (1967).

82.
83.

404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971).
84. Kay, supra note 58, at 42.
85.

Justice Harlan spearheaded judicial opposition in the Supreme Court. See Fallon & Meltzer,
supra note 66, at 1743; Kay, supra note 58, at 57.

86.

See, e.g., Thomas E. Fairchild, Limitation of New Judge-Made Law to Prospective Eﬀect Only:
“Prospective Overruling” or “Sunbursting,” 51 MARQ. L. REV. 254, 269 (1968) (“[I]t is not always
possible nor wise to pull a rabbit out of the hat.”); Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1090 (“The
Linkletter analysis is deeply unsatisfying.”).
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that would deny relief to other similarly situated parties. 87 Not long a�er, the
Court also turned against non-retroactivity in civil cases. In a series of judgments
concerning claims for restitutionary relief from unconstitutional state tax laws,
a majority of the Court disclaimed an inherent power to adjudicate non-retroactively, 88 denounced selective prospectivity, 89 and endorsed a presumption that
retroactivity is “overwhelmingly the norm.” 90 The Court le� room for “pure”
prospective overruling—wherein the Court would deny retroactive relief even to
the party who brings the novel claim—but the current Roberts Court majority
does not seem inclined toward it. 91 The strong presumption now, articulated in
Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, is that
[w]hen [the Supreme] Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties
before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and
must be given full retroactive eﬀect in all cases still open on direct review
and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate
the announcement of the rule. 92
We have reached a point where non-retroactivity doctrine has lost favor in
U.S. federal courts, 93 although it remains popular with many legal scholars. It is
employed to diﬀerent degrees in state courts. 94 And it is gaining traction in

87.

Griﬃth v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 327-28 (1987). The Supreme Court continues, however, to
recognize a separate non-retroactivity doctrine under habeas corpus review. See supra note 61.
88. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 222 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“When the
federal courts have no equitable discretion, we have held a federal court has no authority to
refuse to apply a law retroactively.”); id. at 201 (Scalia, J., concurring).
89.

Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993).
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535 (1991) (opinion of Souter, J., joined
by Stevens, J.); see also McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S.
18, 32 (1990) (discussing “the scope of a State’s obligation to provide retrospective relief” for
unconstitutionally exacted taxes); Renée Burbank, Illegal Exactions, 87 TENN. L. REV. 315, 331
& n.81 (2020) (identifying McKesson Corp. as signaling the Supreme Court’s abandonment of
non-retroactivity doctrine in unlawful government-exaction cases).
91. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
90.

92.

509 U.S. at 97; see Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 752 (1995) (aﬃrming Harper); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 279 n.32 (1994) (characterizing Harper as
“establish[ing] a ﬁrm rule of retroactivity”).
93. Beske, supra note 20, at 647; cf. Masur & Mortara, supra note 22, at 1016 & n.263 (noting that
some federal courts have interpreted Harper to permit courts to “issue purely prospective rulings, so long as they do not apply those rulings to the parties who brought the case”); Elliot
Watson, The Revival of Reliance and Prospectivity: Chevron Oil in the Immigration Context, 36
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 245, 261-64 (2012) (describing a case in which the Ninth Circuit applied
the Chevron Oil test but characterizing its approach as “an exception to the general rule”).
94. See Hammer, supra note 58, at 430; Kay, supra note 58, at 42, 50.
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foreign courts. 95 Following the arc of federal non-retroactivity doctrine, it would
seem that “[t]he end of all the Court’s explorings has been to arrive, more or less,
where it started.” 96
ii. non- retroactivity frameworks
The decline of federal non-retroactivity doctrine can be explained in part by
widespread dissatisfaction with the prevailing frameworks that have sought to
justify it. 97 There is no agreement within the judiciary or academy as to how the
doctrine should be conceived. Jurists have grappled with ﬁrm rules, discretionary balancing tests, and strong presumptions, and no approach has won consensus. 98 Instead, from the case law and commentary we can distill ﬁve distinct
frameworks for understanding the doctrine. These frameworks are not mutually
incompatible but are instead diﬀerent conceptual perspectives on the problem.
This Part describes and critiques these frameworks by way of a prelude to Part
III’s rights-based understanding of law’s temporal reach.
A. Legal-Philosophical Framework
Courts and commentators commonly frame the temporal implications of adjudication as reﬂecting “one of the great jurisprudential debates” about the nature of law. 99 Namely, do judges “ﬁnd” or “make” law? The notion of ﬁnding law
is said to hew to natural-law philosophy; and making law, to legal positivism
and legal realism. The predominant view today is that judge-made law is law
made by judges; that the declaratory theory of adjudication is dead; and so when
judges create law there is no philosophical objection to applying their new law
only to future events.
Such framing is open to several objections, as addressed below. In brief, ﬁrst,
despite contentions to the contrary, it is not absurd to suggest that legal norms—
like social norms—can be “found” independent of formal sources. 100 Second, it

95.

See infra notes 141-150.
Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1103; see Allen, supra note 61, at 106 (“[T]he Supreme Court has
completely remade [retroactivity doctrine] twice in the last ﬁ�y years, casting oﬀ the existing
practice to replace it, all at once, with a completely new and comprehensive approach to the
problem.”).
97. Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1104.
96.

98.

See Lehn, supra note 29, at 572-73.
See, e.g., Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 881 P.2d 1376, 1377 (N.M. 1994);
Hammer, supra note 58, at 430-32.
100. Sachs, supra note 78, at 527.
99.
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is not clear that resolving the jurisprudential debate bears on the question of retroactivity. Critics o�en fail to appreciate that the declaratory theory is not hostile
to legal-positivist and realist outlooks: judges can be seen to make law through
declaring the rules and principles that govern disputes before them. Conversely,
natural-law philosophy is not necessarily incompatible with non-retroactivity.
Indeed, principles of natural law seem to be just as readily invoked to support
prospective adjudication. Thus, the legal-philosophical debate is largely orthogonal to the question of retroactivity. And third, the legal-philosophical framework invariably descends into intractable debate. 101 As the following discussion
elucidates, it is not a feasible framework for settling the temporal implications of
adjudication.
1. Description
The idea that common-law principles or right interpretations of statutes
might preexist their articulation in judicial decisions is associated with Blackstone’s natural-law tradition. Blackstone described judges as “the living oracles”
of the common law who were “sworn to determine, not according to [their] own
private judgment, but according to the known laws and customs of the land; not
delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound an old one.”102
John Austin’s positivist theory challenged this idea by maintaining that judges
do make law when they pronounce new rules or overturn past judgments. Austin
considered it a “childish ﬁction employed by our judges . . . that . . . common
law is not made by them, but is a miraculous something made by nobody, existing . . . from eternity, and merely declared from time to time by the judges.” 103
The Supreme Court has long employed this philosophical contest to frame
the problem of judicial retroactivity. In Sunburst Oil, Justice Cardozo alluded to
the Blackstonian theory when he said that a state court delivering novel precedent may “hold to the ancient dogma that the law declared by its courts had a
Platonic or ideal existence before the act of declaration,” so that when overruling
past precedent, “the discredited declaration will be viewed as if it had never been,
101.

See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 361 (1962) (“Do
the judges ﬁnd the law or do they make it? If you pose this question in the world of correct—
or incorrect—doctrine, you enter a never-ending battle.”); Deryck Beyleveld & Roger
Brownsword, The Practical Diﬀerence Between Natural-Law Theory and Legal Positivism, 5 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 22-23 (1985) (suggesting that the debate between positivism and natural-law theory is only conceptually, but not practically, signiﬁcant); Tim Kaye, Natural Law
Theory and Legal Positivism: Two Sides of the Same Practical Coin?, 14 J.L. & SOC’Y 303, 317-18
(1987) (suggesting that the debate may no longer even be conceptually signiﬁcant).
102. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69.
103.

2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 634 (Robert Campbell ed., London, John Murray 5th ed. 1885).
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and the reconsidered declaration as law from the beginning.” 104 In other words,
a state court could apply its new rules retroactively on the premise that they expound what was always the correct view of the law. But if a state court’s “juristic
philosophy” aligned with Austin’s theory, it could choose to adopt non-retroactivity and “say that decisions of its highest court, though later overruled, are law
[nonetheless] for intermediate transactions.” 105
The Court in Linkletter explicitly framed the problem as a contest between
Blackstone and Austin. Justice Clark for the Court cited Blackstone’s Commentaries as grounding the declaratory theory of adjudication, and with it the idea
that an overruled decision “was thought to be only a failure at true discovery and
was consequently never the law.” 106 By contrast, Justice Clark noted, “Austin
maintained that judges do in fact do something more than discover law; they
make it interstitially by ﬁlling in with judicial interpretation the vague, indeﬁnite, or generic statutory or common law terms that alone are but the empty
crevices of the law.” 107 Past precedent thus remains “an existing juridical fact until overruled” and so “intermediate cases ﬁnally decided under it are not to be
disturbed.” 108 Rather, new judge-made rules can be applied prospectively. Justice Clark characterized Austin’s theory as ascending in acceptance among courts
and commentators, and Blackstone’s philosophy as a theory in decline. He concluded that “there seem[ed] to be no impediment—constitutional or philosophical—to the use of” prospective overruling of past precedent. 109 The Court was
“neither required to apply, nor prohibited from applying, a decision retrospectively.” 110
Those who invoke legal philosophy to frame the temporal scope of novel
precedent tend to assume three propositions. The ﬁrst is that the declaratory
theory rests on the implausible notion that judges only “ﬁnd” law. 111 The theory,
it is said, presupposes that “law is objective and constant. It exists ‘out there,’

104.
105.
106.
107.

Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 365 (1932) (citations omitted).
Id. at 364.
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 623 (1965) (citation omitted).
Id. at 623-24.

108.

Id. at 624.
109. Id. at 628.
110.
111.
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Id. at 629.
John Martinez, Taking Time Seriously: The Federal Constitutional Right to Be Free from “Startling” State Court Overrulings, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 297, 301 (1988) (“According to the
now-outdated ‘declaratory’ or ‘Blackstonian’ theory, courts merely ‘found’ the law rather than
‘made’ it. . . . The modern theory of judicial decision-making, o�en attributed to Professor
Austin, acknowledges that courts make law; they do not simply ﬁnd it.”).
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waiting to be ‘found’ by a court.” 112 Consider a typical characterization of what
it means for judges to declare the law:
The declaratory theory of the common law is the hypothesis that judges
who decide cases (when they are not following precedents, obeying rigid
rules of evidence, or interpreting and applying statutes) do not make but
instead ﬁnd law. In other words, the declaratory theory is that what is
now commonly called “judge-made law” is actually preexisting law that
judges discover and not something that they create. 113
It follows that in novel cases, judges do not wield discretion to legislate new
rules. Rather, they draw on principles ascertainable generally in the body of law
to elucidate that which is not clearly posited in the legal sources. Retroactive adjudication hangs on the assumption that every rule of law preexists its articulation by a court. But Austin blew up this assumption and with it the rationale for
adjudicative retroactivity.
A second common proposition is that the declaratory theory of adjudication
is rooted in natural-law philosophy and subsists in conﬂict with legal positivism.
That law may be found through the “ethical intuitionism” of the judges aligns
the theory with natural law. 114 That law may be found outside of the legal
sources chides against the central tenet of legal positivism. The “counterpart” to
the declaratory theory, then, “is the positivist theory, which acknowledges that
courts do indeed make law.” 115 Judge-made law under this theory can be “new.”
And as such, it need not govern “old” disputes, but can be applied only prospectively. Thus, it is said that Blackstone and Austin represent “two opposing jurisprudential theories of retroactivity.” 116
A third proposition is that the legal system has outgrown the declaratory
theory. The debate is over: judges make law. The adjudicatory function must,
then, be conceived through a positivist or realist lens. It is o�en said that “[i]f
the declaratory theory of the common law was ever truly believed in, it is no
112.

Lehn, supra note 29, at 574.
Brian Zamulinski, Rehabilitating the Declaratory Theory of the Common Law, 2 J.L. & CTS. 171,
171 (2014).
114. Id.
113.

115.
116.

Lehn, supra note 29, at 576.
Chen, supra note 6, at 1421; see Andrew J. Bowen, Fairy Tales and the Declaratory Theory of
Judicial Decisions, 1999 SCOTS L. TIMES 327, 328 (referring to “two competing theories of judicial decision making, the declaratory theory and the change theory”); LaCroix, supra note 66,
at 1349 (“[T]he majority of the Supreme Court’s cases dealing with adjudicative retroactivity
view the choice of retroactivity as implicating the dichotomy between what the Court has
termed the Blackstonian or ‘declaratory’ model of law and the Austinian or ‘positive law’
model.”); Martinez, supra note 111, at 301.
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longer.” 117 Criticisms of the declaratory theory—and of jurists who lend it credence—have become frequent and blunt to the point of condescension. The predominant view is that the declaratory theory is a “myth,” 118 a “ﬁction,” 119 a “fairy
tale,” 120 a “nightmare,” 121 and an “ancient dogma” 122 that is “inherently circular,”
excessively “formalist,” and “antiquated.” 123 The idea that “judges do no more
than discover the law that marvelously has always existed, awaiting only the judicial pen that would ﬁnd the right words for all to heed” is “moonspinning.” 124
It also “lacks the virtue of being true.” 125 The claim that courts ﬁnd law is said to
be “routinely contravened” by judges and is “less and less useful each day.”126
The theory has been “ridiculed,” 127 “discredited,” “abandon[ed],” 128 and “irretrievably lost.” 129 Therefore, its proponents are either “naive” 130 formalists who
are easily “fool[ed],” 131 or they are disingenuous and probably concealing
117.

Hammer, supra note 58, at 410; see Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1759 (suggesting that
“[i]t would be only a slight exaggeration to say that there are no more Blackstonians”); Liron
Shmilovits, The Declaratory Fiction, 31 KING’S L.J. 59, 73-74 (2020) (“[T]wo centuries a�er
Bentham’s rebellion against the orthodoxy of the declaratory theory, there is probably no legal
theory more o�en repudiated than it; so much so, that deriding it is a mark of sophistication.”).
118. Roger J. Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of Judicial Responsibility, 28
HASTINGS L.J. 533, 535 (1977); cf. Mishkin, supra note 34, at 63 (“If the view be in part myth,
it is a myth by which we live and which can be sacriﬁced only at substantial cost.”).
119.

Munroe Smith, State Statute and Common Law, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 105, 121 (1887); see Griﬃn v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 26 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment); Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349 (HL) 378 (Lord Goﬀ of Chieveley) (appeal
taken from Eng.).

120.

Lord Reid, The Judge as Lawmaker, 12 J. SOC’Y PUB. TEACHERS L. 22, 22 (1972).
Richard McManus, Predicting the Past: The Declaratory Theory of the Common Law—From Fairytale to Nightmare, 12 JUD. REV. 228, 245 (2007).
122. Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 365 (1932); see also 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, Truth Versus Ashhurst; Or, Law as It Is, Contrasted with What It Is Said to Be, in THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 233, 235 (John Bowring ed., London, Simpkin, Marshall & Co.
1823) (calling it “dog-law”).
123. Fisch, supra note 19, at 1080, 1082.
121.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Traynor, supra note 118, at 535.
Masur & Mortara, supra note 22, at 1019.
Id.
Kay, supra note 58, at 64.
Hammer, supra note 58, at 409, 411.
Kay, supra note 58, at 66.

James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 546 (1991) (White, J., concurring in
the judgment); see also id. at 549 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I am not so naive . . . as to be unaware that judges in a real sense ‘make’ law.”).
131. Masur & Mortara, supra note 22, at 1019.
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devious agendas.132 Judges who employ the theory perhaps only “pretend[] to
hold” it 133 for “politically expedient” purposes. 134 Blackstone himself, apparently, “presented the ‘declaratory theory’ with a wink and a nod.” 135
Thus, we reach a purported solution: to turn our backs on the theory. To
recognize that “we do not believe in fairy tales any more.” 136 For ostensibly
“[e]ver since the legal realists, sophisticated legal observers have understood that
the courts make law, just as legislatures and agencies do.” 137 So enlightened
courts face a simple inquiry: they need only determine whether a novel precedent
establishes “a new principle of law” 138 or constitutes “a clear break with the
past.” 139 If so, non-retroactivity will be justiﬁable. As Jonathan Masur and Adam
Mortara explain, “If the rule is not new, it will apply in every case; if the rule is
new, the court must decide whether it should be applied retroactively or purely
prospectively, following . . . considerations related to reliance interests and social
costs . . . .” 140

132.

See Allan Beever, The Declaratory Theory of Law, 33 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 421, 422 (2013).
Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 881 P.2d 1376, 1380 (N.M. 1994) (discussing
Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 107 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
134. Masur & Mortara, supra note 22, at 1019.
133.

135.
136.

Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 37 (1996).
Reid, supra note 120, at 22.

137.

Masur & Mortara, supra note 22, at 1019; cf. sources cited supra note 22 (distinguishing legislative from judicial lawmaking).

138.

Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971).
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248 (1969).

139.
140.

Masur & Mortara, supra note 22, at 1010. For a discussion of reliance interests and social costs,
see id. at 1002-03.
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This framework has gained traction in other jurisdictions too. 141 Judges of
the highest courts of India, 142 Ireland, 143 the United Kingdom, 144 Israel, 145 New

141.

Steiner, supra note 65, at 15-16. South Africa’s Constitution speciﬁcally empowers courts to
limit the retrospective eﬀect of judgments striking down unconstitutional laws. S. AFR.
CONST., 1996, § 172(1)(b)(i); see Masiya v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions 2007 (5) SA 30 (CC) at 53,
[51] (S. Afr.).
142. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, (1967) 2 SCR 762, 808 (India) (discussing the relevance of
“two doctrines familiar to American Jurisprudence, one . . . described as Blackstonian theory
and the other as ‘prospective over-ruling,’” and endorsing the latter in the case); see A.R.
Blackshield, “Fundamental Rights” and the Economic Viability of the Indian Nation: Part Three:
Prospective Overruling, 10 J. INDIAN L. INST. 183 (1968).
143.

Murphy v. Att’y Gen. [1982] 1 IR 241, 293-94 (Ir.) (treating as persuasive the practice of “[t]he
American Supreme Court . . . of deciding . . . whether a ruling which upsets what was regarded as the law should operate retrospectively or merely prospectively”); see A. v. Governor
of Arbour Hill Prison [2006] 4 IR 88, 116-17 (Ir.) (“In modern constitutional systems we have
moved on from [Blackstone’s] perception of the law, at least in its purest form, but even when
viewed through Blackstone’s prism the common law did not envisage absolute retroactivity of
judicial decisions and did not permit previous cases, even though ﬁnally determined on principles that were ‘never law’ to be reopened.”); cf. P.C. v. Minister for Soc. Prot. [2018] IESC
57, [39] (Ir.) (noting that only a minority of Supreme Court judges have approved of prospective-only overruling).

144.

Nat’l Westminster Bank plc v. Spectrum Plus Ltd. [2005] 2 AC 680 (HL), [34] (appeal taken
from Eng.) (“[Blackstone’s declaratory] theory is still valid when applied to cases where a
previous decision is overruled as wrong when given. Most overruling occurs on this basis.
These cases are to be contrasted with those where the later decision represents a response to
changes in social conditions and expectations. Then, on any view, the declaratory approach is
inapt.”); see Mary Arden, Prospective Overruling, 120 LAW Q. REV. 7 passim (2004).

145.

LCA 8925/04 Solel Boneh Bldg. & Infrastructure Ltd. v. Estate of Alhamid [2006] (1) IsrLR
201, 216 (Isr.) (“The declaratory theory of law has not acquired great strength in Israel; there
is no constitutional obstacle that prevents recognizing th[e] possibility [of giving precedents
merely prospective force].”); id. at 225-26, 243 (contending that retrospectivity should be the
exception, not the rule, for judicial lawmaking); see Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Time and Judicial
Review in Israel: Tempering the Temporal Eﬀects of Judicial Review, in THE EFFECTS OF JUDICIAL
DECISIONS IN TIME 207, 223-26 (P. Popelier, S. Verstraelen, D. Vanheule & B. Vanlerberghe
eds., 2014).
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Zealand, 146 Bangladesh, 147 Singapore, 148 Ghana, 149 and Canada have indicated
that when courts venture to change the law, they are not shackled by the declaratory theory’s demand for retroactivity. For example, Canada’s apex court has
said:
When the Court is declaring the law as it has existed, then the Blackstonian approach is appropriate and retroactive relief should be granted. On
the other hand, when a court is developing new law within the broad

146.

Chamberlains v. Lai [2007] 2 NZLR 7, [136] (N.Z.) (“We are changing the law in the present
case. . . . We are not declaring [the law]; nor are we simply correcting a mistaken view of the
law. Blackstone might have put it that way but we cannot. We are changing the law because
of a change in perceptions over time of what public and legal policy require.”); see Jesse Wall,
Prospective Overruling—It’s About Time, 12 OTAGO L. REV. 131, 133-34 (2009). But cf. Ha v New
South Wales (1997) 189 CLR 465, 504 (Austl.) (“The adjudication of existing rights and obligations as distinct from the creation of rights and obligations distinguishes the judicial power
from non-judicial power. Prospective overruling is thus inconsistent with judicial power on
the simple ground that the new regime that would be ushered in when the overruling took
eﬀect would alter existing rights and obligations. If an earlier case is erroneous and it is necessary to overrule it, it would be a perversion of judicial power to maintain in force that which
is acknowledged not to be the law.” (citations omitted)); see James Edelman, Chief Justice
French, Judicial Power and Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR
OF CHIEF JUSTICE FRENCH 81, 101-04 (Henry Jackson ed., 2019).
147. Khan v. Bangladesh, ADC Vol IX (A), 10 (2012) (Bangl.) (citing Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, (1967) 2 SCR 762 (India), Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358
(1932), and Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), and concluding that “[o]ur Constitution
does not expressly or by necessary implication speak against the doctrine of prospective overruling”); see M. Jashim Ali Chowdhury, Bangladesh’s Inconsistency with the Doctrine of Prospective Invalidation, in CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES IN ASIA 33, 34 (Po Jen Yap ed., 2019).
148. Public Prosecutor v. Hue An Li, [2014] SGHC 171, [124] (Sing.) (“Our appellate courts (that
is, our High Court sitting in its appellate capacity and our Court of Appeal) . . . have the discretion, in exceptional circumstances, to restrict the retroactive eﬀect of their pronouncements. This discretion is to be guided by [four] factors . . . .”); see WenXiong Zhuang, Prospective Judicial Pronouncements and Limits to Judicial Law-Making, 28 SING. ACAD. L.J. 611, 612
(2016). But cf. Hong Kong v. Wa, [2006] 9 H.K.C.F.A.R. 614, [18] (H.K.) (considering that
“[o]n any view, the power to engage in prospective overruling, if it exists, is an extraordinary
power,” and ﬁnding it not necessary to decide whether Hong Kong courts can exercise the
power); see Andrew Li, Reﬂections on the Retrospective and Prospective Eﬀect of Constitutional
Judgments, in THE COMMON LAW LECTURE SERIES 2010, at 21, 24-32 (Jessica Young & Rebecca
Lee eds., 2011).
149.

Kpebu v Attorney General, [2016] GHASC 15, [36] (Ghana) (“Under the doctrine of prospective overruling, which has its origin in American jurisprudence, and which has been
adopted, developed and applied in deserving cases in other jurisdictions, including India, Malaysia, Singapore, United Kingdom, Uganda and other Commonwealth countries, this court
has power to decide whether to limit the retroactive eﬀect of the declaration of invalidity.”);
see Stephen Kwaku Asare, Inconsequential Declarations of Unconstitutionality and Unconstitutional Consequential Orders: The Case of Professor Stephen Kwaku Asare v Attorney General
and General Legal Council, 63 J. AFRICAN L. 463, 473-77 (2019).
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conﬁnes of the Constitution, it may be appropriate to limit the retroactive
eﬀect of its judgment. 150
The legal-philosophical framework thus concerns the problem of whether a
novel precedent in issue is “new” law.
2. Critique
The problem so stated begs the question. Even putting legal philosophies
aside, there can o�en be genuine disagreement as to whether some novel precedent is really “new” law. Take, as examples, Obergefell and Janus. If these cases
announced “new” precedent and overrode past law, then perhaps their holdings
should apply only to disputes occurring a�er the Supreme Court delivered its
judgments. But if these cases articulated principles that were always discernable
in the Constitution, then the judgments merely corrected aberrant precedent and
their holdings ought to govern past cases. The new-law inquiry predominantly
turns on perspective and thus is easily manipulable based on how it is framed.151
That, of course, was the reason the Court in Sunburst Oil le� the determination
to “the wisdom” of individual state courts’ “philosophies” 152: it thought there
was no right answer to the problem.
A deeper criticism can be leveled against the legal-philosophical approach to
retroactivity: that it misconceives the declaratory theory of adjudication and unfairly caricatures its proponents. It attacks a straw man. 153 John Finnis charges
“the declaratory theory’s despisers” with failing to confront “its essential, normative claim”—that as a theory of adjudication it encapsulates “an important element in judicial duty . . . of judges to diﬀerentiate their authority and responsibility, and thus their practical reasoning, from that of legislatures.” 154 It is the
judge’s adjudicatory role that compels this duty:
[A]djudication is not the telling of some story which if accurate might be
called history—or prescient prediction—and if inaccurate a myth or fairy
tale. Adjudication is the eﬀort to identify the rights of the contending
parties now by identifying what were, in law, the rights and wrongs, or

150.

Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429, [93] (Can.); see Daniel Guttman,
Hislop v. Canada: A Retroactive Look, 42 SUP. CT. L. REV. (2d) 547, 552-53 (2008).

151.

See supra Section I.B.
Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 365 (1932).

152.
153.
154.
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Beever, supra note 132, at 425-30; see Shmilovits, supra note 117, at 69-79.
J.M. Finnis, The Fairy Tale’s Moral, 115 LAW Q. REV. 170, 173 (1999).
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validity or invalidity, of their actions and transactions when entered upon
and done. 155
Contrary to popular belief, the declaratory theory is far from dead. 156 Its essence is simply that judges determine the law by looking to the past. 157 Judges
do not legislate. Rather, they recognize 158 or elucidate 159 the law within the constraints of adjudication. The apparent inadequacies of Blackstone’s descriptive
account of judicial decisionmaking do not erode the principles that it embodies, 160 including, and especially, the retroactive nature of judicial decisions.
The three propositions outlined in the preceding Section miss the mark.
First, the idea that judging involves “ﬁnding” law cannot be dismissed out of
hand. Stephen Sachs disputes the critics’ charge that as a matter of theory “law
has to come from somewhere” and “judges can’t discover norms that no one ever
made.” 161 If social norms can be “found,” why not law? Copy editors and dictionary authors routinely and uncontroversially “declare” standard English, for
instance, though the rules of language derive from no formal source. Language
norms also change and diverge, yet they have determinate content independent
155.

Id. at 172; see Paul Troop, Why Legal Formalism Is Not a Stupid Thing, 31 RATIO JURIS. 428, 43233 (2018).
156. See Beever, supra note 132, at 423 (“Despite contemporary condemnation of the declaratory
theory, the modern law remains committed to it.”); Jason Iuliano, The Supreme Court’s Noble
Lie, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 911, 924-25 (2018) (discussing the American judiciary’s commitment
to the declaratory theory); Shmilovits, supra note 117, at 81 (“Whether we like it or not, the
declaratory theory is still alive and well. It is widely condemned and widely applied.”); see also
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535-36 (1991) (opinion of Souter, J.,
joined by Stevens, J.) (“[T]he declaratory theory of law, according to which the courts are
understood only to ﬁnd the law, not to make it . . . comports with our received notions of the
judicial role . . . .” (citations omitted)).
157.

See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
LLEWELLYN, supra note 101, at 361-62 (explaining that the debate over whether judges ﬁnd or
make law is meaningless, because judges simultaneously do both—“their decision is . . . quite
literally found and recognized, as well as made”—and they do so constrained and guided by legal
materials and context); see DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING, supra note 19, at 61-63 (discussing
Llewellyn’s theory of adjudication); Dagan, American Legal Realism, supra note 19, at 131-36
(same).
159. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, RECOGNIZING WRONGS 19, 239-40, 244, 25455, 363-64 (2020) (describing judicial decisionmaking as “elucidative”—a process of recognizing rights and duties); see CARDOZO, supra note 26, at 124-41 (discussing the judicial power to
declare law).
160. Jessie Allen, Blackstone, Expositor and Censor of Law Both Made and Found, in BLACKSTONE AND
HIS CRITICS 41, 44-49 (Anthony Page & Wilfrid Prest eds., 2018) (defending Blackstone and
discussing how the declaratory theory submits judges’ individual will to the direction of law).
158.

161.

Sachs, supra note 78, at 527; see also Zamulinski, supra note 113, at 171 (discussing, from a natural-law perspective, judges’ “ability to apprehend moral truths”).
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of the sources in which words are expressed. 162 Finding law, Sachs contends, is
“a real and plausible option for a modern legal system.” 163 Such a contention
does not hinge on a defense of Blackstone. Modern jurisprudence may have outgrown Blackstone, but it need not abandon a declaratory view of adjudication.
Mishkin notes that “while the Blackstonian conception is not entirely valid, neither is it wholly wrong.” 164 Most cases can readily be taken to be resolved on the
basis of foregoing law—whether by statute or stare decisis—and most judicial
decisions explicitly have retroactive eﬀect.
Second, it is wrong to assume that the declaratory theory is inconsistent with
the positivist or realist view of judges as lawmakers. 165 Staunch positivists and
realists comprise some of the declaratory theory’s keenest defenders. 166 Justice
Scalia’s opinions on judicial retroactivity, for instance, reﬂect the normative account that Finnis outlines—though the two jurists are philosophically unaligned. Scalia was unapologetically hostile to the idea of judges employing natural-law principles that might “render judgments that contradict positive
law.” 167 And he accepted that “courts have the capacity to ‘make’ law.” 168 But, he
insisted, they do so within the constraints of adjudication. Unlike legislatures,

162.
163.

Sachs, supra note 78, at 531.
Id. at 527.

164.

Mishkin, supra note 33, at 60; see LaCroix, supra note 66, at 1350; Kermit Roosevelt III, A
Retroactivity Retrospective, with Thoughts for the Future: What the Supreme Court Learned from
Paul Mishkin, and What It Might, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1677, 1682 (2007).
165. Beever, supra note 132, at 426; Sachs, supra note 78, at 530-32.
166.

Even those who maintain that the law is “what the judge says,” Reid, supra note 120, at 22, or
“does,” BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO, Jurisprudence, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 7, 12 (photo. reprint 1980) (Margaret E. Hall ed., 1947) (describing the view
of the “neo-realists”), must recognize that judges speak and act from a perspective of hindsight.
167. ANTONIN SCALIA, SCALIA SPEAKS: REFLECTIONS ON LAW, FAITH, AND LIFE WELL LIVED 248
(2017).
168. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (1989) [hereina�er Scalia, The Rule of Law]; see James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I am not so naive . . . as to be unaware that
judges in a real sense ‘make’ law.”); ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 9-14 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)
(acknowledging that judges make law and explaining that the retroactivity of judicial lawmaking compels a modest judicial mindset); cf. Hammer, supra note 58, at 431-32 (considering
the New Mexico Supreme Court’s insinuation that Scalia’s conception of adjudication was
disingenuous); Lehn, supra note 29, at 575 (dubiously attributing to Scalia the intuition “that
because the law does not actually change, the ‘new’ law was in fact always also the ‘old’ law”).
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judges do not make new rules “out of whole cloth.” 169 They must ground their
decisions in the preceding legal materials: “in the text that Congress or the Constitution has provided.” 170 For Scalia, the declaratory theory simply reﬂects the
modest judicial attitude that judges must hold. Recognizing that their lawmaking power is constrained, they should commit to making law only “as judges make
it, which is to say as though they were ‘ﬁnding’ it—discerning what the law is,
rather than decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be.” 171
To cast oﬀ that constraint, he contended, would be “to alter in a fundamental
way the assigned balance of responsibility and power among the three
branches.” 172
A constraining, “more realistic” account of the declaratory theory also appeared across the pond in a seminal decision of the House of Lords. 173 In his
swansong judgment, Lord Goﬀ of Chieveley—whose juridical philosophy maintained that “[p]ragmatism must be the watchword” 174—accepted as “inevitable”
that “in reality . . . the law is the subject of development by the judges.” 175 Since
judicial lawmaking “is what actually happens,” Lord Goﬀ sought to “look at the
declaratory theory of judicial decision with open eyes.” 176 He dismissed the “historical” notion of “an ideal system of the common law, which the judges from
time to time reveal in their decisions.” 177 But he did not regard the declaratory
theory “as an aberration of the common law;” he described it, instead, as “an
inevitable attribute of judicial decision-making.” 178 Lord Goﬀ considered the
169.

Scalia, The Rule of Law, supra note 168, at 1183; see GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 159, at
252.
170. Scalia, The Rule of Law, supra note 168, at 1183.
171.

James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 549 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id.; see Peter Cane, The Common Law, the High Court of Australia, and the United States Supreme
Court, in APEX COURTS AND THE COMMON LAW 66, 77 (Paul Daley ed., 2019).
173. Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349 (HL) 377 (Lord Goﬀ of
Chieveley) (appeal taken from Eng.); see Bowen, supra note 116, at 331 (“The decision in
[Kleinwort] is thus extremely important insofar as it held that the victor in the clash was the
declaratory theory.”); Jane Convery, Lord Goﬀ ’s Swansong: Restitution, Mistake of Law, and the
Retrospective Eﬀect of Judicial Decisions, 3 EDINBURGH L. REV. 202, 216 (1999) (criticizing the
majority Law Lords’ “acceptance of the declaratory theory”); Peter Mirﬁeld, A Challenge to the
Declaratory Theory of Law, 124 LAW Q. REV. 190, 190 (2008) (observing that “[t]he English
judiciary continues to maintain its institutional commitment to the declaratory theory of
law”); cf. Hammer, supra note 58, at 412 (supposing that “English judges, like their American
counterparts, reject the declaratory theory”).
174. Robert Goﬀ, The Search for Principle, 69 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 169, 186 (1984).
172.

175.
176.
177.
178.

Kleinwort Benson, [1999] 2 AC at 377.
Id.
Id. at 378.
Id. at 379.
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essential elements of the declaratory theory to be “the doctrine of precedent” and
the practice of “development, usually . . . very modest development, of existing
principle.” 179 So characterized, Lord Goﬀ thought that even “radical” departures
from previously established principle “must nevertheless be seen as a development of the law, and treated as such.” 180 And what it meant to treat it as such was
that “when the judges state what the law is, their decisions do . . . have a retrospective eﬀect.” 181
To a similar end, the eminent British judge Lord Reid “debunked the notion
that judges declare but do not make law” 182 and ridiculed the theory that one
could ﬁnd the common law “in some Aladdin’s cave” through “knowledge of the
magic words Open Sesame.” 183 But even he did not escape the constraints of the
declaratory theory by venturing to disavow its central tenet: that “judge-made
law is always retrospective.” 184 It is not a contentious proposition that judges determine the law in the context of past disputes. One does not need to be a “natural lawyer” to recognize retroactivity as a basic feature of adjudication.
The converse position is equally tenuous: that the natural-law perspective
rejects the notion of law changing, and that it necessarily rejects non-retroactivity. This is the claim that when judges overrule precedent they simply correct
errors of past judges, so natural law demands retroactivity in adjudication. This
proposition ﬂounders, however, under the assessment of Lon Fuller, the preeminent theorist of the law’s internal morality. Fuller acknowledged that judges develop the law. He also recognized the paradox “that courts, in order to avoid the
appearance of legislating, cast their legislative enactments in the harshest possible form, making them ex post facto.” 185 While accepting the presumption that
“a retroactive law is truly a monstrosity,” 186 Fuller showed that in most cases judicial retroactivity can be justiﬁed, both as a matter of legal morality and pragmatic adjudication. 187 Nevertheless, for Fuller, adjudication did not demand retroactivity in all cases: “Theoretically, a court might distinguish between
[obviously retroactive] decisions and those which announce a rule or standard

179.

Id. at 378.

180.

Id.
181. Id.; see Cane, supra note 172, at 90.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
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Anthony Mason, The Judge as Law-Maker, 3 JAMES COOK UNIV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1996).
Reid, supra note 120, at 22.
Id. at 23; see Beever, supra note 132, at 432-33.
Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 391 (1978).
LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 53 (rev. ed. 1969).
Id. at 53-57, 92, 240-41.
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that seems ‘new,’ even though it may represent a reasoned conclusion from familiar premises.” 188
In exceptional cases of “new” law, some judgments could be “prospective
only.” 189 Such cases would, however, have to be the exception to the norm of
retroactive adjudication in order to maintain the stability of the legal system. 190
Moreover, it is clear that principles of natural right and natural justice underlie many claims for non-retroactivity. Arguments for prospective overruling
are o�en grounded in basic rule-of-law notions of fundamental fairness, 191 reliance on settled law, 192 predictability of law, 193 fair notice of legal change, 194 and
closure and ﬁnality of legal liability. 195 Retroactive adjudication, it seems, is not
an essential condition of natural-law jurisprudence.
And so, at the third proposition—to abandon the declaratory model on legalphilosophical grounds—we reach an impasse. The declaratory theory of adjudication does not hew only to one side of the legal-philosophical debate. Nor does
the notion of judicial retroactivity. Arguments from natural law, legal positivism,
and legal realism can be, and have been, corralled both for and against retroactive
adjudication. Even if the debate were resolved, then, determining whether in a
given case a law is “new”—and how its temporality should be understood—
would remain a puzzle.
3. Summary
The idea that the (non-)retroactivity puzzle can be solved by taking sides in
the Blackstone/Austin debate is fundamentally misconceived. A clear answer to

188.

Fuller, supra note 185, at 392.

189.

Id.
Id.

190.
191.

See, e.g., James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 536 (1991) (opinion of Souter,
J., joined by Stevens, J.) (“[T]o apply the new rule to parties who relied on the old would
oﬀend basic notions of justice and fairness.”); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.
Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 371 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (basing non-retroactivity doctrine on the principle of fairness and “fundamental notions of justiﬁed reliance and due process”); Fisch, supra note 19, at 1084; Daniel E. Troy, Toward a Deﬁnition and Critique of Retroactivity, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1329, 1330-31 (2000).
192. See infra Section II.B.
193.

E.g., Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1763-67.
194. E.g., Guido Calabresi, Retroactivity: Paramount Powers and Contractual Changes, 71 YALE L.J.
1191, 1191 n.2 (1962); Troy, supra note 191, at 1342.
195. E.g., Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 212 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 627 (1965); Thyssenkrupp Steel N. Am., Inc. v. United States,
886 F.3d 1215, 1223 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Kay, supra note 58, at 52.
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law’s temporal implications does not lie within an intractable philosophical debate. Attempts to ﬁnd it there will inevitably be “misguided, inconclusive, and
unproductive.” 196
B. Right-Reliance Balancing Framework
Might the solution lie not in philosophy but in functionalism? Pamela Stephens suggests that the inquiry into whether a novel precedent is “new” law is
“merely code language for the reliance interests involved.” 197 The function of
non-retroactivity doctrine should be to resolve parties’ competing interests.
Many commentators favor the idea that the temporal fallout of new law should
be tempered by balancing recognition of new rights with others’ expectations
and reliance on the state of the law at the time they acted. Justice O’Connor’s
judicial opinions also endorsed this view. Yet accounts of a right-reliance balancing framework are frequently too simplistic and fail to address basic questions
regarding whose reliance is relevant, as well as when reliance interests are material. The lack of a coherent answer to these questions dooms the framework.
1. Description
The crux of the problem with judicial retroactivity lies in the unfairness of
applying new rules to events that preceded a court’s novel precedent. People who
fail to anticipate a legal change will have interacted and transacted against the
backdrop of the “old” rule. Parties may have acted in reliance on some clear statutory or common-law rule that aﬃrms principle of law X, or in the reasonable
expectation that the relevant principle of law was X. These interests will be upset
if a court later overrules the “clear past precedent” or delivers a ruling on a point
that “was not clearly foreshadowed.” 198 A subsequent ruling that the relevant
principle of law is ¬X may undercut the reasonable bases on which parties previously interacted and transacted.
Incentive distortions might then follow. The potential for new decisions to
change past law creates pervasive uncertainty. Fear of disruptive legal change
may deter people from transacting on the basis of current settled law and lead to

196.

Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1084 n.42; see also Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1764 n.187
(endorsing “a philosophically unambitious account” of non-retroactivity doctrine).

197.

Stephens, supra note 31, at 1573.
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971).

198.
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underinvestment. 199 Judges may also become “hesitant to discard an outmoded
rule due to the transition’s impact on settled expectations” 200 and the administrative costs of eﬀecting change. 201 If overall the new rule is superior to the old,
judicial reluctance to apply it may stymie “eﬃcient legal reform.” 202
Non-retroactivity doctrine functions to preserve prior expectation and reliance interests while facilitating implementation of superior new rules of law for
the future. A note in this Journal once opined that the doctrine “allows a court to
have its cake and eat it too—to overrule an outmoded precedent without having
to disappoint the justiﬁed expectations of anyone.” 203 Applying the doctrine,
past events remain governed by the past law, and new events by the new law. As
Masur and Mortara aver, prospective overruling “decouple[s] a judicial decision’s prospective eﬀect—which is presumptively positive—from the backwardlooking harm it might do to investment-backed expectations and reliance interests.” 204 It “enables courts to . . . chang[e] bad law without upsetting the reasonable expectations of those who relied on it.” 205
How is this achieved? Through judicial cost-beneﬁt analysis. 206 The Court
in Chevron Oil explicitly directed judges to “weigh the merits and demerits” of
retroactively applying new rules in each case and to “weigh[] the inequity imposed by retroactive application.” 207 Justice O’Connor, who authored several signiﬁcant opinions favoring non-retroactivity doctrine, invoked the “balanc[ing]”

199.

Masur & Mortara, supra note 22, at 974 (“[L]egal instability can upset reliance interests and
create problems of inadequate investment regardless of whether the change in the law is generally helpful or harmful.”).
200. Rhodes, supra note 4, at 403.
201.

Fisch, supra note 19, at 1119.
Rhodes, supra note 4, at 408; see also Gil J. Ghatan, The Incentive Problem with Prospective Overruling: A Critique of the Practice, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 179, 192-99 (2010) (arguing
that non-retroactivity doctrine suppresses plaintiﬀs’ incentives to argue for eﬃcient changes
in the law); see Masur & Mortara, supra note 22, at 982 (suggesting that the costs of upsetting
reliance-based interests may “lead courts to refrain from changing the law, even when they
believe that the law is not optimally calibrated”).
203. Note, supra note 70, at 912.
202.

204.

Masur & Mortara, supra note 22, at 968.
205. Traynor, supra note 118, at 542.
206.

William W. Berry III, Normative Retroactivity, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 485, 506 (2016) (framing
“the retroactivity inquiry in terms of the normative impact of the new constitutional rule at
issue”); Lehn, supra note 29, at 566 (suggesting that “the only viable solution to the retroactivity problem is a cost-beneﬁt test” and “that the reliance interest is at the heart of this test”).

207.

Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971) (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618, 629 (1965)).
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of competing interests. 208 Reliance is a major interest that has informed the Supreme Court’s landmark judgments. 209 The merits of upholding private rights
as articulated by the courts (which counsel in favor of retroactivity) are balanced
against parties’ “good-faith” expectations and reliance on the state of the law at
the time they acted (which “counsel in favor of nonretroactivity” of new
rules). 210 Despite its seeming demise before the Rehnquist Court, Chevron Oilstyle balancing continues implicitly to inform judicial reasoning today. 211 Stephens suggests that the justiﬁability of a party’s reliance on a prior rule can be
determined by “how well established the prior rule of law was, how clear it was,
[and] perhaps whether there was reason (in the form of evolving, eroding
caselaw) to predict a change.” 212 This framework sets up a neat dichotomy between the interests of those who relied on the old rule and those seeking to beneﬁt from the new rule: the new rule’s temporal reach depends on whose interests
are ultimately more compelling.
2. Critique
This is, however, an overly simplistic précis. In order to understand how reliance interests aﬀect the scope of a new rule of law, we must ﬁrst understand
whose reliance is relevant, as well as when reliance interests are material in the
process of interaction and litigation. The jurisprudence is opaque and inconsistent on both of these points.

208.

James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 558 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting);
see also Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 181-86 (1990) (plurality opinion) (applying the balancing approach to non-retroactivity doctrine).
209. John Bernard Corr, Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court Doctrine as Applied, 61 N.C. L. REV.
745, 773 (1983) (observing that among the factors the Court considers in its retroactivity analyses, reliance “perhaps stirs the greatest empathy”); Shannon, supra note 34, at 813 (“The
problem usually takes the form of reliance; because one or more parties . . . relied on the ‘old’
law, it would be unfair to apply the ‘new’ law to those parties.”); Stephens, supra note 31, at
1560 (“The fairness which formed the rationale for pure or modiﬁed prospectivity, was of a
type which focused on reliance.”); Jason Tzu-cheng Kuo, Note, Retroactivity of Refund Claims
for Unconstitutional State Taxes: How Helpful Is the Chevron Oil Test?, 45 TAX LAW. 889, 893
(1992) (“Constitutional violations should be classiﬁed into at least two types, one in which
there is no reliance . . . , and another in which there is demonstrated reliance.”).
210. Chen, supra note 6, at 1435; see Traynor, supra note 124, at 542 (contending that retroactivity
of novel precedent would “upset[] the reasonable expectations of those who relied” on prior
law).
211.
212.
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See Beske, supra note 20 passim.
Stephens, supra note 31, at 1573.
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a. Who?
There is no satisfactory answer as to whose reliance interests should be taken
into account. A narrow focus (that considers the litigants’ interests) means the
law will be one thing for people who can prove reliance and another thing for
people who cannot. A broad focus (that considers anyone’s interests) is nebulous
and may well subvert litigants’ own interests.
Consider ﬁrst the narrow focus. One might expect the argument for nonretroactivity to hinge on the mutual reliance on the old rule by all of the “litigants” to the case. 213 If parties were operating in the shadow of the prior rule,
intuitively it seems unfair to revise the basis of their interaction a�er the fact in
a way that neither party would have expected. Commentary on non-retroactivity
doctrine frequently refers to protecting “the parties’” reliance interests. 214 But
case law shows that mutual reliance of litigants is not pertinent. Indeed, parties’
interests are o�en at odds. One party may litigate seeking to challenge the status
quo, while others plead reliance on the status quo to constrain the scope of any
subsequent legal change. 215 Reliance arguments are considered particularly persuasive when the party pleading reliance is a public body for which the fallout of
legal change would be disruptive. 216 Where, for instance, a court strikes down
an unconstitutional tax, a state’s “good faith reliance on a presumptively valid
statute” 217 and its “exceedingly strong interest in ﬁnancial stability” 218 will tend
to weigh in favor of restricting backward-looking relief.
More broadly, relevant interests may extend beyond litigants. The reliance
interests of nonparties who stand to be adversely aﬀected by a change in the law
seem to weigh against retroactive implementation of a new rule. Indeed, it is far
from clear that actual reliance is pertinent at all. 219 Supreme Court precedent indicates that the impact on general categories of people might be the more

213.

Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971). But see Fisch, supra note 19, at 1086
(“Looking to the litigants’ interests . . . provides little guidance.”).
214. See Stephens, supra note 31, at 1569.
215.
216.

See Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 218-19 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See Stephens, supra note 31, at 1574.

217.

McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 44 (1990).
218. Id. at 37.
219.

See Note, supra note 70, at 945 (suggesting that “in a great many cases . . . the parties will have
acted without any knowledge at all of what the governing law was” and so they cannot realistically claim to be surprised by a change in the law; “whatever law is ﬁnally held to govern
their conduct, whether it be the old rule or the new rule, will be a new rule to them”).
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signiﬁcant consideration than the impact on the parties to the case. 220 Justice
O’Connor favored an expansive view of relevant reliance interests. Her judgments invoked non-retroactivity to protect the reliance interests not just of immediate parties, 221 but also of nonparty state or government entities, 222 government oﬃcers tasked with enforcing an overruled law, 223 and even the legislatures
that enacted the law 224 and the judges who interpreted it. 225 In American Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, Justice O’Connor emphasized the importance of giving “great
weight to the reliance interests of all parties aﬀected by changes in the law.” 226 In
her dissent in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, she characterized prospective overruling as necessary to protect the interests of “every jurisdiction in the
Nation that reasonably relied on” the previous rule of law. 227 It would seem that
so long as someone—whether or not a party to proceedings—relied on a previous
rule of law, their interest will tilt the scales toward non-retroactivity of novel
precedent. Such appeal to general reliance may well subvert, rather than protect,
litigants’ own reliance interests.
b. When?
As to the temporal question, is it reliance on the old rule at the time of transaction, at the time of litigation, or at the time of judicial resolution that is relevant? And how should courts take account of shi�s in a party’s reliance? The
jurisprudence on these points is also unclear. It is useful in this regard to revisit
the two scenarios that implicate retroactivity discussed in Section I.A. Pending
cases are those brought at a time when the old rule was seen to be in force. In
these cases, it is tempting to assume that at the time the parties interacted, their

220.

See Kay, supra note 58, at 42 (“[C]ourts almost always consider categories of cases[,] not the
presence or absence of reliance by the particular parties before the court.”). But see Stephens,
supra note 31, at 1574 (“[I]t should be actual reliance in the usual case, which will be necessary
to overcome the presumption of retroactivity.”).

221.

Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 370 (1991) (O’Connor,
J., dissenting) (emphasizing “respondents’ entirely proper reliance” on the prior rule).

222.

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989).
Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 185 (1990) (plurality opinion).

223.
224.

Id. at 182.
225. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1791 n.318 (noting the Supreme Court’s seeming concern
for “protecting the reliance interests or sensibilities of state court judges rather than those of
state and local oﬃcials”). But see Schwartz, supra note 34, at 756 (“Nor is it clear who would
be harmed by complete retroactivity. State judges might be oﬀended, but they certainly would
not be harmed.”).
226.
227.
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reliance interests were aligned with the “old” rule. This may be true of plaintiﬀs
who sue seeking to take advantage of the old rule without anticipating it being
overruled. But what of pioneering plaintiﬀs—such as the Obergefell plaintiﬀs—
who believed the old rule was wrong and sought to challenge it by reference to
some other, better rule? 228 Their reliance was never on the old rule, but instead
on a competing rule or constitutional principle. Should non-retroactivity doctrine draw a distinction between cases according to diﬀerences in the parties’
respective accounts of reliance?
And what of those subsequent cases—like those that followed in Obergefell’s
wake—where a plaintiﬀ, whose interaction was apparently governed by the old
rule, seeks (without violating other procedural constraints) 229 to rely on a new
rule announced by a court? It is not necessarily the case that plaintiﬀs simply
shi� their reliance interests from the old rule to the new rule when it suits them.
Successive plaintiﬀs might always have viewed the old rule as unjust or unconstitutional yet not had the means or fortitude to challenge their treatment under
it until some favorable, novel precedent was handed down. Should such circumstances negate the inference that they “relied” on the old rule at all? Or should
such cases raise the specter of opening the ﬂoodgates, so as to warrant non-retroactivity? It is diﬃcult to ascertain when reliance interests are material in these
cases.
i.

Pending Cases

The reliance interest is premised on the unfairness of rules “changing” between the time a party acts and the time its actions are adjudicated. 230 This unfairness seems particularly stark when a plaintiﬀ has brought suit seeking to invoke rule X, but rule X is replaced with rule ¬X before the plaintiﬀ ’s suit is
resolved. That is what happened in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 231 a case that became the high watermark of the Supreme Court’s civil non-retroactivity doctrine. Huson had ﬁled a personal-injury action two years a�er he was injured on
Chevron Oil’s oﬀshore drilling rig. Federal precedent at that time held that maritime law governed oﬀshore injuries, and Chevron Oil did not challenge the
timeliness of Huson’s claim under the admiralty laches doctrine. However, while
the claim was pending, the Supreme Court handed down Rodrigue v. Aetna
228.

The old rule in this case being state laws that “deﬁne marriage as a union between one man
and one woman.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 653-54 (2015). The new rule being an
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment that protects the petitioners’ “right to marry or
to have their marriages, lawfully performed in another State, given full recognition.” Id. at 655.
229. Such as res judicata or limitations periods. See infra Section III.B.
230.
231.

See Lehn, supra note 29, at 565.
404 U.S. 97 (1971).
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Casualty & Surety Co., holding that injuries occurring on ﬁxed oﬀshore platforms
were governed not by maritime law but by the law of the adjacent state. 232 One
of the implications of Rodrigue, though it was not the subject of that litigation,
was that such claims would be subject to state statutes of limitations. Chevron
Oil sought to invoke Rodrigue to dismiss Huson’s claim because he had ﬁled it
outside of the adjacent state of Louisiana’s more restrictive one-year limitations
statute.
It is easy to see how reliance interests tilted the Court in favor of restraining
the retroactive eﬀect of Rodrigue in Huson’s case. Chevron Oil had not initially
questioned the applicability of maritime law to the suit. Huson had not anticipated that the governing precedent would change. Both parties, it seems, “relied”
on maritime law governing their dispute, at least until it served the defendant’s
interests to argue otherwise. The Court considered it “inequitable” to hold Huson to the one-year limitations period when at the time “he could not have
known the time limitation that the law imposed upon him.” 233 The inference is
that if Huson’s case had been resolved before Rodrigue, it would have succeeded,
and that Huson should not be penalized by the happenstance of when his case
was heard. But this inference only holds because Chevron Oil did not challenge
maritime law’s jurisdiction at the outset. Had Chevron Oil always pleaded state
limitations law in response to Huson’s claim, 234 thereby setting up the sort of
argument that ultimately succeeded in Rodrigue, it is not obvious that the balance
of competing reliance interests would necessarily have favored Huson.
Novel precedent does not inevitably disrupt mutual reliance interests in
pending cases. 235 The more recent case of Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde 236 provides a stark counter-illustration to Chevron Oil. Hyde, too, suﬀered an injury
attributable to the defendant. She ﬁled suit three-and-a-half years a�er her accident. Ohio’s limitations period for personal injury was two years, but Hyde
sought to rely on a statutory exception that tolled limitations while a defendant
was not “present” in the state. 237 In reply, the Pennsylvania-based defendant argued that Hyde’s claim was barred by the two-year limitations period, and that
the tolling provision was unconstitutional and so did not apply. Thus, from the
outset of the litigation, the parties “relied” on diﬀerent rules of law. Before the

232.
233.

395 U.S. 352, 355 (1969).
Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 108 (quoting Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969)).

234.

It is far from deﬁnitive that “[t]he most [Huson] could do was to rely on the law as it then
was.” Id. at 107; see infra Section III.C.

235.

Fisch, supra note 19, at 1086 (“[T]he actual degree to which a new rule aﬀects justiﬁed reliance
interests varies considerably from case to case.”).

236.

514 U.S. 749 (1995).
Id. at 751 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.15(A) (1991)).

237.
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case reached trial, the U.S. Supreme Court delivered judgment in Bendix Autolite
Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., holding that the Ohio limitations-tolling provision for out-of-state defendants violated the Commerce Clause. 238 In this context, it is not so easy to conceive of Bendix as disrupting the parties’ reliance interests, as it simply reﬂected Reynoldsville Casket’s position from the outset. Hyde
was not caught oﬀ guard in the way Huson was caught oﬀ guard. Reynoldsville
Casket did not need to rely on Bendix to advance its limitations argument. It
invoked the arguments that informed the reasoning in Bendix from the outset.
The Supreme Court then unanimously rejected the argument that Hyde’s reliance on the pre-Bendix understanding of the law should trump the presumptive
retroactivity of the holding in Bendix. 239 Reynoldsville Casket prevailed under
the “new” law.
Chevron Oil and Reynoldsville Casket were cases concerning plaintiﬀs’ reliance
on an old rule. More commonly, it is defendants who invoke non-retroactivity to
curb the impact of a change in the status quo. The argument seems compelling
that defendants should not be penalized for relying on some unchallenged legal
rule that is impugned only at a future date. 240 But once a legal rule is challenged,
pleas of reliance seem more dubious. Why should a defendant on notice of a
challenge to the validity of a legal rule nevertheless continue to beneﬁt from
pleading reliance on that rule?
In this regard, the Supreme Court’s decision in American Trucking Ass’ns v.
Smith is problematic. 241 Smith arose out of a constitutional challenge brought by
out-of-state truckers to Arkansas’ Highway Use Equalization Tax Act (HUE Tax
Act), a tax statute enacted in March 1983 with eﬀect from July 1983. 242 The plaintiﬀs ﬁled suit in May 1983, contending that the HUE Tax Act violated clauses of
both the state and federal constitutions. Thus, the HUE Tax Act was subject to
judicial review from the outset. While the case was being litigated, Arkansas continued to levy the tax without escrow. A�er failing in the state courts, 243 the
plaintiﬀs sought certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, but the Court held
their appeal pending decision on a materially similar case, American Trucking

238.

486 U.S. 888, 891 (1988).

239.

Reynoldsville Casket, 514 U.S. at 758-59; see also Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.
Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364 (1991) (retroactively applying a new statute-of-limitations interpretation).
240. See discussion of subsequent cases infra Section II.B.2.b.ii.
241.
242.
243.

496 U.S. 167 (1990).
See id. at 206 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the HUE Tax Act).
See Am. Trucking Ass’n v. Gray, 707 S.W.2d 759, 761-63 (Ark. 1986) (relying on the Supreme
Court’s prior decisions upholding ﬂat taxes).
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Ass’ns v. Scheiner. 244 The Supreme Court delivered Scheiner in June 1987, holding
that Pennsylvania’s unapportioned ﬂat highway-use tax violated the Commerce
Clause, and remanded the Arkansas case back to the Arkansas Supreme Court.245
In light of the new precedent, the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled the HUE tax
unconstitutional, but it declined to order restitution of taxes back to 1983, holding that Scheiner did not apply retroactively. 246 On further appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, a four-Justice plurality 247 in Smith held that Scheiner did not apply
to taxation of highway use prior to the date it was decided (namely, June 23,
1987). That was because Scheiner had established “a new principle of law,” and
its retroactive application was neither necessary nor appropriate. 248 The State of
Arkansas, the plurality held, had “relied on valid, existing precedent in enacting
and implementing its tax.” 249 They considered that the “inequity of unsettling
actions taken in reliance on those precedents [was] apparent,” as refunds of previous taxes paid “could deplete the state treasury, thus threatening the State’s
current operations and future plans.” 250
This is an unsatisfying presentation of the respective reliance interests in
Smith. The four plurality Justices characterized the State of Arkansas as having
relied in “good faith” on “presumptively valid” law. 251 True, the HUE Tax Act
was not clearly invalid when enacted. 252 But even before the HUE Tax Act came
into eﬀect, its lawfulness and constitutionality were challenged in court. The
state was on notice from the outset that its reliance might not be well placed. The
plaintiﬀs, meanwhile, placed their reliance in the U.S. Constitution and the State
of Arkansas Constitution, clauses of which they contended invalidated the HUE
244.

483 U.S. 266 (1987).

245.

Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Gray, 483 U.S. 1014 (1987).
246. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Gray, 746 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Ark. 1988) (ordering restitution only back
to the date of Justice Blackmun’s escrow order on August 14, 1987).
247. Justice Scalia joined as a ﬁ�h vote concurring with the plurality’s judgment, writing separately
because he thought that Scheiner was wrongly decided and it was necessary to curb its consequential impact. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 202 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). For further discussion, see infra Section II.E.1.
248. Smith, 496 U.S. at 187 (plurality opinion).
249.
250.

251.

Id. at 183.
Id. at 182; see also James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 558 (1991) (O’Connor,
J., dissenting) (emphasizing states’ reliance interests “at a time when most States are struggling to fund even the most basic services”).

Smith, 496 U.S. at 186 (plurality opinion) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 209
(1973)). This argument has also been used to justify the non-retroactivity of Obergefell, 576
U.S. 644 (2015), and Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). See supra notes 6, 9.
252. Cf. McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 46 (1990) (noting
that the state could “hardly claim surprise” at the invalidation of the tax scheme at issue, given
that it was “virtually identical” to a scheme previously invalidated by the Court).
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Tax Act. The plaintiﬀs ultimately succeeded on their primary argument—their
reliance was shown to be well placed. Why should the unsuccessful defendant
state’s reliance trump the long-held reliance interests of the successful plaintiﬀs? 253
ii. Subsequent Cases
The reliance assumption—that retroactive application of new rules to past
transactions is unfair because at the time of transaction, the parties would have
“relied” on the old rule—fails in pending cases, and it is similarly diﬃcult to defend in subsequently ﬁled cases. These are cases where a plaintiﬀ ﬁles a claim
only a�er the new rule is delivered. For several reasons, we cannot assume that
plaintiﬀs’ reliance shi�s from the old rule to the new rule in such cases, or that
ﬁling suit gives rise to unfairness that favors defendants’ reliance on the old rule.
First, the line between pending and subsequent cases is procedural, not substantive. A plaintiﬀ who ﬁles suit challenging a rule of law before an appellate
court hands down a novel precedent that overturns that rule may have pleaded
the exact same arguments as the principal plaintiﬀ whose case became the vehicle
for change. 254 They might also be materially the same arguments that subsequent plaintiﬀs bring when they seek to take advantage of the new rule. The
diﬀerence is one of timing, not substantive pleading.
Second, there are any number of reasons why plaintiﬀs might not ﬁle suit to
vindicate a rights violation before a novel precedent is handed down. They may
lack the resources, the competence, or the conﬁdence to pioneer proceedings.
Such plaintiﬀs might even comprise those with particularly sympathetic circumstances but who are only in a position to pursue their rights via class-action proceedings led by others. This does not mean we can presume that such plaintiﬀs
viewed the old rule as valid and constitutional at the time they labored under it,
such that their suit under the new rule should be subject to dismissal.
Third, the inquiry into parties’ actual reliance is unhelpful. Changes in precedent invariably aﬀect countless parties and nonparties to litigation—many of
whom will, and perhaps many more of whom will not, have “relied” on the old
rule. 255 The non-retroactivity analysis attempts an impossibly ambitious balancing exercise between manifold competing interests. But, as Justice Souter

253.

See infra Section III.B.
254. See Walter V. Schaefer, The Control of “Sunbursts”: Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42
N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 645 (1967) (arguing that “[t]oo many irrelevant considerations, including
the common cold, bear upon the rate of progress of a case through the judicial system” for it
to be a salient basis for distinguishing rights).
255. See Fairchild, supra note 86, at 260.
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insisted in James B. Beam, the substantive law cannot “shi� and spring” according to “the particular equities” of individual parties’ claims, like “whether they
actually relied on the old rule and how they would suﬀer from retroactive application of the new.” 256 For “reliance on cases subsequently abandoned” is “a fact
of life if not always one of jurisprudential recognition.” 257
Recognizing these problems in a series of tax-restitution cases, a majority of
the Supreme Court post-Smith shrank from treating reliance interests as persuasive when advanced by defendants in cases brought following a novel precedent.
In James B. Beam, the plaintiﬀs had sought a refund of Georgia state excise taxes
on imported liquor paid between 1982 and 1984, a�er the Supreme Court in June
1984 struck down a materially similar tax statute in Hawaii. 258 Writing an opinion in support of the Court’s judgment, 259 Justice Souter applied this “new” rule
retroactively, though he acknowledged the suspicion that such plaintiﬀs “only
exploit others’ eﬀorts by litigating in the new rule’s wake.” 260 Countering that
charge, Justice Souter maintained that these “putative hangers-on . . . are merely
asserting a right that the Court has told them is theirs in law.” 261 Such plaintiﬀs
“cannot be characterized as freeloaders any more than those who seek vindication
under a new rule on facts arising a�er the rule’s announcement. Those in each
class rely on the labors of the ﬁrst successful litigant.” 262
Moreover, Justice Souter continued, using non-retroactivity doctrine to distinguish between pending and subsequent cases would only exacerbate administrative burdens, because “distinguishing between those [plaintiﬀs] with cases
pending and those without would only serve to encourage the ﬁling of replicative
suits when this or any other appellate court created the possibility of a new rule
by taking a case for review.” 263

256.

James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 543 (1991) (opinion of Souter, J., joined
by Stevens, J.), cited with approval in Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993);
see Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swi�-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 406 n.6 (2006).

257.

James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 536 (opinion of Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.).
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).

258.
259.

Justice Souter’s opinion was joined only by Justice Stevens. The opinion was supplemented
by three others that concurred in the judgment and by one dissent authored by Justice O’Connor for herself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Kennedy.
260. James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 542 (opinion of Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.) (adding that “Beam
had yet to enter the waters at the time of our decision in Bacchus, and yet we give it Bacchus’
beneﬁt”).
261.

Id. Justice Souter continued, “The applicability of rules of law is not to be switched on and oﬀ
according to individual hardship.” Id. at 543.

262.

Id. at 542.
Id. at 542-43.

263.
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A similar approach was taken in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation. 264
The Harper plaintiﬀs had sought a refund of Virginia state taxes discriminatorily
imposed on their federal retirement beneﬁts a�er the Supreme Court struck
down as unconstitutional a materially similar tax scheme in Michigan. 265 While
Michigan had conceded that restitution was the appropriate remedy, Virginia did
not. The Virginia Supreme Court declined to apply the U.S. Supreme Court’s
new precedent retroactively, 266 even a�er it reevaluated the plaintiﬀs’ suit in
light of James B. Beam. 267 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Applying James B.
Beam, Justice Thomas held that when the Court “applies a rule of federal law to
the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and
must be given full retroactive eﬀect” in both pending and subsequent cases.268
The Court majority rejected Justice O’Connor’s position that defendants’ reliance interests should take precedence unless the defendant acted in a manner akin
to bad faith. 269 The majority did not do so for “fairness” reasons, although, patently, unfairness can ensue from applying disparate rules to principal and successive parties. 270 Instead, the Court invoked “basic norms of constitutional adjudication” to prioritize applying precedent—including new rules—equally to
all. 271 In so doing, the Court majority repudiated the technique of selective prospective overruling altogether.
3. Summary
The right-reliance balancing framework calls on courts to weigh the costs
and beneﬁts to parties of applying new rules retroactively. This framework is
malleable to the point of being manipulable. Notions of reliance can readily be
264.

509 U.S. 86 (1993).

265.

Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of the Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989).
Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 401 S.E.2d 868 (Va. 1991).

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

271.

Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 410 S.E.2d 629 (Va. 1991).
Harper, 509 U.S. at 97.
Id. at 135 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Molitor v. Kaneland Cmty. Unit Dist. No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89, 96-97 (Ill. 1959) (initially using selective prospectivity to grant relief to one student who brought a personal-injury suit as a test case against his school following a serious bus crash, while denying relief to
other victims of the same crash (including the test plaintiﬀ ’s siblings) whose cases were pending—a disparity in treatment that was only rectiﬁed in subsequent proceedings), revisited in
182 N.E.2d 145 (Ill. 1962); see also Fairchild, supra note 86, at 268-69 (discussing Molitor);
Hammer, supra note 58, at 423-24 (noting the unfairness of the initial Molitor holding).
Harper, 509 U.S. at 87 (quoting Griﬃth v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987)); see also Reich
v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 114 (1994) (“[T]axpayers need not have taken any steps to learn of
the possible unconstitutionality of their taxes at the time they paid them. Accordingly, they
may not now be put in any worse position for having failed to take such steps.”).
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tamed to meet decisionmakers’ desired ends. It remains unclear whose reliance is
pertinent to the assessment, and whether the inquiry is a subjective or objective
one. Nor is it clear when in the process of interaction and litigation reliance interests become material. The upshot of this framework, it would seem, is that so
long as someone, somewhere, at some time might have relied on the “old” rule,
their interest will weigh against retroactive application of the “new” rule. This is
not a stable foundation on which to rest the doctrine.
C. Choice-of-Law Framework
Perhaps the problem with the right-reliance balancing framework is that it
emphasizes the wrong dichotomy. Sunburst Oil suggested that novel precedent
presents courts with a “choice” between applying old law and applying new
law. 272 In the 1950s, Henry Hart and Albert Sacks characterized Sunburst Oiltype cases as raising a “problem of the conﬂict of laws in time.” 273 This characterization has endeared itself to some judges at the highest level. Under scrutiny,
however, it does not fare well. The choice-of-law framework bears the same
ﬂaws as the legal-philosophical and right-reliance balancing frameworks.
Though intuitively appealing, it is not a workable method for determining the
temporal reach of novel precedent.
1. Description
According to Hart and Sacks’s “conﬂict of laws in time” theory, the problem
with new law arising from the judicial branch is that
the substantive content of its laws is constantly changing. . . . Again and
again, in many varied types of situations, the question[] presents itself:
Should this matter be settled in accordance with the law as it was or appeared to be at one or another past point of time or in accordance with
the law as it appears to be now? 274
This question, which sets up a dichotomy between old law and new law from
which an adjudicating court must choose, was ﬁrst articulated in earnest at the

272.

Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932); see Richard H.S. Tur,
Time and Law, 22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 473 (2002).

273.

HART & SACKS, supra note 75, at 606.
Id. at 616.

274.
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federal level in Smith. 275 Justice O’Connor contended that when reliance interests weigh in favor of non-retroactivity, lower courts considering subsequent
cases should apply the law that governed at the time of the transaction in issue.
This meant that
[i]f the operative conduct or events occurred before the law-changing
decision, a court should apply the law prevailing at the time of the conduct. If the operative conduct or events occurred a�er the decision, so
that any reliance on old precedent would be unjustiﬁed, a court should
apply the new law. 276
The choice-of-law framework proposes that a legal issue may be subject to
diﬀerent laws that correspond to two diﬀerent temporal periods. That is because
“when the Court changes its mind, the law changes with it.” 277 The judge’s task
is to apply the law that governed at the time the issue in dispute arose. 278
Justice Souter built upon this framework in James B. Beam. He explained that
whether a new rule applies retroactively “is properly seen in the ﬁrst instance as
a matter of choice of law,” 279 which leaves a court with three options: (1) to apply
the new rule “fully retroactive[ly]” (a practice Justice Souter described as “overwhelmingly the norm”); 280 (2) to overrule “purely prospective[ly];” 281 or (3) to
apply “modiﬁed, or selective, prospectivity” by “apply[ing] a new rule in the case
in which it is pronounced, then return[ing] to the old one with respect to all
others arising on facts predating the pronouncement.” 282 Justice Souter rejected
this third option of selective prospectivity as contrary to “principles of equality

275.

Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 191 (1990) (plurality opinion); see Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1757 (noting that “[t]he four Justices in the [Smith] plurality adopted a
starkly positivist outlook”).

276.

Smith, 496 U.S. at 191 (plurality opinion). But see id. at 218-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
277. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 550 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
278.

Justice O’Connor in Smith rejected the dissent’s framing of this problem as involving not a
choice of law but a choice of remedy. Non-retroactivity doctrine, Justice O’Connor maintained,
is “better understood as part of the doctrine of stare decisis, rather than as part of the law of
remedies.” Smith, 496 U.S. at 196 (plurality opinion); see Stephens, supra note 31, at 1535; Kuo,
supra note 209, at 892-93; infra Section II.D.
279. James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 534-35 (opinion of Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.), endorsed by
Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 131-32 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see
Hans W. Baade, Time and Meaning: Notes on the Intertemporal Law of Statutory Construction and
Constitutional Interpretation, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 319, 326 (1995); Kuo, supra note 209, at 899.
280. James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 535 (opinion of Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.).
281.
282.

Id. at 536.
Id. at 537.
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and stare decisis,” 283 a rejection that the Harper majority later aﬃrmed. 284 And
though Justice Souter and Justice O’Connor were in agreement that judicial retroactivity was a choice-of-law problem, they parted ways in its application. For
Justice Souter, once it was found that a new rule had been applied to the parties
in the principal case in which it was articulated, the rejection of selective prospectivity le� the Court only one option: to apply the new rule retroactively “for
all others.” 285 Such was the case in James B. Beam. In contrast, Justice O’Connor
in dissent contended that the Court’s failure to deal with retroactivity when striking down the unconstitutional state tax at issue was an oversight that ought not
to be perpetuated when reliance interests weighed on the side of prospective
overruling. 286 Her view would suggest that the Court should explicitly pronounce the temporal scope of its judgments in future landmark cases. 287 The
Supreme Court has not, however, adopted such an approach. 288
2. Critique
The choice-of-law framework hinges on the premise “that parties should be
judged by the law in eﬀect at the time of their actions” and so the judicial inquiry
should focus on “what the transaction-time law [was].” 289 There are several
problems with the framework.
First, despite impressions, the choice-of-law framework “bears no obvious
resemblance” to conﬂict-of-laws analysis. 290 In the ﬁeld of conﬂict of laws,
choice of law is a preliminary procedural inquiry that determines which jurisdiction’s laws govern a substantive dispute. 291 It is employed, for instance, in

283.
284.

Id. at 540. But see id. at 550 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
509 U.S. at 97.

285.

James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 543 (opinion of Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.).
286. See id. at 550-51 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Kuo, supra note 209, at 891.
287.

James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 550 (O’Connor, J. dissenting). But see Note, supra note 70, at 951
(“When a federal court overrules a prior decision and announces a new rule of law by applying
it to the litigants in the case or controversy before it, it should withhold any statement as to
the retroactive eﬀect of the new rule. The question of whether the new rule should be applied
retroactively should not be decided until it is presented to a court as an actual case and controversy.”).

288.

Far from it. Since the mid-1990s, the Court has largely avoided the subject of judicial nonretroactivity. See infra note 318.

289.

Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1080.
Id.

290.
291.

326

HERMA KAY, LARRY KRAMER, KERMIT ROOSEVELT & DAVID L. FRANKLIN, CONFLICT OF LAWS:
CASES—COMMENTS—QUESTIONS 415 (10th ed. 2018).

retroactive adjudication

determining whether federal law or state law governs a case.292 The choice-oflaw inquiry relevant to retroactivity, by contrast, is neither preliminary, nor procedural, nor jurisdictional. It is a substantive inquiry into the rights of the parties
that directly determines how a dispute should be resolved. It is unhelpful to conﬂate these two concepts.
Second, the choice-of-law framework is not actually about choosing between
two laws. It is about ﬁnding what the law was during a speciﬁc temporal period. 293 The pertinent question, as Justice O’Connor characterized it in Smith, is
whether a transaction was governed by the “old” law or the “new” law. 294 This
inquiry reintroduces the conundrum of the legal-philosophical framework. The
judge’s decision on which law prevailed at the time of the parties’ transaction will
invariably be informed by their personal perspective and their philosophy of law
and adjudication. As already addressed, such inquiry is “unworkable in principle
and in practice.” 295
Third, to the extent that the choice-of-law framework does give judges a
meaningful choice between (temporal) laws, that choice, at least according to
Justice O’Connor, is guided by the right-reliance balancing framework. 296 It is
therefore subject to the same criticisms as that framework. 297
Finally, it is not clear whether, or why, the choice-of-law framework should
focus on the time of the parties’ transaction rather than the time of their dispute.
Roosevelt’s critique is premised on an example of “a transaction between two
parties” where a lawsuit is “ﬁled immediately therea�er.” 298 But transactions are
not necessarily reducible to discrete moments, nor is there necessarily immediacy
between when parties ﬁrst interact and when a dispute arises between them. A
party has no right of action until it has suﬀered a wrong or experienced a rights
violation. Is rights violation (i.e., the event that causes the plaintiﬀ to sue) not
“the operative conduct or event[]” on which the choice-of-law inquiry should
focus? 299 This supposition suggests a further complexity: the relevant rule
might change between the time of the transaction and the time of the dispute,

292.

Kuo, supra note 209, at 899.

293.

A variant of the choice-of-law framework is Jill E. Fisch’s equilibrium theory of (non-)retroactivity doctrine. See supra Section I.B.

294.

Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 191 (1990) (plurality opinion).
Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1081; see, e.g., Smith, 496 U.S. at 212 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that the impugned Arkansas ﬂat tax “violated the Constitution before our decision in
Scheiner”).

295.

296.
297.
298.
299.

See Smith, 496 U.S. at 183 (plurality opinion).
See supra Section II.B.2.
Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1080.
Smith, 496 U.S. at 218-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see id. at 191 (plurality opinion).
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and change again between the time of dispute and the time of judgment. In such
circumstances, how should the judge choose?
3. Summary
The choice-of-law framework asks courts to identify what the law was at the
time of the transaction in issue. This framework bears the same ﬂaws as the legal-philosophical and right-reliance balancing frameworks, while injecting further complexity of its own. The characterization of a legal rule as either “old” or
“new” may vary based on decisionmakers’ individual perspectives and legal philosophies, how they choose to factor in reliance interests, and when they consider operative conduct or events to be material. Such scope for variation in judicial approach can oﬀer little certainty or stability to parties assessing their
rights and duties in a dynamic legal order.
D. Remedial Framework
Instead of asking what law governed at the time of transaction, many scholars favor asking what law governs at the time of judgment. That is, “[c]ourts
should apply their current best understanding of the law to all cases before them,
regardless of whether the best understanding at the time of the transaction
would produce a diﬀerent result.” 300 Under this approach, judgments will always operate retroactively for the purpose of determining what the law was, but
courts may employ equitable considerations to curb the remedial impact of unexpected judicial changes in the law. Alas, the central inquiry of the remedial
framework—whether legal change was anticipatable—cannot produce principled distinctions between cases warranting retroactive relief and those not.
1. Description
The idea that the impact of new law should be addressed through the law of
remedies was urged by Justice Harlan II in a series of minority opinions delivered
in the twilight of his tenure on the Supreme Court.301 In United States v. Estate of
300.

Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1117; see Frederic Bloom, The Law’s Clock, 104 GEO. L.J. 1, 51 n.321
(2015) (“A time of decision rule would help close the transition window, making it clearer
what law applies in any particular instance—even if the law changed during litigation.”).

301.

Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 295 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Grifﬁth v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987) (noting that the Court had since “embraced to a
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Donnelly, a case concerning civil non-retroactivity doctrine, Justice Harlan expressed “fear” that endeavors to distinguish new law from old risked “ensnar[ing]” the Court in “a retroactivity quagmire.” 302 Instead, he endorsed applying novel precedent retroactively to all cases until doctrines of limitation or
res judicata placed them “beyond challenge.” 303 “Any uncertainty engendered by
this approach should,” he thought, “be deemed part of the risks of life.” 304 Relevant “equitable considerations,” such as “reliance,” could then be addressed “in
the determination of what relief is appropriate in any given case.” 305 On this approach, new law presents a problem for remedies, not substantive rights.
Justice Harlan’s contention that “‘[r]etroactivity’ must be rethought” has
prevailed. 306 Current Supreme Court precedent characterizes the issue as a question for remedies. 307 Justice Stevens for the dissenting justices in Smith, for example, adopted Justice Harlan’s framework. 308 He contended that Chevron Oil
and its progeny could be shown, on “[c]lose examination,” to concern “a remedial principle for the exercise of equitable discretion by federal courts” rather
than “a choice-of-law principle.” 309 This was a revisionist reading of the Court’s
precedent that Justice O’Connor sharply criticized in her plurality opinion. 310
Justice O’Connor’s aversion to the remedial framework was short lived, however, as the Court’s majority increasingly soured on non-retroactivity doctrine.
In Harper, the Court’s majority implicitly accepted the remedial framework,
though it declined to limit the remedial impact of its novel precedent in the

signiﬁcant extent the comprehensive analysis presented by Justice Harlan in [the Mackey and
Desist] opinions”).
302.

Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. at 295.
303. Id. at 296.
304.
305.

Id.
Id.

306.

United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 548 (1982) (citing Desist, 394 U.S. at 258 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).

307.

Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 761 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment); Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 114 (1994); Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509
U.S. 86, 98 (1993); see Harper, 509 U.S. at 112 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).

308.

Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 210 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Fallon &
Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1757.

309.

Smith, 496 U.S. at 219-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also James B. Beam Distilling Co. v.
Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535 (opinion of Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.) (“Once a rule is found
to apply ‘backward,’ there may then be a further issue of remedies, i.e., whether the party
prevailing under a new rule should obtain the same relief that would have been awarded if the
rule had been an old one.”).
310. Smith, 496 U.S. at 195-96 (plurality opinion).
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case. 311 Justice O’Connor, now in dissent, maintained that “[t]he questions of
retroactivity and remedy are analytically distinct.” 312 However, concerned about
“the Court’s revisions to the law of retroactivity,” which were restricting its “authority to temper hardship,” Justice O’Connor herself invoked the remedial approach. 313 She objected to retroactive remedies being “unanticipated windfall[s]”
to plaintiﬀs, imposing on defendant states “unanticipated ﬁnancial burdens” that
are ultimately borne by “blameless and unexpecting taxpayers” of those states. 314
Her priority was to preserve the Court’s ability “to avoid injustice by taking equity into account when formulating the remedy for violations of novel constitutional rules.” 315
Justice Kennedy gave the last substantive Supreme Court judgment on this
matter. Writing for himself and Justice O’Connor in Reynoldsville Casket Co. v.
Hyde, he reiterated the remedial framework 316 but “postpon[ed] extended discussion of reliance interests as they bear upon remedies” for a suitable future
case. 317 Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has not since found such a case. 318 This
has not dampened academic interest in non-retroactivity doctrine, however.
Richard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer were the ﬁrst to theorize the remedial
framework in earnest in an inﬂuential article in the Harvard Law Review. 319
Many scholars have embraced their perspective since. 320 Fallon and Meltzer
311.

Harper, 509 U.S. at 98 (1993); see id. at 112 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).

312.

Id. at 131 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 133, 136.

313.
314.

Id. at 129-31 (emphasis added).
315. Id. at 136.
316.
317.

514 U.S. 749, 761 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 764.

318.

At least not in the civil context. See also Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 243 (2011) (seemingly endorsing Justice Harlan’s approach to the retroactive eﬀect of new rules of criminal
procedure, while citing the since-abandoned plurality opinion in Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith,
496 U.S. 167 (1990), for the proposition that “[r]emedy is a separate, analytically distinct
issue [from retroactivity]”); cf. id. at 254 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“What we are actually determining when we assess the ‘retroactivity’ of a new rule is not the temporal scope of a newly
announced right, but whether a violation of the right that occurred prior to the announcement
of the new rule will entitle a criminal defendant to the relief sought.” (quoting Danforth v.
Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271 (2008))); cases cited supra note 61 (citing recent criminal-law
cases).

319.

Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, cited in Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 103
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring), and id. at 133, 136 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

320.

See, e.g., John M. Greabe, Remedial Discretion in Constitutional Adjudication, 62 BUFF. L. REV.
881, 927-28 (2014) (“[T]he Court should use a purely remedial framework—and not selective

330

retroactive adjudication

contended that “the concept of ‘new’ law” reﬂects a practical issue about the “relative unpredictability” of legal change, an issue “best understood as addressing
a question within the law of remedies.” 321 They outlined a theory of constitutional remedies that seeks to accommodate the sometimes-competing interests
in providing “eﬀective redress to individual victims of constitutional violations”
and in adequately “keep[ing] government within the bounds of law.” 322 Satisfaction of these two interests, they suggested, sometimes warrants substitutionary remedies and sometimes even the withholding of remedies. The barometer
for restricting remedies should depend on the novelty and unpredictability of
the legal change at issue. For Fallon and Meltzer, “legal rules and principles are
new to the extent that, ex ante, their recognition as authoritative would have
been viewed as relatively unlikely by competent lawyers.” 323 When a defendant
violates foreseeable or “established law,” withholding remedies on the basis of
cost or administrative disruption will oﬀend interests in rights protection, fairness, and sound incentive structures. 324 By contrast, when a defendant “might
have thought their conduct constitutionally valid, there is less need to impose a
‘penalty’ to deter future misconduct”—especially, Fallon and Meltzer contended,
when the defendant is a government oﬃcial. 325 In such cases, when rights are
relatively unpredictable ex ante, “the moral strength of a plaintiﬀ ’s claim to relief” may not be compelling. 326 The “interest in individual redress” in such cases

prospectivity or any other non-retroactivity doctrine—to protect the public interest from the
costs of constitutional innovation.”); John C. Jeﬀries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 90 (1999) (explaining that remedial limits “facilitate[] constitutional change by reducing the costs of innovation”); Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1107
(“[R]emedial analysis is the only acceptable route to prospective results . . . .”); Kuo, supra
note 209, at 901 (“[F]ocusing on remedies . . . avoids Chevron Oil’s obsession with the existence of new or old laws.”) see also Rhodes, supra note 4, at 411 (“[R]emedial relief may be
manipulated to mitigate society’s reliance costs from legal change”); Shannon, supra note 34,
at 842-43 (suggesting that “[t]he most sophisticated version” of the prospective approach that
separates “the issue of the ‘applicable’ rule of law . . . from the issue of the appropriate remedy” is “that advanced by Richard H. Fallon, Jr., and Daniel J. Meltzer”).
321.

Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1736; see also United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S.
286, 295 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (considering the impulse “to avoid jolting the expectations of parties to a transaction”).
322. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1736.
323.
324.

Id. at 1763.
Id. at 1793.

325.

Id.; see id. at 1795-96 (“[A]djustment of remedies when a constitutional violation is quite unpredictable exacts little toll on the aspiration to keep government generally within constitutional bounds.”).
326. See id. at 1797.
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may have to “yield” to other interests, which could warrant the withholding of
remedies. 327
2. Critique
The remedial framework invokes the language of equity, but its conceptualization of equity is sui generis. The remedial framework is not grounded in traditional equitable considerations of prejudice or hardship to a defendant. 328 It is
grounded in speculative considerations regarding the foreseeability or predictability of legal change. This is its ﬂaw.
The line Fallon and Meltzer strive to draw—between whether or not a novel
precedent was “relatively unpredictable”—remains highly indeterminate. Their
task is similar to the inquiry concerning whether a judgment represents “a clear
break with the past.” 329 It is not clear how this should be decided. 330 Fallon and
Meltzer would deﬁne new law “narrowly” so that “rules and decisions that are
clearly foreshadowed, . . . reﬂect ordinary legal evolution, . . . or are dictated by
precedent” could not be a basis for withholding remedies. 331 Curiously, this position suggests that the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus was not “new” law,
since public-sector unions had “been on notice for years” that the tide of constitutional precedent was turning against them. 332 Janus should, accordingly, have
retroactive eﬀect. Yet “any eﬀort to deﬁne the requisite degree of novelty will
necessarily be spongy and highly manipulable. The signals sent by the Supreme
Court in application will be at least as important as the precise verbal formulation.” 333
One upshot of the inquiry into the predictability of legal change would seem
to be to drive a wedge between pending and subsequent cases on any issue. That
is because those who ﬁle suit pleading novel claims, challenging unfavorable
precedent, reveal by their actions an anticipation that their complaint is recognizable in law. Under the remedial framework, the opposite inference could be
drawn against those who sit back until a�er unfavorable precedent is overturned.
For instance, when the Supreme Court delivers a landmark judgment that is followed by a ﬂood of lawsuits that seek to invoke the right that the judgment
327.
328.

Id. at 1791.
See infra Section III.B.

329.

Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1831 (citing McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages
& Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1990)).

330.

See Kuo, supra note 209, at 901.
Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1817.

331.
332.
333.

332

Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2484 (2018).
Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1796.
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upheld, there may be compelling fairness and reliance reasons to frame the Supreme Court’s judgment as novel precedent and to restrict backward-looking relief. 334 Janus could be understood as such an example. It could be inferred that
public-sector workers who “litigat[e] in the new rule’s wake” 335 do so only because they did not foresee the Supreme Court overturning its precedent (concerning the compulsory deduction of union agency fees), and so their claim (for
restitution of past-collected fees) should yield to the defendants’ reliance and
administrability interests. But the same cannot be said of all those plaintiﬀs who
already had cases pending in federal courts on the day Janus was handed
down. 336 Nor could it be said of the principal plaintiﬀs in the Janus case itself.
For those plaintiﬀs, legal change was clearly foreseeable and predictable because
it was the very thing their lawsuits sought. There could be no basis for withholding relief from such plaintiﬀs according to the remedial framework. Indeed, Fallon and Meltzer favored the method of selective prospectivity precisely because
it would vindicate the expectation interests at least of principal plaintiﬀs who successfully litigate their rights. 337
This critique can be taken further. Novelty and unpredictability of legal
change are characterized as objective inquiries. Fallon and Meltzer deﬁne these
inquiries according to the expectations of “competent lawyers” 338 or what government oﬃcials “reasonably might have thought.” 339 That being so, it seems
irrelevant that subsequent plaintiﬀs might not have anticipated legal change
when there are principal plaintiﬀs and plaintiﬀs with cases pending who did.
Since novel precedent is invariably preceded (and caused) by at least one party
who ﬁghts for it, legal change will invariably be (nontrivially) anticipatable before the date a court hands down a landmark judgment. This insight shakes a
core assumption of the remedial framework. If the principal plaintiﬀs to a novel
case are able to foresee or predict legal change when ﬁling suit, then others—be
they potential plaintiﬀs or defendants—ought to be able to do so as well.
334.

Cf. Fisch, supra note 19, at 1083 (“Viewing retroactivity purely in remedial terms, although
appealing in theory, is unsatisfying. From the perspective of the litigant, winning the application of a particular rule of law has little value unless the litigant is entitled to the relief justiﬁed
by that rule.”).

335.

James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 542 (1991) (opinion of Souter, J., joined
by Stevens, J.).

336.

See, e.g., Lee v. Ohio Educ. Ass’n, 951 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2020); Danielson v. Inslee, 945 F.3d
1096 (9th Cir. 2019); see also Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 9, at 43 n.9 (citing pending
agency-fee-refund cases).
337. This preserves litigant incentives to raise novel claims. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, at
1806-07; cf. Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1108 (“Formalism may be a vice, but incoherence is
no virtue, and incoherence is what selective prospectivity brings.”).
338.
339.

Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1763.
Id. at 1793.
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Subsequent claims for past grievances should therefore be viable so long as they
are ﬁled within the requisite limitations period. And if that premise is accepted,
then the distinction that the remedial framework utilizes to grant remedies in
some cases and withhold them in others collapses. The framework provides no
principled basis for withholding remedies at all.
3. Summary
The remedial framework seeks to delineate retroactive remedies by reference
to the foreseeability or predictability of legal change. Even its proponents concede that this inquiry is necessarily “spongy and highly manipulable,” 340 weakening its interpretive force. Further, where legal change is found to be foreseeable or predictable for some parties, it seems doubtful that the remedial
framework can justify any limits on retroactive remedies for others. The very
process of litigation renders legal change anticipatable. As such, the framework
is unable rationally to contain the temporal scope of novel precedent.
E. Exceptionality Framework
The ﬁnal framework can be addressed brieﬂy, for it is not a theory of nonretroactivity so much as a contingency of last resort.
1. Description
It should not be controversial to state that judicial retroactivity is “overwhelmingly the norm.” 341 During the Warren Court’s foray into non-retroactive
adjudication, Thomas Fairchild observed that “the technique of prospective
overruling” was employed “as an exceptional expedient when the traditional retroactivity would wreak more havoc in society than society’s interest in stability
will tolerate.” 342 He endorsed maintaining this cautious approach. 343 Similarly,
in Reynoldsville Casket, Justices Kennedy and O’Connor sought to preserve non-

340.

Id. at 1796.

341.

James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535 (1991) (opinion of Souter, J., joined
by Stevens, J.); cf. Masur & Mortara, supra note 22, at 1016 (suggesting that “courts remain
free to issue purely prospective rulings, so long as they do not apply those rulings to the parties
who brought the case”).

342.

Fairchild, supra note 86, at 254.
Id. at 269.

343.

334
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retroactivity at least in “exceptional cases” where important fairness and reliance
interests demanded it. 344
A curious example of non-retroactivity being implicitly endorsed as a last
resort was Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Smith. Justice Scalia was no fan
of non-retroactivity doctrine. He rejected all of the aforementioned frameworks. 345 He was labeled a “neo-Blackstonian,” 346 which in his case can only
mean he assented to the function of the declaratory theory of adjudication, albeit
not to Blackstone’s formal account of it. 347 Nevertheless, in Smith, Justice Scalia
added the ﬁ�h vote to Justice O’Connor’s judgment for the Court, which refused
plaintiﬀs’ claims for retroactive relief brought in light of the Court’s decision in
Scheiner, because in his view, expressed in his Scheiner dissent, that case was
wrongly decided. 348 Justice Scalia said that while ordinarily stare decisis would
cause him to uphold a decision of the Supreme Court as precedent for successive
cases, he could not cast a vote that would impose liability upon a litigant when
he had already declared that no such liability should lie. 349 Employing the language of non-retroactivity, Justice Scalia refused to “upset th[e] litigant’s settled
expectations” by applying against them a decision that had “overruled prior
law.” 350
2. Critique
There is little substance to an exceptionality approach to non-retroactivity.
Lacking a conceptual framework, there are no ﬁrm principles to guide judges as
to when a case warrants “exceptional” treatment. This gives rise to concerns that
non-retroactivity will be too o�en, too rarely, or too arbitrarily employed.
A series of tax-restitution cases in England presents a cautionary tale to this
eﬀect. In England, prospective overruling is “a wholly exceptional” resort.351 It
344.

Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 761 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
345. Id. at 759-61 (Scalia, J., concurring); James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 548-49 (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment).
346. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1757.
347.
348.

349.
350.
351.

See supra Section II.A.2.
See Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 202-05 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (citing Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 303-06 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
See Smith, 496 U.S. at 204-05 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 205 (emphasis omitted).
Nat’l Westminster Bank plc v. Spectrum Plus Ltd. [2005] 2 AC 680 (HL), [74] (appeal taken
from Eng.); see also Ramdeen v. State [2015] AC 562 (PC), [90] (appeal taken from Trin. &
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was not employed when, around the turn of the millennium, corporate groups
that operated within the European Union sued the U.K. Government for discriminatory tax treatment under the U.K. corporation and value-added-tax statutes. 352 A�er the corporate groups’ substantive claims were upheld in landmark
appellate judgments, further plaintiﬀs ﬁled suit seeking restitution of their past
paid taxes, in some cases dating back to 1973 (when the U.K. joined the European Economic Community). 353 The plaintiﬀs claimed that they could not have
“discovered” their mistakes of law 354 in paying the taxes until the corporate
groups’ novel claims had been upheld by the courts, thereby (retroactively) clarifying the legal landscape. England, like most U.S. states, applies a discovery rule
to determine when the statute of limitations begins to run in cases of “mistake.” 355 Applying this rule, limitation was thought not to run against any of the
plaintiﬀs’ claims until the date the novel precedent on which their arguments
relied was handed down. 356 This led the English courts to uphold as timely
claims for restitution in respect of three decades of tax payments. This understanding of the retroactivity of novel precedent threatened to neuter the statute
of limitations in cases of “mistake of law” in England, exposing billions of
pounds of past-collected revenue to litigation. 357 Yet, even these circumstances
did not tempt any English judge to adopt the exceptional method of prospective

Tobago) (“[I]n very exceptional cases, European and common law courts do have power to
declare the law with prospective eﬀect only[.]”); Canada (Attorney Gen.) v. Hislop, [2007] 1
S.C.R. 429, [140] (Can.) (Bastarache, J., concurring) (“[R]etroactivity of a constitutional
remedy . . . is the norm in our constitutional jurisprudence, not the exception.”).
352. Mitchell, supra note 15, at 1.
353.

See Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Comm’rs for Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs [2018]
STC 1657 (UKSC); Test Claimants in the Franked Inv. Income Grp. Litig. v. Comm’rs of Her
Majesty’s Revenue & Customs [2017] STC 696 (EWCA).
354. Mistake of law was the basis of their cause of action. ANDREW BURROWS, A RESTATEMENT OF
THE ENGLISH LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 10(1) (2012); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 5 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
355.
356.

Limitation Act 1980, c. 58, § 32(1) (Eng.); see 2 CALVIN W. CORMAN, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
§ 8.3 (1991); infra note 381.

Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Grp. Plc v. Her Majesty’s Comm’rs of Inland Revenue [2007] 1 AC
558 (HL), [31], [71], [144], applied in FII Test Claimants, [2017] STC 696, [372] (“[I]n the
case of a point of law which is being actively disputed in current litigation the true position is
only discoverable . . . when the point has been authoritatively resolved by a ﬁnal court.”); cf.
Samuel Beswick, Discoverability Principles and the Law’s Mistakes, 136 LAW Q. REV. 139, 140
(2020) (arguing that this ratio decidendi contravenes the text, principles, and policies of limitations law). The Supreme Court abandoned this interpretation and overruled Deutsche Morgan Grenfell in Test Claimants in the Franked Inv. Income Grp. Litig. v. Comm’rs for Her Majesty’s
Revenue & Customs, [2020] UKSC 47, [253].
357. McManus, supra note 121, at 236; Mitchell, supra note 15, at 1.
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overruling. 358 Lacking any clear standards, the doctrine cannot be employed in
a consistent and principled manner.
3. Summary
Non-retroactivity doctrine is widely accepted to be an exception to the ordinary course of retroactive adjudication. But being an exception cannot be its only
feature. Otherwise, its implementation can only be arbitrary.
iii. right-of-ac tion framework
The ﬁve preceding frameworks each seek to explain how novel precedent affects parties’ rights. What these frameworks have in common is that they focus
primarily on the rights of principal plaintiﬀs—those who pioneer novel proceedings. The content of those plaintiﬀs’ judicially determined rights is then treated
as governing successive parties’ claims. In other words, each of the frameworks
presupposes that successive litigants’ rights to legal recourse depend upon the
timing and outcome of principal plaintiﬀs’ cases. This is not, however, how
rights of action are conventionally conceived. And this is why non-retroactivity
doctrine has found no satisfactory framework.
This Part outlines an alternative framework grounded in conventional common-law reasoning. This framework reorients judges’ focus onto the claims that
are currently before them—those over which they have direct jurisdiction. It embraces the retroactivity of judicial precedent: disputes over rights can only be
resolved from a perspective of hindsight and cannot, it is contended, feasibly be
insulated from developments in precedent. While rejecting the premises of
(non-)retroactivity jurisprudence, the right-of-action framework nevertheless
shares with that jurisprudence three core features:

358.

See Edelman, supra note 146, at 103-04 (suggesting that the doctrine of prospective overruling
should not govern claims in mistake of law); cf. Stephens, supra note 31, at 1568 (commenting
that in U.S. law, “should the [C]ourt announce a new rule of law that provides a cause of
action where one did not exist before, a litigant may not take advantage of that to bring a case
barred by the relevant statute of limitations”).
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(1) A focus on the rights of action of the parties before an adjudicating court.
This focus inﬂuenced the judicial opinions of Justice Stevens, 359 Justice
Souter, 360 and Justice Scalia, 361 in particular. 362
(2) A view that rights should be construed through the court’s “current best
understanding of the law.” 363 In other words, judges should apply decision-time law, rather than seek to identify some diﬀerent transactiontime law. This was the view adopted by Justice Harlan 364 and endorsed
by Roosevelt. 365
(3) A concern to avoid remedies that do injustice to either party. This concern underlaid the judicial opinions of Justice O’Connor 366 and informed the remedial framework developed by Fallon and Meltzer. 367
The right-of-action framework outlined in this Part takes no position in the
legal-philosophical debate, 368 and it does not turn on whether one adopts a formalist or a functionalist understanding of rights of action. Further, the right-ofaction framework eschews the assumptions of the right-reliance balancing
framework. Reliance, clearly, is a proxy for hardship. But it is a superﬂuous
proxy. We already have a body of doctrine designed to relieve defendants from
the hardship of the ordinary course of the law: equity. Equitable principles—not

359.

Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 214 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[O]nce a
determination has been made that a party is properly before the Court and a new decisional
rule properly states the law, interests of repose should play no role in determining the substantive legal rights of parties.”); see Shannon, supra note 34, at 874 (“The focus must remain
on the parties and the issues before the court, and the law announced must be the law that is
applied to those parties in resolution of those issues.”).

360.

James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 542 (1991) (opinion of Souter, J., joined
by Stevens, J.) (“[T]he putative hangers-on . . . are merely asserting a right that the Court has
told them is theirs in law.”).
361. Smith, 496 U.S. at 201 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Either enforcement of the
statute at issue . . . was unconstitutional, or it was not; if it was, then so is enforcement of all
identical statutes in other States, whether occurring before or a�er our decision . . . .”).
362.

See also Note, supra note 70, at 937 (emphasizing that decisions of retroactive application
should be made “in the context of actual cases and upon actual facts”).

363.

Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1117.
United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 297 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(“[C]ourts should apply the prevailing decisional rule to the cases before them.”).
365. Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1117.
364.

366.
367.
368.
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See supra Sections II.B-C.
See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1833.
In this respect it is “a philosophically unambitious account” of law’s temporal implications. Id.
at 1764 n.187. See supra Section II.A.
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amorphous appeals to fairness, eﬃciency, or reliance—should be employed
when the ordinary adjudication of rights in light of novel precedent would lead
to injustice.
The right-of-action framework makes no use of the choice-of-law framework, either, for as Section II.C showed, that framework involves no meaningful
choice between laws and distracts from the core problem. In contrast, it is accepted that the remedial and the exceptionality frameworks embody some important principles—especially that withholding remedies for rights violations
should be the exception, not the rule. Yet, they fall short of facilitating consistent
and principled reasoning. There is a better way to rationalize the temporal scope
of novel precedent.
This Part proceeds as follows. Section III.A reframes the core problem. It
contends that the salient temporal period is not when an appellate court hands
down novel precedent, but when novel rights of action become justiciable. In
other words, it is when a plaintiﬀ comes to have a valid legal complaint to plead
to a court. This inquiry—whether a novel claim is properly before a court—is
informed by two complementary temporal 369 inquiries: ripeness doctrine and
limitation law’s accrual inquiry. Understanding these principles of law is key to
understanding the temporal nature of rights of action.
Section III.B considers the limits on rights of action recognized in law. The
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has long acknowledged important temporal limits and defenses, including res judicata, collateral estoppel, limitations, laches
and acquiescence, and stays of judgment. Section III.B argues that these doctrines can properly constrain injustices that might arise from construing past
rights through decision-time law.
Section III.C summarizes the implications of this framework. It argues that
the framework avoids the ﬂawed assumptions of the contemporary non-retroactivity frameworks and provides the soundest rationalization of the temporal
scope of novel precedent.
A. Justiciability of Rights of Action
The problem of novel precedent concerns whether “new” rules apply to past
transactions and disputes. Does the interpretation of law upheld in a principal
case inform the content of successive plaintiﬀs’ rights? The answer ultimately
depends on whether successive plaintiﬀs can obtain a judgment requiring

369.

Justiciability encompasses a number of nontemporal doctrines as well, such as standing. See
Russell W. Galloway, Basic Justiciability Analysis, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 911, 921-32 (1990);
Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 129-38 (2007). This Article
employs the term justiciability in its narrower, temporally oriented sense.
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defendants to provide redress in their case. This response may seem circular, but
it is not. 370 It relies on a principled and pragmatic demarcation between persons
with timely legal claims and those without. The key is to understand when it is
that plaintiﬀs gain the power to sue in a case: in other words, when they gain a
right of action.
A right of action is a legal power. When the law grants persons who have
suﬀered a substantive rights violation a right of action, it enables them—if they
comply with applicable procedures—to obtain a court order compelling another
person to take actions to remedy the violation. John Goldberg and Benjamin
Zipursky deﬁne a right of action as a plaintiﬀ ’s legal “power to obtain a remedy”
from the defendant. 371 As such, it is more than simply the right to ﬁle a claim or
to have one’s day in court. It is a “right to prosecute an action with eﬀect.” 372
Whereas substantive rights have an air of timelessness—I always have a right
not to be assaulted by you—a right of action is a time-bounded power. It empowers a plaintiﬀ to hold a defendant accountable for a speciﬁc rights violation
occurring at an identiﬁable point in time. It has a lifespan: it can be pursued only
once there are valid grounds for alleging a deprivation of a substantive legal
right, 373 and it can expire if the plaintiﬀ takes no action. 374
Before we can understand how novel precedent aﬀects successive plaintiﬀs’
rights, we must ﬁrst understand when it is that a plaintiﬀ is able to assert a right
of action. That moment occurs when the plaintiﬀ ’s grievance becomes justiciable
before a court. Justiciability concerns whether a court is able to hear and adjudicate on a plaintiﬀ ’s grievance. Nonjusticiable claims include those that are not

370.
371.

GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 159, at 98-99.
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights and Responsibility in the Law of Torts, in
RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAW 251, 268 (Donal Nolan & Andrew Robertson eds., 2011) [hereina�er
Goldberg & Zipursky, Rights and Responsibility]; see also John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law from the Internal Point of View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1563, 1567 (2006) (deﬁning a right of action as “a power to seek recourse
through law that belongs to the right holder whose rights have been violated by the doing of
the wrong”).

372.

GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 159, at 98 (quoting Patterson v. Patterson, 59 N.Y. 574, 57879 (1875) (emphasis added)).

373.

As discussed later in this Section, this is ultimately determined by a court assessing the complaint with hindsight, “deciding whether the fabric of law that already exists is such that plaintiﬀ is entitled to relief from the court.” Benjamin C. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 72.

374.

Rights of action expire according to the governing laws of limitation and other time-sensitive
doctrines and defenses. See infra Section III.B.
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“ripe” 375 or that have not “accrued.” 376 The “ripeness” inquiry is generally concerned with whether a claim is premature (i.e., has been ﬁled too early), and the
“accrual” inquiry with when the limitations clock begins to run against a claim.
Both inform the temporal lifespan of rights of action—the “when” of adjudication. 377 Though taxonomically distinct, these doctrines concern the same thing:
the point in time at which a plaintiﬀ may ﬁle and begin to litigate her claim for
a court-ordered remedy. 378 This point is ultimately determined by the particular
circumstances of each plaintiﬀ ’s case.
Ordinarily, rights of action ripen and accrue (the terms are interchangeable)
when the relevant rights violation occurs—when, for example, a physical interaction that appears to meet the deﬁnition of a battery happens. But what of those
would-be plaintiﬀs who do not know that they have a viable right of action?
Perhaps their injuries are concealed, or they do not understand their options for
civil recourse, or the state of the law is unstable. Does the right of action stay
dormant while it remains unfound?
Courts have long grappled with this problem in the limitations context. The
traditional view was that rights of action accrue when the material facts on which
they are based occur, so the limitations period would run whether or not a potential plaintiﬀ had actual knowledge of those material facts. 379 The contemporary prevailing view is that an action accrues “when the claimant discovers, or in

375.

In constitutional law, a claim is ripe when the issue pleaded is either “purely legal” or needs
no “further factual development,” and the challenged conduct has a “suﬃciently direct and
immediate” impact on the plaintiﬀ. Michael Aaron DelGaudio, From Ripe to Rotten: An Examination of the Continued Utility of the Ripeness Doctrine in Light of the Modern Standing Doctrine,
50 GA. L. REV. 625, 641 (2016).

376.

See Bloom, supra note 300, at 27. In limitation law, generally “a cause of action does not accrue
until a party has a right to enforce the claim.” Schulz v. Milne, No. 95-15703, 1996 WL 570498,
at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 3, 1996) (quoting Norco Constr., Inc. v. King Cty., 801 F.2d 1143, 1146
(9th Cir. 1986)); see 1 CALVIN W. CORMAN, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS § 6.1 & n.12 (1991).

377.

See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363
passim (1973).

378.

See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Uniﬁed Approach to Justiciability, 22 CONN. L. REV. 677, 696 (1990)
(“[T]he ripeness test [is] used to assess whether the plaintiﬀ is legally entitled to relief.”);
Daniel Zacks, Claims, Not Causes of Action: The Misapprehension of Limitations Principles, 48
ADVOCS.’ Q. 165, 169 n.12 (2018) (suggesting that whether a cause of action “completes, accrues, arises, or ripens . . . all means the same thing: the date on which the cause of action ﬁrst
becomes viable”); see also, e.g., Bayou Des Familles Dev. Corp. v. United States, 130 F.3d 1034,
1038 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (considering when plaintiﬀ ’s claim became “ripe for adjudication, starting the statute of limitations clock”); Boerger v. Levin, 812 F. Supp. 564, 566 n.4 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (“Since the claim is not yet ripe, the limitations period cannot have begun.”).
379. Stephen V. O’Neil, Accrual of Statutes of Limitations: California’s Discovery Exceptions Swallow
the Rule, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 106, 106 (1980) (“The basic principle governing the accrual of
limitation periods states that they run from the date of injury.”).
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the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the acts constituting
the alleged violation.” 380 This “discoverability” 381 inquiry is an objective one,
which defers time until a plaintiﬀ is reasonably in a position to pursue a right of
action. When someone fraudulently conceals a harm they have caused to a
would-be plaintiﬀ, for instance, that plaintiﬀ ’s right of action will accrue only
once they have the ability to discover the concealed harm. 382 Non-retroactivity
doctrine would seem to cast novel principles of law in a similar way—as having
been concealed from would-be plaintiﬀs until “the date of the decision announcing the principle.” 383 The date of judicial announcement is typically taken to be
the point at which something “new” happens that creates and disrupts others’
legal rights and duties. It is seemingly the date that plaintiﬀs discover (or reasonably should discover) the “new” law. This date is taken to be the fulcrum for
determining whether the new law governs past rights retroactively or applies
only prospectively.
Yet, even if novel principles of law are subject to a discoverability analysis,384
it would be an error to hold that novel rights cannot be discovered until they are

380.

Winnett v. Caterpillar, Inc., 609 F.3d 404, 408 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Noble v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 997, 1000 (6th Cir. 1994)); see Fleishman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 465
N.Y.S.2d 735, 737 (1983) (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining
that declaring a limitations period expired before it can be discovered seeks “to declare the
bread stale before it is baked”); see also Adam Bain & Ugo Colella, Interpreting Federal Statutes
of Limitations, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 493, 553 (2004) (tracing the discovery rule of accrual for
federal limitations statutes to Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169-71 (1949)); cf. TRW Inc. v.
Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 37 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (calling the discovery rule “bad wine
of recent vintage”).

381.

This concept is more commonly known in the United States as “the discovery rule.” Lonny
Hoﬀman & Bret Wells, The Exceptions Prove the Rule: Recalibrating the Discovery Rule and Equitable Fraud Exceptions to the Legal Injury Rule, 71 BAYLOR L. REV. 63, 83 (2019). This Article
prefers “discoverability” to “discovery” for three reasons: to distinguish the limitation doctrine from the procedural practice of document discovery; to reinforce that discoverability incorporates an objective inquiry; and to align the analysis with other common-law jurisdictions
that recognize this limitation doctrine. See ANDREW MCGEE, LIMITATION PERIODS 137 para.
8.002 (8th ed. 2018).

382.

2 CORMAN, supra note 355, §§ 9.9, 11.5.
383. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 187 (1990) (plurality opinion).
384.
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Cf. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122 (1979) (“We are unconvinced that for statute
of limitations purposes a plaintiﬀ ’s ignorance of his legal rights and his ignorance of the fact
of his injury or its cause should receive identical treatment.”); Marrero Morales v. Bull S.S.
Co., 279 F.2d 299, 301 (1st Cir. 1960) (“[I]gnorance of one’s legal rights does not excuse a
failure to institute suit . . . . This principle is applicable not only to ignorance of substantive
legal rights but also to ignorance of the procedures of law by which a more favorable doctrine
of substantive law can be sought.” (citations omitted)); Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 751 P.2d 923,
929 (Cal. 1988) (“[I]t is the discovery of facts, not their legal signiﬁcance, that starts the
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ﬁrst articulated by an appellate court. Rights of action may ripen and accrue even
while a plaintiﬀ is ignorant of the law or while binding precedent stands against
the plaintiﬀ ’s case. 385 That is because justiciability doctrines are not concerned
with the plaintiﬀ ’s certainty of litigation success. They are concerned with the
plaintiﬀ ’s ability to plead an action before a court. The law on any point may be
unclear, but it is presumptively discoverable by virtue of plaintiﬀs’ right to access
the courts, whose function it is to rule upon and elucidate the law. A right of
action accrues when, as a matter of fact and law, one has a reasonable basis for
claiming to have suﬀered a substantive rights violation. When the suit rests on a
novel theory of liability, or on an argument for a change in substantive law, this
feature of rights of action gives rise to a paradox: one does not know whether
one “really” has a right of action—as opposed to a claimed or putative right of
action—until there is a ruling on the merits. But if the plaintiﬀ prevails on the
merits, the plaintiﬀ ’s claim (asserted from the outset of litigation) to be entitled
to enlist the courts to obtain a remedy from the defendant is vindicated. In this
sense, the accrual of rights of action precedes courts’ determinations of novel
principles of law. This is inevitable from the sequential nature of litigation: judgment can only follow the ﬁling of a (novel) claim. A�er all, it takes a challenge to
the status quo for new rules to develop. 386
When a new rule is announced, it may spur litigation by others, but its issuance does not aﬀect the justiciability of others’ rights of action. Same-sex couples
in America had a right of action each time they were denied marriage certiﬁcates
even before June 26, 2015, 387 as did public-sector employees before June 27, 2018
each time agency fees were deducted without their consent. 388 On each occasion,
aﬀected persons gained a right to object, to plead to a court that they had been
wronged, to litigate their substantive rights, and to seek recourse for the violations they faced. That is how Obergefell and Janus reached the Supreme Court in
the ﬁrst place. The numerous plaintiﬀs who had similar pending cases when the

statute.”); Passmore v. Watson, 337 P.3d 84, 87 (Mont. 2014) (“A statute of limitations begins
to run when all facts relevant to a claim are known or through reasonable diligence could be
known. The rule does not apply to legal theories.” (emphasis omitted)).
385. 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 136 (2020).
386.

Where parties have access to the courts, it is therefore wrong to suggest that “it is unfair to
parties to judge them by law about which they had no way of knowing.” Roosevelt, supra note
28, at 1105.
387. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 680-81 (2015). Similarly, employees who were ﬁred for
being homosexual or transgender had rights of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 even before June 15, 2020, when the Supreme Court held that such employer conduct
amounts to sex discrimination. Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020).
388. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486 (2018).
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Supreme Court handed down judgment in Obergefell389 and Janus 390 had already
been advancing viable rights of action. Moreover, the fact that others might have
awaited the Court’s landmark decisions before litigating their own past grievances does not mean that their rights of action were not already justiciable. The
opportunity to litigate objectively subsisted regardless of whether individuals subjectively appreciated their legal position.
As noted, there is an element of conditionality built into the idea of rights of
action. A complaint, when ﬁled, is merely an allegation, or a claimed right of action. That claim is not vindicated (or perfected) until the plaintiﬀ establishes
that the law entitles her to entry of judgment in her favor. 391 This is where legal
argumentation and precedent comes in. The plaintiﬀ must (be able to) prove
that the defendant violated a substantive legal duty owed to the plaintiﬀ, which
conferred on the plaintiﬀ a substantive legal right as against the defendant. In
determining whether the parties are governed by a substantive right-duty relation, the successive court must interpret the relevant facts and law. In interpreting the law, the court should heed all relevant—including novel—precedent.
That is because the considerations that persuaded an appellate court to (re)interpret the law in a novel case—whether driven by discrepancies in doctrine,
principle, or policy—are considerations that also could have been employed by
(successive) plaintiﬀs before the (successive) court when pleading their own
case. As the Supreme Court insisted in Danforth v. Minnesota, “the underlying
right necessarily pre-exists [the Court’s] articulation of the new rule.” 392 Timely
legal claims ought therefore to be assessed by courts “apply[ing] their current
best understanding of the law to all cases before them.” 393
The temporal question, then, is not whether new law applies backwards to
create new rights. It is whether, back when the plaintiﬀ suﬀered the violation
they complain of (i.e., when their right of action ripened or accrued), “the fabric
of law that already exist[ed] [was] such that plaintiﬀ is entitled to relief from
the court.” 394 The “fabric of law” is the authority that the court draws upon in
coming to its (novel) judgment. Though jurists disagree as to what counts as
389.

See Nicolas, supra note 4, at 397-400.

390.

See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
391. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 159, at 98-99; Goldberg & Zipursky, Rights and Responsibility, supra note 371, at 265-66; see Baade, supra note 279, at 340 (noting that those who seek
change bear the burden of argument).
392.

552 U.S. 264, 271 (2008).
393. Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1117.
394.
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Zipursky, supra note 373, at 627. This inquiry does not require us to answer whether the new
rule was always the law, or to determine precisely when in time the law changed. We only have
to answer whether it is the law for these plaintiﬀs’ grievances that are justiciable before the court
today. See infra note 419.
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legitimate authority—as to the place of positive sources, morality, and social conditions in judicial reasoning—there is signiﬁcant common ground on the idea
that legal authority constrains adjudication.395 Legal authority in Obergefell encompassed Federal Due Process doctrine. In Janus it encompassed First Amendment doctrine. This notion must be understood to be ﬂexible enough to envelop
all those novel arguments that are open to plaintiﬀs to invoke on the facts, and
to recognize that principles and interpretations of law can develop and change in
a manner that may bear upon claims being adjudicated. 396 Within this rubric,
when a pleaded action encounters an unfavorable rule, the pertinent question is
not when has the rule changed but when could the plaintiﬀ have made the case for
change. It is from then that the plaintiﬀ ’s right of action can be considered justiciable. And it is from then that the plaintiﬀ can, in making their case, invoke the
same principles and reasoning to persuade the immediate court as may have persuaded an appellate court in another case to hand down a novel precedent.
In sum, trial courts should “apply the prevailing decisional rule to the cases
before them,” as Justice Harlan implored.397 This framework aligns with the dissent’s view of adjudication that Justice O’Connor criticized in Smith: that a court
should simply “determine whether a case was properly before it and, if so, apply
current law,” allowing the “retroactivity question” to pass by altogether. 398 This
view would seem to comport with the prevailing position of the Court following
Harper. 399 The temporal scope of novel precedent should be understood not in
terms of a rule’s retroactivity, but in terms of its justiciability.
B. Limits on Rights of Action
Non-retroactivity doctrine presumes that novel precedent creates novel
rights for the future, not the past. But when a past transaction or dispute is litigated in light of a new rule, proponents of this doctrine do not take the date of

395.

This is the essence of “the judicial cra�.” Scalia, The Rule of Law, supra note 168, at 1183; see
DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING, supra note 19, at 50-59; GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 159, at
252-53; Dagan, American Legal Realism, supra note 19, at 140-43.

396.

See Dagan, American Legal Realism, supra note 19, at 130, 135 n.57, 136 (considering legal-realist, legal-positivist, and legal-interpretivist views on the reforming, reﬁning, and evolving of
law).
397. United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 297 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
398.

Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 191 (1990) (plurality opinion) (disapproving of
Justice Stevens’s dissent); see Roosevelt, supra note 28, at 1117.

399.

Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993); see supra note 92 and accompanying
text.
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the novel judgment as the point from which limitation begins to run. 400 They
assume limitation begins as it ordinarily does: upon accrual or discoverability of
the action. 401 This steers the puzzle into “topsy-turvy land” 402: if novel rights
did not “exist” in the past then they could not begin to accrue until the novel
precedent was handed down. But if the limitations statute was already running
at that time, then viable rights have already accrued. It is surely axiomatic that “a
statute of limitations does not begin to run against a cause of action before that
cause of action exists.” 403 Limitations statutes ensure timely litigation by penalizing plaintiﬀs who sleep on their rights. Yet, how can “a man . . . sleep on a right
he does not have”? 404
The solution is to recognize that the judicial function is inherently retroactive. 405 Precedent today necessarily informs how we should understand past
rights. That does not mean new rights of action are unlimited in scope. They are
subject to defenses. Interests of justice and fairness are embodied in long-recognized temporal limits on rights of action. 406 This Section describes these doctrines, and seeks to explain why one in particular, laches, has untapped potential
as a tool to ensure justice in the face of novel precedent.
1. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
The doctrine of res judicata bars plaintiﬀs from relitigating claims that have
already been ﬁnally adjudicated. 407 Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation
of judicially determined issues. 408 Parties who have had their day in court do not
get a second bite at the apple even when the weight of precedent has

400. And

it would not be prudent to do so, as the English experience shows. See supra Section
II.E.2.

401.
402.

403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
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Stephens, supra note 31, at 1568.
Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J., dissenting) (“Except in topsy-turvy land you can’t die before you are conceived . . . or miss a train running on
a non-existent railroad.”); see also Susan D. Glimcher, Statutes of Limitations and the Discovery
Rule in Latent Injury Claims: An Exception or the Law?, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 501, 501 (1982) (citing Dincher).
Dincher, 198 F.2d at 823.
Id.
See supra Section I.B.
See McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2481 (2020).
See Lehn, supra note 29, at 590-92.
Id. at 585-87.

retroactive adjudication

subsequently shi�ed in their favor.409 If that seems unfair, 410 it is, as Justice Harlan maintained, “part of the risks of life.” 411 The rule of law requires that a plaintiﬀ has an opportunity to put forward their case and argue it as best they can
before the courts. It does not require that a plaintiﬀ is able to keep returning to
the courts, ﬁling successive suits in respect of the same event, until they ﬁnally
win. It is more important that litigation have a determinate end so that rights
can be ﬁxed. 412
2. Limitation
Once a right of action has ripened and accrued (i.e., once the rights violation
complained of has occurred or become discoverable), a corresponding limitations period will begin to run. 413 The period is ﬁxed by statute. 414 The limitations clock ticks regardless of the perceived stability or instability of the relevant
law at issue. 415 The clock is paused by ﬁling suit. A plaintiﬀ who fails to ﬁle a
complaint that asserts their right of action before expiry of the limitations period
will usually be barred from doing so at a later date.416 A�er a speciﬁed period,

409.

See Stephens, supra note 31, at 1568; see also James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S.
529, 541 (1991) (opinion of Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.) (discussing res judicata and procedural barriers such as statutes of limitations as constraints on one’s ability to press a claim
based on new law). In the criminal context (which is beyond the scope of this Article), defendants have a (constrained) right to have their case revisited on collateral review. See supra
note 61.
410. See Fairchild, supra note 86, at 267.
411.
412.

413.
414.

United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 296 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
See Kay, supra note 58, at 52 (“At some point adjudication comes to an end and unsuccessful
civil litigants are denied the solace of newer and friendlier law.”); Arthur Ripstein, The Rule of
Law and Time’s Arrow, in PRIVATE LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW 306, 307 (Lisa M. Austin &
Dennis Klimchuk eds., 2014) (providing a formal account of limitations periods as essential
to the rule of law); Jeremy Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, 103 ETHICS 4, 15-16 (1992)
(giving reasons to think that rights fade and change with time such that historic injustices can
be superseded by contemporary circumstances).
See supra note 378.
1 CORMAN, supra note 376, § 1.5, at 75.

415.

54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 135 (2020) (“The discovery rule . . . is not applicable to a situation where a plaintiﬀ waits to ﬁle suit or a claim until he or she has some assurance of
success on the merits of his or her claim. . . . The operation of the statute of limitations is not
postponed where plaintiﬀs are in possession of all the facts necessary to determine whether
they have a cause of action but are ignorant of the law on which their claim is based.”).
416. Id. § 313. This applies unless the defendant waives the limitations defense or, exceptionally, a
court applies a statutory or equitable discretion to waive or extend the ordinary limitations
period. Id. § 133.
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the law treats the would-be defendant’s actions as “beyond challenge” in the interests of ﬁnality and closure. 417
The eﬀects of retroactive adjudication should not, then, be overstated. When
judicial precedent “changes” the law, it is not necessarily pronouncing on the law
for all time in the past. 418 It is determining the law aﬀecting those claims still
justiciable within the limitations period. Unless a court somehow retains jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes from centuries ago, it will have no occasion to rule
authoritatively on what the law was that governed such centuries-old disputes. 419 Statutes of limitations serve a crucial function in curbing the fallout of
judicial change.
3. Laches and Acquiescence
Non-retroactivity doctrine was developed to counter the hardship borne by
parties who acted and transacted on the basis of an understanding of law that is
subsequently upended by novel precedent. Non-retroactivity proponents cast
this hardship as a problem of new law retroactively changing past rights and
threatening reliance interests. The core problem, though, is not ex post recalibration of rights and duties. It is having to wait to ﬁnd out what one’s rights and
duties really are. The core problem, in other words, is delay.
If parties to a transaction knew on day one that their transaction was legally
defective, it would hardly be unfair or ineﬃcient for their transaction to be recalibrated to ﬁt the law. But parties typically have no such knowledge in nonretroactivity cases. To the contrary, parties may endure signiﬁcant delay between
a transaction and when it is challenged in court, as well as signiﬁcant delay between suit and when the law is ﬁnally determined by judicial decision. Most of
the time this delay is simply accepted as the inevitable cost of practical justice. If
a novel judgment takes a party by surprise, at least its eﬀects are constrained only
to events falling within the statute of limitations and outside the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel.
In exceptional cases, though, even such constrained disruption may be
thought by a court to be too much. It is in such cases that courts have tended to
417.

United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 296 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); see
supra note 412.
418. This is the stuﬀ of (intractable) jurisprudential debate. See supra Section II.A.
419.
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Courts are not in the habit of adjudicating grievances occurring a hundred years ago because
those rights of action expired long ago. It is therefore not necessary to answer whether, for
example, a court would adjudicate a suit brought today against D1 for invading P1’s privacy in
1919 in the same way as it would adjudicate a suit brought today against D2 for invading P2’s
privacy in 2019, because any right of action P1 had in 1919 is no longer justiciable today. The
only pertinent question is whether in 2019 D2 breached a duty owed to P2.
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turn to non-retroactivity doctrine. This Section suggests that courts can better
mitigate the fallout of legal change by employing established equitable principles
than by seeking to resuscitate non-retroactivity doctrine. The Supreme Court
has long cast its non-retroactivity judgments in terms of “equitable considerations,” 420 but it has not imbued that notion with substantive content. 421 This
Section proposes to do just that: to put forward an alternative way that judges
can limit “new” rights in exceptional cases. Given the essential problem is delay,
courts should turn away from non-retroactivity doctrine and toward the equitable doctrines of laches and acquiescence, guided by the maxim that “equity aids
the vigilant, not the indolent.” 422
a. Description
Laches and acquiescence are closely related doctrines. 423 Laches arises when
a claimant’s delay is unreasonable and causes prejudice to the defendant. 424 It
420.

Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. at 296 (Harlan, J., concurring), cited in Harper v. Va. Dep’t of
Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 133 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting), Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith,
496 U.S. 167, 190 (1990) (plurality opinion), and Smith, 496 U.S. at 215 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 543-44 (1991) (opinion of
Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.) (“[N]othing we say here precludes consideration of individual equities when deciding remedial issues in particular cases.”); id. at 547 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (characterizing the argument against “selective application of new
rules” as “a question of equity”); id. at 551, 557-58 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing “the
equities of retroactive application”); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 108 (1971) (noting that retroactive application of a statute of limitations might produce “substantial inequitable results”).
421. Cf. Kuo, supra note 209, at 895-96 (“Equity considerations have included: (1) the length of
time during which the taxes have been paid, (2) the availability of other remedies, (3) the
administrability of refunding retroactively, and (4) the policy implications of retroactive refunds.” (footnotes omitted)).
422. EATON, supra note 21, at 52.
423.

So much so that some courts and commentators subsume acquiescence into laches. See, e.g.,
30A C.J.S. Equity § 142 (2020); J.D. HEYDON, M.J. LEEMING & P.G. TURNER, MEAGHER, GUMMOW AND LEHANE’S EQUITY: DOCTRINES AND REMEDIES § 38-015, at 1086 (5th ed. 2015); SARAH WORTHINGTON, EQUITY 36 (2d ed. 2006).

424.

Samuel L. Bray, A Little Bit of Laches Goes a Long Way: Notes on Petrella v. Metro-GoldwynMayer, Inc., 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 1, 2 (2014) (“[L]aches is not concerned merely with
the fact of delay. It matters why the plaintiﬀ delayed bringing the claim and what eﬀect that
delay had on the defendant. In doctrinal terms, the delay must be ‘unreasonable’ and cause
‘prejudice.’”); see 2 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 419, at 171-72 (S.F., Spencer W. Symons ed.,
5th ed. 1941) (1882) (deﬁning laches as “such neglect or omission to assert a right as, taken in
conjunction with the lapse of time, more or less great, and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, operates as a bar in a court of equity” (quoting Cahill v. Superior
Court, 78 P. 467, 469 (Cal. 1904))).
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concerns the claimant’s inaction “a�er an act is done.” 425 Acquiescence arises
when a claimant knows or has the means of knowing her rights but unreasonably
delays in asserting them. 426 It concerns “inaction during performance of an act”
that amounts to tacit assent to the act later complained of. 427 For both doctrines,
the relevant inaction is failure to bring timely suit. 428
The foundations of these doctrines, fundamental to equity jurisdiction, were
long ago encapsulated by the Lord Chancellor, Lord Camden, as follows:
A court of equity which is never active in relief against conscience, or
public convenience, has always refused its aid to stale demands, where
the party has slept upon his right and acquiesced for a great length of
time. Nothing can call forth this court into activity, but conscience, good
faith, and reasonable diligence; where these are wanting, the court is passive, and does nothing. Laches and neglect are always discountenanced,
and therefore from the beginning of this jurisdiction, there was always a
limitation to suits in this court. 429
Laches and acquiescence are exceptions to the ordinary rule that violations
of justiciable rights warrant a remedy. They give courts discretion to cut oﬀ litigation of rights of action even when initiated within a normal statutory limitations period. Their criterion of unreasonableness, combined with prejudice to the
defendant (in respect of laches) or tacit assent of the claimant (in respect of acquiescence), sets a high threshold. Where defendants can overcome this threshold, however, these doctrines can be powerful and pragmatic tools for constraining the fallout of lawsuits brought in the light of new law.
Laches and acquiescence concern whether claimants failed to pursue legal
rights with reasonable diligence. This equitable inquiry mirrors (and indeed

425.

30A C.J.S. Equity § 142 (2020).
27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 113 (2020); 30A C.J.S. Equity § 151 (2020); HEYDON, LEEMING &
TURNER, supra note 423, § 38-070, at 1094; WORTHINGTON, supra note 423, at 36.
427. Bay Newfoundland Co. v. Wilson & Co., 4 A.2d 668, 671 (Del. Ch. 1939); 30A C.J.S. Equity
§ 142 (2020); see Dock & Terminal Eng’g Co. v. Pa. R.R. Co., 82 F.2d 19, 20 (3d Cir. 1936)
(ﬁnding plaintiﬀ ’s inaction to be “tacit consent or acquiescence”); J. GEORGE N. DARBY &
FREDERICK ALBERT BOSANQUET, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN
ENGLAND AND IRELAND 351-52 (London, William Maxwell & Son 1867) (“A person . . . [acquiesces] if he lie[s] by with full knowledge of his rights, and tacitly allows conduct which is
inconsistent with them . . . .”); 3 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, supra note 424, § 817, at 245-46
(Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941) (1883) (outlining a narrow deﬁnition of acquiescence).
428. 30A C.J.S. Equity § 151 (2020).
426.

429.
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Smith v. Clay (1767) 29 Eng. Rep. 743, 744, cited with approval in Hayward v. Nat’l Bank, 96
U.S. 611, 617-18 (1877), and Bowman v. Wathen, 42 U.S. (1. How.) 189, 193 (1843).
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informed) 430 the “discoverability” inquiry in the limitations context. The pertinent period of delay begins when the claimant “discovered or by the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have discovered the wrong of which he or she complains.” 431 This will typically coincide with the point at which a claim becomes
“ripe such that a court could entertain it.” 432 This point can be understood in
several ways—as the point when the material elements of the alleged rights violation have all occurred, when the claimant is reasonably in a position to pursue
a right of action, or when the claimant has the ability to plead an action before a
court. 433
Like the limitation inquiry, the equitable inquiry is concerned with when
rights of action become justiciable. As Section III.A showed, this may be well
before an appellate court hands down a novel judgment. Reﬂecting on the equitable doctrine of laches, Andrew Kull and Ward Farnsworth suggest: “Certain
restitution plaintiﬀs—such as parties who lie low and wait to see how prices develop, before deciding whether to ratify or rescind a voidable transaction—oﬀer
textbook examples of the conduct that laches is designed to frustrate.” 434 The
same could, by analogy, be said of claimants who lie low and wait to see how
legal precedent develops.
What amounts to unreasonable delay will “depend on the peculiar equitable
circumstances” of each case. 435 Unreasonableness is not governed by any ﬁxed
rule or period of time. Courts will consider whether a claimant’s delay had a signiﬁcant impact on the litigation and the parties’ positions and whether it could
be adequately explained. There can o�en be signiﬁcant delay between the accrual
of a novel right of action and when suit is ﬁled—particularly in those cases where
claims are only brought a�er some landmark Supreme Court judgment is delivered. Delay can be signiﬁcant without necessarily being extensive. It may be signiﬁcant if, during the period of delay, the defendant takes actions and changes
their position in reliance on their presumed rights because the would-be plaintiﬀ
has not formally challenged their actions by ﬁling suit. 436 In such cases,
430.
431.

See Hoﬀman & Wells, supra note 381, at 76-86.
30A C.J.S. Equity § 151 (2020).

432.

Id.
433. See supra Section III.A.
434.

ANDREW KULL & WARD FARNSWORTH, RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT: CASES AND
NOTES 504 (2018).

435.

The Key City, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 653, 660 (1871), cited in Czaplicki v. Hoegh Silvercloud, 351
U.S. 525, 533 (1956).

436.

E.g., Perry v. Judd, 471 F. App’x 219, 222 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that laches barred relief
sought by Republican-primary presidential candidates who had “displayed an unreasonable
and inexcusable lack of diligence,” which “signiﬁcantly harmed the defendants” in delaying
by several months their constitutional challenge to Virginia’s ballot requirements).
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particularly where reliance could be expected, a court might quite appropriately
characterize certain delay as “unreasonable.”
A ﬁnding of laches depends—in addition to unreasonable delay—upon prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice may be evidentiary in nature: it may stem from
a loss of evidence or witnesses. Or it may be expectations based: it may stem
from the defendant having taken “actions or suﬀered consequences that it would
not have, had the plaintiﬀ brought suit promptly.” 437 Defendants might, for instance, change their position in reliance on a claimant’s inaction by spending
money received prior to learning the money is the subject of a restitutionary
claim. Laches is a useful safety valve within the right-of-action framework. 438 It
is a more principled mechanism for alleviating prejudice to parties than is nonretroactivity doctrine. Consider, for example, how it could apply following Janus.
Given that public-sector unions had for many years relied on statute and precedent to validate the collection of compulsory agency fees, 439 a court might well
be justiﬁed in invoking laches to stem the “ﬂood of class action lawsuits” brought
in Janus’s wake, which have “threaten[ed] to bankrupt unions around the nation.” 440 That is because litigants’ delay may have prejudiced unions by not alerting them that the money collected was subject to challenge. Unions could be
understood to have changed their position when they spent and distributed incoming revenue, rather than holding it in escrow pending the outcome of litigation. Arguably, these cases could meet the doctrine’s exceptional threshold. A
court could in its discretion use laches to limit the scope of any valid restitutionary claims to, say, the fees collected in the X months prior to plaintiﬀs ﬁling
suit—rather than the full period of collection covered by the limitations statute.
A ﬁnding of acquiescence depends—in addition to unreasonable delay—
upon a claimant’s constructive knowledge and tacit assent to the alleged rights
violation. A claimant may acquiesce by failing to object to a transaction by ﬁling
suit in respect of it within a reasonable time. What must be (able to be) known
are the relevant facts (in other words, the material elements) that make up the
right of action. This doctrine can play a particularly signiﬁcant role in curbing
437.

438.

Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 955 (9th Cir. 2001); see Roger Young & Stephen
Spitz, SUEM—Spitz’s Ultimate Equitable Maxim: In Equity, Good Guys Should Win and Bad
Guys Should Lose, 55 S.C. L. REV. 175, 188 (2003) (“[Equity] would not easily reward someone
who caused undue prejudice to another by sleeping on his rights.”).

See Henry E. Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, 130 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 6567) (on ﬁle with author) (considering how equity’s moralizing maxims operate as a safety
valve); Kenneth Ayotte, Ezra Friedman & Henry E. Smith, A Safety Valve Model of Equity as
Anti-Opportunism 11-12 (Mar. 30, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2245098 [https://perma.cc/T6C3-3MQM].
439. The most signiﬁcant precedent, of course, was Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S.
209 (1977).
440. Tang & Smith, supra note 9, at 24.
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“opportunistic” tax-restitution suits. 441 The doctrine is said to have “frequently
been applied in taxpayers’ actions” where claimants unreasonably delay ﬁling
suit a�er having had “express or implied knowledge or notice of the matter complained of.” 442 Generally, tax exactions can be challenged and reviewed once
paid. It is submitted that once a claimant is in a position to challenge the legality
of a tax exaction, they ought to do so in a timely manner. It is not an exercise of
reasonable diligence to await ﬁrst the outcome of some other taxpayer’s litigation
and, in the event of their success, to sue only in their wake. 443
What distinguishes the approach here from the non-retroactivity frameworks is that the defense will only prevail where defendants can demonstrate
prejudice or tacit assent suﬃcient to justify the court’s intervention. They must
point to evidence. Otherwise, plaintiﬀs are entitled to retroactive relief to vindicate their rights violations. Unlike under the non-retroactivity frameworks,
claims of general reliance on “old” law will not suﬃce.
It is worth highlighting how the laches and acquiescence defenses under the
right-of-action framework diﬀer, in particular, from the “equitable considerations” employed under the remedial framework. 444 The remedial framework
seeks to delineate retroactive remedies based on the foreseeability or predictability of legal change. Unpredictable changes in the law provide a basis for denying
retroactive relief under that framework. Yet, since unpredictability is an objective
inquiry, the remedial framework can only ever capture too much or too little.
Either a legal change is considered unpredictable, in which case everyone—including those with pending cases seeking the legal change—must be denied
441.

See Kuo, supra note 209, at 896 (“O�en, unconstitutional taxes are a substantial source of
revenue for many states.”).

442.

L.S. Tellier, Annotation, What Constitutes Laches Barring Right to Relief in Taxpayers’ Action, 71
A.L.R.2d 529 (1960). Laches and acquiescence typically do not, however, apply against the
government, and so the doctrine may not provide protection to taxpayer defendants in cases
such as South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). See 30A C.J.S. Equity § 144
(2020).
443. See Beswick, supra note 356, at 150-54, 158-60 (critiquing how a rule to this eﬀect has distorted
doctrine and parties’ incentives to a dramatic extent in England); see also Gonzalez v. Crosby,
545 U.S. 524, 536-37 (2005) (noting that a change in the law of limitation does not in and of
itself constitute extraordinary circumstances to justify vacating order denying habeas corpus
petition, and that the petitioner had shown a “lack of diligence in pursuing review of the statute-of-limitations issue” in his case); Cabarga-Cruz v. Fundacion Educativa Ana G. Mendez,
Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1207, 1210 n.2 (D.P.R. 1985) (“The foresight on the development of the law
required of litigants in the retroactivity analysis is equally applicable to those who would justify a late amendment to pleadings on the need to incorporate a recent legal development or
change. They should at least be diligent in detecting the possibility of change in the law so as
to minimize the hardship and prejudice on the other parties that a late amendment will
cause.”), aﬀ ’d, 822 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1987).
444. Supra Section II.D.
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retroactive relief, or the fact that there is novel litigation seeking legal change
renders such change foreseeable and predicable, in which case (if successful) all
claimants ought to be entitled to retroactive relief—regardless of how proactive
they have been in pursuing their rights. The remedial framework produces a
one-size-ﬁts-all outcome. So even if this framework could coherently identify
legal issues warranting a non-retroactive response (which, for the reasons discussed in Section II.D, is doubtful), it cannot diﬀerentiate between parties deserving of (non-)retroactive relief. The doctrines of laches and acquiescence, by
contrast, do not depend on the predictability of legal change or the date an appellate court happens to hand down a novel judgment. They depend on the extent of claimants’ delays between the event(s) complained of and the date(s) of
ﬁling suit. Those who ﬁle suit promptly have a more compelling claim for retroactive relief than do those who sit on their rights.
While the right-of-action framework is attuned to the rights and interests of
parties before adjudicating courts, that does not mean it is unreceptive to brightline interpretations of what amounts to laches or acquiescence in complex litigation. Where defendants face suit on multiple fronts in respect of similar events
or complaints (as is the case, for example, in litigation concerning the compulsory deduction of union agency fees), it may well be appropriate, and indeed
inevitable, that precedents emerge as to what is unreasonable delay in respect of
the defendants’ conduct. Such precedents would not do so by reference to a speciﬁc date, as the non-retroactivity frameworks are wont to do. They would establish, instead, a time period within which delay in ﬁling suit would be considered reasonable (e.g., within X months from when a plaintiﬀ ’s right of action
accrued or ripened), and beyond which claims would be treated as time-barred.
This would enable successive claimants to identify the scope of their legally enforceable claims without having to litigate each afresh.
b. Objections and Responses
Some of the cases in which courts have employed non-retroactive adjudication likely fall beyond the traditional scope of the doctrines of laches and acquiescence. But that does not mean the doctrines are irrelevant. Even leaving their
doctrinal bounds intact, laches and acquiescence could usefully be employed by
analogy in appropriate cases. That is to say, the law could take the lead from equity. 445 In cases where courts previously might have turned to non-retroactivity
doctrine, they could instead turn to the principle that underlies these equitable
doctrines, namely, that remedying promptly prosecuted harms should be prioritized over remedying those that are brought a�er signiﬁcant delay. Claimants
445.
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W.M.C. GUMMOW, CHANGE AND CONTINUITY: STATUTE, EQUITY, AND FEDERALISM 38 (1999).
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ought to pursue their rights vigilantly. If (successive) claimants prefer to hold
back and wait to see whether the law develops favorably in other (principal) parties’ cases, they ought to bear the risk of delay—just as principal parties bear risk
when litigating novel rights. Courts have not resiled from fashioning non-retroactivity doctrine along largely amorphous “equitable considerations.” These considerations might be more normatively persuasive were they aligned with established equitable principles. 446
Alternatively, the formal doctrines of laches and acquiescence 447 could be developed to meet this context. 448 Admittedly, doing so would face a number of
objections. But each, as the remainder of this Section shows, can be overcome.
The ﬁrst objection is that, if laches were more liberally employed, claimants
would never know ex ante whether a court was going to deem them out of time.
Claims might be rejected for delay though they are brought within the prescribed limitations period. The answer, although cold comfort to claimants, is
that courts will balance the respective prejudices to parties when weighing
whether to invoke the equitable defense. Fortunately, courts have centuries of
doctrine and principle to call upon to guide their discretion and moderate arbitrariness. That is more than what they have had to navigate the discretionary
quagmire of non-retroactivity doctrine (a doctrine that is vulnerable to the same
objection).
The second objection targets the idea that a suit ﬁled within a statutory limitations period could nevertheless be dismissed for “unreasonable” delay. This
issue has long divided courts. Some contend that laches can never bar relief for
a claim ﬁled within the limitations period. 449 But the better view is that it can.450
446.

This is not to suggest that analogizing to the doctrines of laches and acquiescence to constrain
rights of action would be without objection. Flexibility begets uncertainty. In particular, the
ﬁrst and ﬁ�h objections that follow would also apply if courts reasoned by analogy to laches
and acquiescence.
447. The remainder of this Section discusses laches, but the discussion should be assumed to encompass acquiescence also. See supra note 423 (noting that acquiescence is o�en subsumed
into laches).
448.

See Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530, 587-89 (2016)
(postulating that the system of equitable remedies could be reformed to make rules such as
laches explicitly functional).
449. Thomas G. Robinson, Laches in Federal Substantive Law: Relation to Statutes of Limitations, 56
B.U. L. REV. 970, 973-74 (1976) (“[T]he federally developed laches doctrine applies only to
those claims based upon federal equitable or maritime rights for which Congress has neglected to establish a limitations period.”).
450. STEPHEN A. SMITH, RIGHTS, WRONGS, AND INJUSTICES: THE STRUCTURE OF REMEDIAL LAW
312-14 (2020) (suggesting that resort to laches may be justiﬁed, even within a limitations period, in cases where the burden of complying with a court order increases over time); Bray,
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Laches would be a toothless instrument for guarding against unreasonable prejudice if it could not bar relief within the limitations period.
The Supreme Court considered the relationship between laches and limitations in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. and held that laches can be invoked
notwithstanding a limitations statute. 451 Admittedly, the majority opinion was
circumspect on this point. Justice Ginsburg for the Court thought there was “little place” for laches in a regime of statutory limitations periods, 452 and she conﬁned her holding to claims for “equitable relief, in extraordinary circumstances.” 453 Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion, however, more expansively
rejoined that Congress enacts limitations statutes against the background of
common law and equity, 454 and that the place for laches remains “an important
one”: “In those few and unusual cases where a plaintiﬀ unreasonably delays in
bringing suit and consequently causes inequitable harm to the defendant, the
doctrine permits a court to bring about a fair result.” 455 Prima facie, then, it is no
suﬃcient retort that a limitations statute is extant.
A third and formidable objection is that, according to the Supreme Court in
Petrella and SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC,
laches, being “a defense developed by courts of equity,” “cannot be invoked to
bar legal relief.” 456 In other words, laches is only a defense “to claims of an equitable cast.” 457

supra note 424, at 17 (arguing that for equitable claims, “absent a clear statutory abrogation,
laches should be allowed even where there is a statute of limitations since Congress is presumed to legislate against the backdrop of traditional equitable principles”).
451. 572 U.S. 663, 667-68 (2014); see Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68
VAND. L. REV. 997, 1035 (2015); Bray, supra note 448, at 585.
452. Petrella, 572 U.S. at 685.
453.
454.
455.

Id. at 667.
Id. at 694 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

Id. at 700.
Petrella, 572 U.S. at 678, applied in SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby
Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954, 960 (2017) (noting that laches is not a defense against damages
for patent infringement); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 70 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“[Laches] applies only to a suit for equitable relief.”);
Bray, supra note 448, at 535, 548 (noting—without commenting on whether equitable constraints such as laches “would never be useful for legal remedies”—that “it is the blackletter
law of the vast majority of jurisdictions that laches is an equitable defense good against equitable claims, but not against legal claims”).
457. Petrella, 572 U.S. at 678.
456.
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Whether equitable defenses can bar legal claims has long been a matter of
contest within courts. 458 Equitable remedies (such as injunctions) are historically, formally, and functionally distinct from legal remedies (such as damages). 459 The Court’s holding in Petrella presents a barrier for cases in which legal
remedies (like damages) are sought in the wake of new law. There are, however,
four ways courts might overcome this barrier to preserve the use of laches in such
cases:
(1) O�en the monetary remedies sought in this context are restitutionary
rather than compensatory. 460 Federal and state courts have long blurred
the distinction between legal restitution and equitable restitution. 461
The Restatement (Third) largely dismisses the distinction as “ambiguous.” 462 Thus, while taxonomically inelegant, it is open to courts to cast
restitutionary claims as equitable in nature and therefore subject to the
equitable doctrine of laches.
(2) Claims brought in the wake of new federal law are typically constitutional in nature. They arise from statutes being struck down, new constitutional rights being articulated, or old constitutional principles being
reinterpreted. Constitutional remedies characteristically fall short of
458.

See T. Leigh Anenson, Equitable Defenses in the Age of Statutes, 36 REV. LITIG. 659, 698 (2018)
(“A modern issue for equitable defenses, particularly those like laches and unclean hands that
operated exclusively against equitable relief, is whether they may be extended to bar actions
seeking damages.”); T. Leigh Anenson, Statutory Interpretation, Judicial Discretion, and Equitable Defenses, 79 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 5 n.9 (2017) [hereina�er Anenson, Statutory Interpretation]
(noting “the Federal Circuit divided over the scope of laches” in SCA Hygiene Products, 137 S.
Ct. 954); Bray, supra note 448, at 546(noting some states “allow[] one or more of the equitable
defenses to be applied to all claims for legal relief”).
459. See IRIT SAMET, EQUITY: CONSCIENCE GOES TO MARKET 28-42 (2018); cf. SMITH, supra note
450, at 31, 312 (arguing “that it is possible to describe and explain both (so-called) Legal remedies and (so-called) Equitable remedies on the basis of the same principles,” and yet defending the distinction in the laches context on the basis that “delays in seeking speciﬁc relief [e.g.,
injunctions] typically prejudice defendants more signiﬁcantly than delays in seeking non-speciﬁc relief [e.g., damages]”).
460. See Burbank, supra note 90, at 351 (conceiving of illegal exaction cases as giving rise to “a
restitution remedy . . . when the government unlawfully requires or demands money or property, regardless of the basis for that illegality”).
461.

See Tracy A. Thomas, Justice Scalia Reinvents Restitution, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1063, 1063 (2003)
(“Equitable restitution is unrecognizable in recent Supreme Court decisions.”); Note, The Intellectual History of Unjust Enrichment, 133 HARV. L. REV. 2077, 2094-95 (2020) (discussing
American courts’ confusion about unjust enrichment’s place in equity and law).

462.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
2011); see also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 3-36, 82-84
(1991) (approving courts’ willingness and tendency to skirt antiquated divisions between law
and equity).
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making victims of rights violations whole. This right-remedy gap is well
acknowledged and is accepted by many scholars as a feature of courts’
inherent equitable discretion to grant, withhold, or tailor backwardlooking relief in constitutional cases. 463 Recourse to equitable defenses,
including laches, in such cases would therefore seem acceptable.
(3) Even in cases where the monetary relief requested is clearly legal in nature, the Supreme Court’s holdings in Petrella and SCA Hygiene—that
equitable defenses cannot bar legal claims—need not necessarily apply
across the board. Petrella was a copyright-infringement case, and SCA
Hygiene a patent-infringement case. Copyright and patent infringement
each typically concern ongoing harms. A case-speciﬁc court order may
be the only way to prevent a defendant’s ongoing infringement. These
cases could be distinguished from new-law cases, in which continuing
unlawful conduct typically ends once an authoritative judgment determining the law is handed down. The primary concern in new-law cases
is how to respond to past conduct, not to ongoing conduct. There remains a useful role for laches to play in such cases.
(4) More boldly, the Court could venture to revise its “new equity” jurisprudence464 and endorse the minority opinion in Petrella: that there is no
“general rule” barring “laches in actions for legal relief,” and in

463.

Jeﬀries, supra note 320, at 91; see Anenson, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 458, at 38 (“[A]n
equitable analysis subordinates private law to public right.”); Michael Coenen, Right-Remedy
Equilibration and the Asymmetric Entrenchment of Legal Entitlements, 61 B.C. L. REV. 129, 132-38
(2020) (cautioning that the right-remedy gap will tend to expand over time, since it is easier
for judges to limit legal entitlements than it is to promote them, and identifying strategies for
overcoming the asymmetry); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and
Remedies—and Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 683-89 (2006) (arguing that courts equilibrate their doctrines of justiciability, substantive rights, and remedies
so as to achieve overall desirable outcomes); John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s
Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1121, 1166 (1996)
(arguing that courts should determine claims of constitutional violation but defer the remedial response to the states, the executive branch, and the Congress); see also Hanoch Dagan &
Avihay Dorfman, Substantive Remedies, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 36-39) (on ﬁle with author) (discussing a tort doctrine of “crushing liability” that
can operate ex post to excuse defendants from the disproportionate burden of full remedial
relief).

464.

See Bray, supra note 451; see also Anenson, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 458, at 4 (“Equitable defenses . . . have been resurrected. The Supreme Court is raising the dead in recent decisions.”); James Fullmer, The Outer Limits of Equity: A Proposal for Cautious Expansion, 39
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 557, 568 (2016) (“A�er hundreds of years of judicial evolution, equitable remedies are hardly experimental or dangerous such that they should be tools of last
resort.”).
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appropriate cases—whether legal or equitable—it ought to be available
as a defense. 465
Accordingly, the objection based on the law/equity distinction is not insurmountable.
Fourth, there is authority for the proposition that delay may be excused until
the state of the law clearly favors a claimant’s case. The Equity chapter of the
Corpus Juris Secundum states that “[d]elay for the purpose of awaiting a change
of previously unfavorable law is a reasonable delay for the purposes of laches,
and does not constitute a lack of diligence.” 466 Moreover, “[t]he pendency of legal proceedings may excuse a delay in instituting a subsequent suit involving the
same subject matter.” 467 This is bad law and bad policy. As a matter of law, it is
inconsistent with two principles also recorded in the Corpus Juris Secundum.
First, that “[i]gnorance of one’s legal rights is not a reasonable excuse in a laches
case.” 468 Second, that delay is determined from when the right of action accrued,
became ripe, or was discoverable. Delay is calculated from “the earliest time at
which plaintiﬀs were able to bring their claims.” 469 It is incontrovertible that
claims may reasonably be brought despite an unfavorable state of the law. It is
only through bringing novel claims that novel law can develop. 470 As a matter of
policy, excusing such delay encourages claimants to sit back on their rights in the
hopes of beneﬁtting from others who pursue theirs. It discourages claimants
from pursuing their rights vigilantly. 471 This contravenes the very essence of the
equitable doctrine. The authority on this point thus warrants skeptical review.
A ﬁ�h objection is that in many cases the defendant’s complaint will stem
not from delay as such, but from the mounting and seemingly disproportionate
claims brought against it in light of new law. Is delay not being used as a proxy
465.

Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S 663, 697 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he Court has said more than once that a defendant could invoke laches in an action for
damages . . . despite a ﬁxed statute of limitations.”).
466. 30A C.J.S. Equity § 150 (2020) (citing In re Beaty, 306 F.3d 914, 927 (9th Cir. 2002)).
467.

Id. § 166 (“[P]ending litigation excuses delay only where such litigation actually prevented
assertion of the plaintiﬀ ’s claim in a court of competent jurisdiction. . . . [D]elay pending the
decision of a test case is not excusable in the absence of an agreement to abide by the event.”).
468. Id. § 171.
469.
470.

471.

Id. § 151.
Supra Section III.A. Where plaintiﬀs ﬁle suit in the shadow of some ongoing principal litigation, a court may ﬁnd it appropriate to stay their proceedings pending the outcome of the
principal case. This is, for example, what the Supreme Court did in the American Trucking
litigation. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Gray, 483 U.S. 1014 (1987). In such circumstances, delay
is in the court’s hands. It is not the plaintiﬀs who are responsible for delay.
Cf. supra note 443 (collecting sources that criticize plaintiﬀs who waited for legal doctrine to
develop before pursuing their claims).
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for hardship in the same way reliance is used in non-retroactivity doctrine? The
short answer is that it is. But that does not sweep away the value of this construct.
Where prejudice to a defendant stems from mounting claims, 472 vigilance/indolence is the fairest metric for distinguishing meritorious and unmeritorious
claims. 473 Prima facie, the more prompt plaintiﬀs are to ﬁle suit, the more vigilant they are in pursuing their rights, and—relative to indolent plaintiﬀs—the
more deserving their claim for relief. 474
Sixth, what should be done in cases, such as American Trucking Ass’ns v.
Smith, in which plaintiﬀs ﬁle suit without delay? Recall that in Smith, the impugned HUE tax was enacted in March 1983, plaintiﬀs ﬁled suit in May 1983,
and the HUE Tax Act took eﬀect from July 1983. 475 While their appeal was pending, the Supreme Court in June 1987 delivered the favorable Scheiner judgment
on which the Smith plaintiﬀs then sought to rely. 476 In July 1990, the Smith
plaintiﬀs’ substantive claim succeeded before the U.S. Supreme Court. Yet, the
Supreme Court plurality denied the plaintiﬀs full retroactive relief on the basis
that the HUE Tax Act’s enactors had acted in “good faith” and that “equitable
considerations tilt[ed] the balance toward nonretroactive application” of
Scheiner. 477 It is not clear why Scheiner should bear upon the Smith plaintiﬀs’
case at all: the Smith plaintiﬀs had mounted their arguments in court against the
HUE tax well before Scheiner was decided. Their right of action had accrued in

472.

See SMITH, supra note 450, at 312-14 (describing laches as an appropriate response when the
burden of complying with a court order increases over time, although also assuming that the
burden of complying with monetary orders remains relatively constant over time).

473.

One might object that this metric favors sophisticated and well-resourced claimants over
those uninformed of their legal rights and those unable to pursue them. This objection is a
more fundamental critique of the civil-litigation system generally. As a matter of doctrine and
policy, impecuniosity does not normally excuse delay. See Leggett v. Standard Oil Co., 149
U.S. 287, 294 (1893) (“[A] party’s poverty or pecuniary embarrassment [is] not a suﬃcient
excuse for postponing the assertion of his rights.”); Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942,
954-55 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding, as part of laches determination, that a party’s delay was unreasonable despite his claims that he could not aﬀord to bring suit); 30A C.J.S. Equity § 165
(2020). This rule, however, operates less harshly in our era of class-action lawsuits and litigation funding. Plaintiﬀs in high-stakes litigation are o�en backed by well-resourced interested
organizations. For example, the American Civil Liberties Union brought suit on behalf of the
named claimants in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S 644 (2015), and the National Right to Work
Legal Defense Foundation and the Liberty Justice Center on behalf of the named claimants in
Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).

474.

The Court in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S 663, 668 (2014), averred that a
plaintiﬀ ’s delay can “be brought to bear at the remedial stage.”

475.

Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 206-07 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987); see Smith, 496 U.S. at 190 (plurality
opinion).
477. Smith, 496 U.S. at 181, 186 (plurality opinion).
476.
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1983 and was immediately pursued. (Indeed it is happenstance that the Supreme
Court held their appeal, rather than deciding it at the same time as, or instead
of, Scheiner. 478) In any event, Smith is hardly an exemplar for invoking equitable
defenses. The Smith plaintiﬀs, by immediately ﬁling suit, did everything they
could to protect themselves from what was ultimately held to be an unconstitutionally discriminatory tax. The burden of delay was not caused by the plaintiﬀs,
but by the drawn-out process of litigation. The defendants were on notice from
the outset that the constitutionality of the HUE Tax Act was under challenge. In
such circumstances, it hardly seems equitable that the plaintiﬀs should bear the
burden of paying the unconstitutional tax. Thus, according to this Article’s rightof-action framework, Smith was wrongly decided (the dissenting opinion was
right), 479 and it is not a case in which the equitable defense of laches could apply.
Defendants in such a case could, however, still grasp for the other temporal and
nontemporal limits on rights of action outlined in this Section.
Finally, might Smith not stay the exception but become the norm under the
right-of-action framework? A�er all, once plaintiﬀs are alerted to the risk that
laches might bar their claims, they will have an incentive to challenge legal rules
promptly to ensure that the opportunity to do so does not expire. This might
perpetuate opportunistic litigation of rights. A threefold response can be given
to this objection. First, parties are unlikely to challenge the validity of legal rules
(and of actions taken under those rules) where they have no plausible grounds
to believe that the rules are in some way legally invalid. Unsuccessful plaintiﬀs
would bear the cost and, without an arguable case, would face dismissal for failure to state a claim. Second, since parties already have an incentive to challenge
potentially invalid rules, making way for a laches defense would only marginally
aﬀect timing incentives. Third, it would be a good thing if the consequence is to
encourage early litigation over potentially invalid legal rules. It is better for all
parties, and particularly for states and governmental authorities, to know earlier
rather than later whether their rules are good law. It is best that ultra vires laws
are identiﬁed as soon as possible so that those responsible may redress and correct them. The drastic circumstances of the English tax-restitution cases, which

478.

See supra note 244 and accompanying text; see also Schaefer, supra note 254, at 645 (arguing
that the application of “new” law should not hinge on what stage a case happens to have
reached in the judicial system).
479. Smith, 496 U.S. at 212 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Arkansas HUE tax also violated the
Constitution before our decision in Scheiner and petitioners are entitled to a decision to that
eﬀect. . . . Petitioners would have prevailed if the Pennsylvania tax invalidated in the Scheiner
case had never been enacted, or if that litigation had not reached our Court until a�er their
litigation did. They should not lose simply because we decided Scheiner ﬁrst.”).
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exposed three decades of past-paid taxes to protracted litigation, should be
avoided. 480
4. Stay of Judgment
A ﬁnal temporal limit that courts can impose is staying entry of judgment.481
This defers a successful plaintiﬀ ’s opportunity to obtain a remedy until a future
date, which can provide time for a legislature to recalibrate relevant rights and
obligations (within constitutional bounds) in the interim period in a way that
may bear upon the plaintiﬀ ’s ultimate position. Critique of the judiciousness and
constitutionality of stays of judgment is beyond the scope of this Article.
5. Nontemporal Defenses
In addition to time-oriented limits, a number of “pre-existing, separate, independent rule[s]” may also limit rights of action. 482 These include doctrines of
sovereign immunity, 483 qualiﬁed immunity, 484 a good-faith defense to

480.

See supra Section II.E.2.
481. E.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 970 (Mass. 2003) (staying entry of
a judgment recognizing a state constitutional right of same-sex marriage for 180 days); see
Rhodes, supra note 4, at 415-16.
482.

Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 756 (1995); see South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.,
138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018).

483.

See Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise in Constitutional Adjudication: The Eleventh
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 953, 983-84 (2000); Vicki
C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 569-72 (2003); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 83-84 (1988); Roosevelt, supra
note 28, at 1136.

484.

See Reynoldsville Casket, 514 U.S. at 757-59. Although this doctrine, too, is highly problematic.
Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualiﬁed Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797
(2018); see Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862, 1862-65 (2020) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (criticizing the Court’s denial of certiorari on the question of
whether the doctrine of qualiﬁed immunity should be narrowed or abolished); Alan K. Chen,
The Intractability of Qualiﬁed Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1937, 1941-51 (2018).
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constitutional torts, 485 forfeiture, 486 estoppel, 487 procedural default, 488 change
of position, 489 and passing on, 490 as well as the other justiciability doctrines such
as standing. 491 Again, analysis of these various limits is beyond this Article’s
scope.
C. Summary
The right-of-action framework requires timely complaints to be resolved according to the adjudicating court’s best understanding of the law. This encompasses relevant novel precedent. But whether a complaint remains timely must
be understood in the context of established defenses and limits on rights of action. The right-of-action framework maintains the burden on plaintiﬀs to investigate and pursue their rights vigilantly. It incentivizes prompt litigation of novel
rights by empowering courts, in exceptional cases where equity demands, to
protect defendants from the prejudicial consequences of undue delay. Unlike
non-retroactivity doctrine, it does not excuse parties who are caught oﬀ guard
by novel precedent. For instance, the right-of-action framework rejects Justice
Stevens’s characterization of Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson as a “special” case in which
“[i]t would have been most inequitable to have held that the plaintiﬀ had ‘slept

485.

See supra note 336. Although, for the same reasons the Smith plurality judgment can be criticized, invoking “good faith” to bar relief in pending suits is dubious. See Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at i, Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty & Mun. Emps., No. 19-1104 (Mar. 10, 2020)
(presenting the question of whether there is a “good faith defense” to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in cases
of new law); William Baude, Is Qualiﬁed Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 55-62
(2018); Schwartz, supra note 484, 1801-03, 1814. See also, in the context of criminal-procedure
violations by government, Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 254 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting), which states that “[a] new ‘good faith’ exception and this Court’s retroactivity decisions
are incompatible.” Cf. Beske, supra note 20, at 679-81 (discussing the relevance of retroactivity
doctrine to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule’s “good-faith” exception).

486.

See Beske, supra note 20, at 681-87.
See Andrew Robertson, Reliance and Expectation in Estoppel Remedies, 18 LEGAL STUD. 360, 36162 (1998).
488. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Light from Dead Stars: The Procedural Adequate and Independent State
Ground Reconsidered, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1888, 1889 (2003).
489. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 65 (AM. LAW INST.
2011).
490. See id. § 64.
487.

491.

See Erin F. Delaney, Analyzing Avoidance: Judicial Strategy in Comparative Perspective, 66 DUKE
L.J. 1, 16-28 (2016).
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on his rights’ during a period in which neither he nor the defendant could have
known the time limitation that applied to the case.” 492
It is not correct that the parties could not have known their respective rights
and obligations under law prior to the day the Supreme Court handed down its
novel decision in Rodrigue, or that “[t]he most [Huson] could do was to rely on
the law as it then was.” 493 Huson gained a right of action the day he was injured
on Chevron Oil’s drilling rig. He had reason to seek legal advice from that date.
That he did not anticipate that state limitations law governed his claim, and that
Chevron Oil did not think to argue it, does not take away from the reality that
had Huson ﬁled his claim within one year of his injury, there would have been
no question as to its timeliness. Rodrigue did not abolish Huson’s right of action.
It may be that Huson’s claim could have been saved by some other independent
doctrine. 494 But that doctrine should not have been non-retroactivity.
Invoking established equitable principles such as laches—either directly or
by analogy—is a preferable response to new law than the amorphous “equitable
considerations” that underlie judicial non-retroactivity doctrine. Even radical
shi�s in precedent, as evinced in Obergefell and Janus, bear on past rights. The
timing of such judgments does not determine which same-sex couples suﬀered
rights violations when they were denied the beneﬁts of marriage, or which public-sector employees suﬀered rights violations when they were compulsorily
charged agency fees. Rather, the timing of those rights violations determines
whether such plaintiﬀs can still have their day in court. This is the key point that
distinguishes the right-of-action framework from the alternatives.
The right-of-action framework outlined in this Article eschews the non-retroactivity paradigm. It distinguishes cases according to when rights of action accrued and prioritizes remedying the most recent-in-time harms over those that
are brought a�er delay. It does not divorce rights from remedies by reference to

492.

Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 220 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 108 (1971)); see also Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis &
Petrigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 370-74 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (endorsing
the Court’s previous practice of applying new judicially determined limitations periods nonretroactively as a matter of fairness, justiﬁed reliance, and due process); id. at 377 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for adopting an approach to limitations that the plaintiﬀs could not have anticipated and with which they could not have complied); David N.
Mark, Retroactivity of Statute of Limitations Rulings Under the Inﬂuence of Jim Beam, 29 IDAHO
L. REV. 361, 365 (1992) (arguing that “retroactivity of statute of limitations rulings should still
be decided under the Chevron Oil three-factor equitable test”).
493. Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 107; see supra Section II.B.2; cf. Beske, supra note 20, at 690-92.
494.
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The Court could, for instance, have held Chevron Oil was estopped from introducing a late
limitations defense. See Rhodes, supra note 4, at 420-23.
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an arbitrary date that a signiﬁcant novel precedent is handed down. 495 It does
not hinge on courts distinguishing between pending and subsequent cases. And
it embodies an important value in our legal system: that equity aids the vigilant.
conclusion
Non-retroactive adjudication fails to construe rights and remedies in a manner that does justice to parties. Its assumptions are ﬂawed. 496 Its foundations—
fairness, reliance, eﬃciency, and ﬁnality—are manipulable. 497 And perhaps most
concerningly, it risks collapsing into a crude policy tool, whereby from case to
case either retroactivity or prospectivity is favored merely to achieve the decisionmaker’s preferred outcome. 498 Non-retroactivity doctrine does not satisfactorily rationalize the temporal scope of novel precedent.
The Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence, which recognizes a strong presumption of adjudicative retroactivity, is but one step removed from the rightof-action framework. The Court should take the ﬁnal step by collapsing the presumption into acceptance. The right-of-action framework is coherent and compelling because it recognizes that novel precedent, like all precedent, is inherently
retroactive. Whether “new” law applies to a given case depends on the justiciability of the plaintiﬀ ’s right of action. Only if justice demands it should equitable
doctrines, such as laches, interfere to curtail plaintiﬀs from vindicating their judicially recognized rights. By reconceptualizing the puzzle of novel precedent in
these terms, we solve it.

495.

Cf. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1794-97 (arguing that retroactive remedies can be withheld when new rules would have been unpredictable).

496.

See supra Part II.
497. See Chen, supra note 6, at 1435; Stephens, supra note 31, at 1560-61.
498.

See Chen, supra note 6, at 1450-51. Similar concerns permeate the temporality of new rules of
criminal law and procedure. See supra note 61. They are also salient in so-called “judicial takings” cases. See Eduardo M. Peñalver & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Judicial Takings or Due Process?,
97 CORNELL L. REV. 305, 331-33 (2012).
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